No he never. Also you need to look at US Vs Miller. The only way you can regulate a weapon is to prove that it would not be used in connection with a militia or the military.
Scalia in Heller: We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
The 7th circuit opinion:
Heller holds that a law banning the possession of handguns
in the home (or making their use in the home infeasible)
violates the individual right to keep and bear arms secured
by the Second Amendment. But the Court added that
this is not a “right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever
in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554
U.S. at 626. It cautioned against interpreting the decision to
cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions”, including the
“historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous
and unusual weapons’”.
Plaintiffs ask us to distinguish machine guns from semiautomatic
weapons on the ground that the latter are commonly
owned for lawful purposes. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
This does not track the way Heller distinguished United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): The Court took from Miller the
rule that the Second Amendment does not authorize private
persons to possess weapons such as machine guns and
sawed‐off shotguns that the government would not expect
(or allow) citizens to bring with them when the militia is
called to service.
Plaintiffs ask us to distinguish machine guns from semiautomatic
weapons on the ground that the latter are commonly
owned for lawful purposes. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
This does not track the way Heller distinguished United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): The Court took from Miller the
rule that the Second Amendment does not authorize private
persons to possess weapons such as machine guns and
sawed‐off shotguns that the government would not expect
(or allow) citizens to bring with them when the militia is
called to service. During Prohibition the Thompson submachine
gun (the “Tommy gun”) was all too common in Chicago,
but that popularity didn’t give it a constitutional immunity
from the federal prohibition enacted in 1934. (The Tommy
gun is a machine gun, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §921(23)
and 26 U.S.C. §5845(b), and generally forbidden by 18 U.S.C.
§922(a)(4), because it fires multiple rounds with a single pull
of the trigger; like the Uzi it is called a “submachine gun” to
indicate that it is smaller and more mobile than other machine
guns. The AK‐47 and AR‐15 (M16) rifles in military use
also are submachine guns, though civilian versions are restricted
to semi‐automatic fire.) Both Heller and Miller contemplated
that the weapons properly in private hands for
militia use might change through legal regulation as well as
innovation by firearms manufacturers.
And relying on how common a weapon is at the time of
litigation would be circular to boot. Machine guns aren’t
commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they
are illegal; semi‐automatic weapons with large‐capacity
magazines are owned more commonly because, until recently
(in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it would
be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon
can be banned is that there is a statute banning that it, so that
it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be the
source of its own constitutional validity.
