UN to let IRAN inspect its self! Great Job Kerry and Obama!!
- Thread starter SIXERS24
- Start date
Additionally,
Surprise Inspections require 24 days worth of notice and cannot include military bases.
And, as the article says, the IAEA will monitor the inspectors. You also seem to forget that Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, the EU and the United Nations all signed off on the agreement. Nice wingnut faux outrage though.
Not sure why you feel comfortable with this?? It is a crappy agreement for us.
“Particularly troublesome, you have to wait 24 days before you can inspect.”
–Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), speaking to reporters about the international nuclear agreement with Iran, Aug. 10, 2015
“At non-designated sites it will take 24 days to get an inspection.”
–Schumer, speaking to reporters, Aug. 11
Sometimes a single word can make a difference in a lot of Pinocchios.
The first statement by Schumer—who has emerged as an important opponent of the nuclear deal reached with Iran—was sent to The Fact Checker by a reader who thought it was wildly misleading. The second statement was provided by Schumer’s staff as a counterexample.
What difference does insertion of the word “non-designated” make? And does the agreement really say no inspections can happen for 24 days?
The Facts
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated between Iran and six world powers, is a lengthy and complex document. That means it is open to interpretation and debate –and advocates and opponents can twist meanings.
But it is clear that Iran’s declared nuclear sites, such as the Natanz uraninum encirchment facility, will be under continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency –and the IAEA would have immediate access. Under the deal, for 10 years Iran will have limits on the enrichment permitted at Natanz; the IAEA will be able to keep close tabs on the production. That’s why our reader was outraged by Schumer’s first statement, which suggested that inspectors couldn’t go anywhere in Iran until a 24-day clock had ended.
Indeed, the JCPOA even allows IAEA monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge production and storage facilities, the procurement chain, and mining and milling of uranium—verification measures that many experts say exceed previous negotiated nuclear deals.
The issue involves the question of what to do if the IAEA learns of suspicious activity at an undeclared site. The IAEA can demand instant access—but Iran could refuse. So the JCPOA sets up a process to resolve the stand-off, described in a 29-page document known as Annex 1.
First, there’s a 14-day period for negotiations. If nothing is resolved, the matter is brought to a Joint Commission under which five of eight members could force Iran to open the facility to inspectors. (The members of the commission are representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, European Union, China, Russia and Iran.) There’s a seven-day limit on Joint Commission consultations. If the Joint Commission orders Iran to open the facility, Iran has three days to comply—or face a “snapback” of sanctions. The process is supposed to remain in place for 15 years.
Add it up—14 plus 7 plus 3—and you get 24 days. But that’s the maximum, not the minimum, as Schumer seems to suggest in both statements.
Ironically, this provision was added to remove a loophole in an enhanced IAEA inspections regime known as the Additional Protocol, which Iran has agreed to accept. The Additional Protocol requires access to suspect sites in 24 hours, but it does not have immediate consequences for a nation that refuses to permit access. The JCPOA’s 24-day provision is intended to close that loophole.
Many nuclear proliferation experts think it’s actually a useful provision, intended to halt, within a certain time frame, disputes about right of access that have hampered earlier nuclear accords. Without something to close this loophole, given Iran’s history of blocking and misleading IAEA inspectors, the negotiations likely would have collapsed.
But the 24-day clock also has many critics. Former weapons inspector David Albright, who has remained neutral on the Iran deal, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that with Iran’s long history of hiding its nuclear activities, “24 days could be enough time, presumably, for Iran to relocate undeclared activities that are in violation of the JCPOA while it undertakes sanitization activities that would not necessarily leave a trace in environmental sampling.”
Albright, who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, noted that in the past Iran was able to stretch out disputes over access for more than 24 days, but over time Iran has gained “extensive practice at defeating IAEA and U.S. detection methods.”
Albright said that this provision could be strengthened if the IAEA made clear it would expect access within 24 hours, as indicated in the Additional Protocol. If Iran started to slow things down, then the United States and its partners could begin to “slow nuclear cooperation and approvals of exports to Iran via the procurement channel.” In other words, pressure would start from the first day: “Iran should get a message that prompt access is required under the Additional Protocol, despite the language in the JCPOA.”
Albright has been trying to convince lawmakers to make this clear in separate legislation. “Those who oppose the deal do not like the approach of fixing weaknesses because it quickly devolves to them implicitly endorsing the deal or risking doing so,” he told The Fact Checker. “So, my approach will be more appealing to opponents once the vote is over.”
Matt House, a spokesman for Schumer, said: “If Iran is going to cheat, it will not be at a declared site with inspectors and the eyes of the world watching. Instead, it will be at a non-designated site, and if Iran is going through the trouble of cheating at a non-designated site, of course they will delay inspections as long as possible to avoid being caught. Inspections at non-designated sites are where the rubber meets the road, and the fact that Iran can drag out inspections for 24 days is absolutely a key factor when weighing the merits of the deal.”
The Pinocchio Test
In an issue as important as this, it’s important to get the details right. Schumer should not leave some audiences with the impression that the agreement only allows inspections after 24 days, even at non-designated sites. That’s the maximum period. As Albright noted there are ways to ramp up the pressure fairly quickly, given that access is expected after 24 hours under the Additional Protocol.
It’s also important to recognize that this provision was intended to strengthen the system of enhanced inspections and limit Iran’s ability to hide unauthorized activities. It was the product of negotiations, and so experts may differ as to whether it falls short.
But in the meantime Schumer needs to be more careful with his language. A failure to mention that this provision related to undeclared sites is worthy of Three Pinocchios, while a failure to acknowledge that 24 days is the maximum period of time is about One Pinocchio. So we’re going to average it at Two.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...about-24-days-before-you-can-inspect-in-iran/
No it doesn't.
From the article.
"That wording suggests that - beyond being barred from physically visiting the site - the agency won't even get photo or video information from areas Iran says are off-limits because they have military significance."
It seems clear to me that by now Obama is deliberately putting the screws to this country. No one could be this bad by accident one would have to be trying to achieve this level of ineptness.
BHO would have done anything to get an agreement to add to his legacy of failure, this is the definition of " any where, any time" to liberals
Barack's Muslim advisor, Valerie Jarrett, is smiling from her private residence in the White House.
So who's the REAL JV team?
So who's the REAL JV team?
Don't you know? It's not about what he's done/doing to the US. It's about destabilizing regions around the world so it can fall into bedlam and chaos sometime after January 2017, when he has an opening in his schedule to come riding in on a white...eerrr...black horse and save the day. (Sarcasm abounds)
Those sneaky Iranians.
They are way more intelligent than us 'Mericans. They can with all our technology watching them be able to move an entire nuclear program from one location to another with out being detected in less than 24 days. Simply amazing.
They are way more intelligent than us 'Mericans. They can with all our technology watching them be able to move an entire nuclear program from one location to another with out being detected in less than 24 days. Simply amazing.
Faux outrage? Really? This coming from the king of misleading faux outrage cut and paste articles.
Actually they don't have to move it, if it is considered a "militarily sensitive area".
All inspectors(who aren't Iranian) are barred from those areas.
If you want to assess the level of actual concern with this deal and the inspection parameters, etc., don't listen to what the politicians say; listen to what the military and security guys say. Particularly, what Israel's military and security guys are saying and doing...
So, you can be a 'stooge' to the political rhetoric being bantered about, or you can look at the actual actions being taken by those formally responsible for the military security of their nations.
Now, in a fresh sign of a debate, the Israel Defense Forces has made public a 33-page overview of its strategic doctrine that raised eyebrows in Israel last week for barely mentioning Iran or its nuclear program.
Entitled simply, “IDF Strategy,” and authored by the chief of staff, Lt. Gen Gadi Eisenkot, the paper is a dry, dispassionate assessment of changing threats, military goals, and guiding principles for warfare. It marks the first time the army has ever released such a report to the public.
“It's not a secret that some high-ranking people in the Israeli security establishment, including the IDF, view this deal more favorably than the prime minister,’’ says Amir Tibon, diplomatic correspondent for “Walla!,” an Israeli news website. “On the one hand, they think that the deal does indeed push Iran away from the bomb, which is a good thing. On the other hand, they share Netanyahu’s concern about Iran using sanctions relief money to increase its support for terror proxies across the region.’’
...
Asked to comment on the strategy document, a senior Israeli military official cautioned against jumping to conclusions about the army’s positions on the Iran deal. However, other Israeli defense analysts say the omissions weren’t a coincidence.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Midd...-New-signs-military-is-at-odds-with-NetanyahuEntitled simply, “IDF Strategy,” and authored by the chief of staff, Lt. Gen Gadi Eisenkot, the paper is a dry, dispassionate assessment of changing threats, military goals, and guiding principles for warfare. It marks the first time the army has ever released such a report to the public.
“It's not a secret that some high-ranking people in the Israeli security establishment, including the IDF, view this deal more favorably than the prime minister,’’ says Amir Tibon, diplomatic correspondent for “Walla!,” an Israeli news website. “On the one hand, they think that the deal does indeed push Iran away from the bomb, which is a good thing. On the other hand, they share Netanyahu’s concern about Iran using sanctions relief money to increase its support for terror proxies across the region.’’
...
Asked to comment on the strategy document, a senior Israeli military official cautioned against jumping to conclusions about the army’s positions on the Iran deal. However, other Israeli defense analysts say the omissions weren’t a coincidence.
So, you can be a 'stooge' to the political rhetoric being bantered about, or you can look at the actual actions being taken by those formally responsible for the military security of their nations.
You want us to feel better because those countries signed on to the deal?
France?
China?
Russia?
The EU?
What a joke.
It's not about moving an entire nuclear program. It's about moving what you don't want others to see.
Yes. They can move what they don't want inspectors to see even with our technology. It's not hard to hide what you're moving.
Oh....well, a stupid deal must be ok then. Face it, tons of cash, compliance testing with way too much cushion....the mullahs high-fived their hands bloody after the "deal."
Never over-estimate your enemy. The Russians did it in Afghanistan and got their ass kicked.
I don't think this is true. I've never seen anything saying Iran will be able to claim something is a military sensitive area to skirt inspections. Maybe you are referring to the inspections of the past work. That doesn't mean Iran can use the excuse for inspections of current sites.
LOL. What a tool. No onsite inspection of a site. Nice deal, Obama/Kerry.
"The agreement diverges from normal inspection procedures between the IAEA and a member country by essentially ceding the agency’s investigative authority to Iran. It allows Tehran to employ its own experts and equipment in the search for evidence for activities that it has consistently denied — trying to develop nuclear weapons...Olli Heinonen, who was in charge of the Iran probe as deputy IAEA director general from 2005 to 2010, said he can think of no instance where a country being probed was allowed to do its own investigation. Iran has refused access to Parchin for years and has denied any interest in — or work on — nuclear weapons. Based on U.S., Israeli and other intelligence and its own research, the IAEA suspects that the Islamic Republic may have experimented with high-explosive detonators for nuclear arms at that military facility and other weapons-related work elsewhere. The IAEA has repeatedly cited evidence, based on satellite images, of possible attempts to sanitize the site since the alleged work stopped more than a decade ago."
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guyben...o-inspect-itself-at-key-nuclear-site-n2041113
Even worse. It's like letting Lance Armstrong or Barry Bonds do their own drug testing. Incredible. You have to be a supreme partisan hack to go along with this deal.Iranian chief nuclear inspector:
Gee...you should probably notify the Israeli security and defense officials on this one....FORGET about harassing those poor gay folks trying to put two grooms on a wedding cake!!!! This is FAR more important for an internet link-jockey as reknowned as yourself!!!
And the Pope!!! You HAVE to write him and tell him how YOU know SO much more than he does about chemistry and climate! He is SO WRONG, and is screwing up the menu for Cafeteria Catholics like yourself!
Iran has refused access to Parchin for years and has denied any interest in — or work on — nuclear weapons. Based on US, Israeli and other intelligence and its own research, the IAEA suspects that the Islamic Republic may have experimented with high-explosive detonators for nuclear arms.
The IAEA has cited evidence, based on satellite images, of possible attempts to sanitize the site since the alleged work stopped more than a decade ago.
If you don't have uranium or plutonium, you can make as many 'detonators' as you like, but you won't be able to make a bomb. If this faux outrage is over a site that hasn't been 'up and running' in a decade, and DOES NOT have nuclear material handling or enrichment capability, it seems like a bunch of political nonsense to me....
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Midd...t-alleged-nuke-work-site-news-service-reports
What a dishonest twit. A typical Joeism, "look at the shiny object over here". You originally post something that has nothing to do with OP then ignore the fact that this "side deal" was done without the knowledge of the IDF. Way to go Joe. Why don't you dazzle us with one of you pretty charts to change the subject.Gee...you should probably notify the Israeli security and defense officials on this one....FORGET about harassing those poor gay folks trying to put two grooms on a wedding cake!!!! This is FAR more important for an internet link-jockey as reknowned as yourself!!!
And the Pope!!! You HAVE to write him and tell him how YOU know SO much more than he does about chemistry and climate! He is SO WRONG, and is screwing up the menu for Cafeteria Catholics like yourself!
LOL on your Pope comments. What does that have to do with anything? You just supported several fallacious arguments. Congratulations, nobody does it better than you do. Why don't you google pope comments about economics. Please tell me you understand that policy dealing with one affects the other. Oh wait, you don't even know the difference between supply and demand. Oh, and you continue to look like a boob because it's apparent you don't understand what the term cafeteria Catholic means. LOL.
BTW, how is your ark coming along? You better hurry up and get it finished, because the floods are coming from all the warming. "We're melting". LOL, you are such a tool, Obama's EPA policy reduces temps .01 degree over 50 years. Yippeee.
"But the terms of this particular agreement appear unusual. The IAEA has sought access to several sites, including an Iranian military complex at Parchin, for nearly a decade, in order to obtain answers to a set list of questions over the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.
Physical access will be denied, the report said, as will photo and video evidence of areas of several sites, to accommodate Iran’s “military concerns.”
“If this is the agreement, then it is absurd,” said Simon Henderson, a proliferation expert and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “If we are not confident that we know what Iran has done in the past, then we cannot accurately estimate how long it would take Iran to break out.”
The United States estimates that Iran’s current “breakout time” to a nuclear weapon – the time it would need to obtain enough fissile material for one bomb – is two to three months. The JCPOA aims to extend that breakout time to one year for roughly a decade.
“Unless non-Iranians do the inspecting, we won’t be confident,” Henderson continued, calling the development a “major, perhaps fatal, weakness” in the accord. “It is no good just considering breakout in terms of enriching enough material, in this case [highly enriched uranium], for a nuclear weapon.”
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Ir...ary-site-meets-demands-of-nuclear-deal-412689
FACT: Confidential Inspection Agreements Are Routine In Nuclear Arms Reduction Deals And Unrelated To U.S. Role In Inspections
Center On Arms Control And Non-Proliferation: Confidential Inspections Have Proven Trustworthy And Shield Informants Who Help Ensure Effective Inspections. According to the Center On Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP), bilateral confidential agreements like the one in the just-concluded Iran nuclear deal have featured in many nuclear arms reduction deals - most recently with Libya. CACNP has warned that revealing information about agreements between the IAEA and Iran could jeopardize potential informants.
Under the deal, Iran must submit a full report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear history before it can receive any sanctions relief. The IAEA will review the report and follow-up with Iran in order to conclude its investigation. The IAEA has said that it expects to complete this report by the end of 2015.
Some critics are calling this a secret side deal between the IAEA and Iran; however, this is standard operating procedure, and every such agreement the IAEA has with other countries is also confidential. This was even true during the IAEA's inspections into Libya. While the general public is not privy to the details of the arrangement, it is safe to assume that the United States government has been fully briefed on the procedures.
The arrangement specifies procedural information regarding how the IAEA will conduct its investigation into Iran's past nuclear history, including mentioning the names of informants who will be interviewed. Releasing this information would place those informants, and the information they hold, at risk. [Center On Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 8/3/15]
The United States Is a Key Member Of The IAEA And Will Analyze Iranian Inspection Data At Vienna Headquarters. While the IAEA is a non-aligned United Nations organization, its 164 members control inspections protocol. The United States is a charter member of the IAEA - the agency was created in response to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech at the UN in 1953 -- and supplies a large portion of its experts and funding.
Thomas Shea, who spent more than two decades as an IAEA inspector, says Iran does not accept any American inspectors today. He recently told the Atlantic Council that he hopes that will change.
"I do think that there's a need for more Americans on the staff," he said, pointing out that the U.S. pays a quarter of the IAEA's $380 million annual budget. Shea says this should entitle the U.S. to have one out of four of the inspector jobs.
[...]
The IAEA needs to make sure that its reports on Iran are viewed around the world as objective, [Trevor Findlay of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs] said. He thinks the U.S. could do more in Vienna, where the inspectors' reports are analyzed and where the IAEA's task force on Iran is based.
"The United States often provides cost-free experts to the agency, they provide technology, they provide intelligence information, so the role of the United States is critical," Findlay said. [NPR,7/18/15; IAEA, accessed 8/7/15]
NPR: Absence Of U.S.-Iranian Diplomatic Relations Excludes Americans From On-The-Ground Inspections. According to NPR, because the U.S. does not maintain normal diplomatic relations with Iran, American inspectors are unable to obtain the necessary visas to enter Iran as part of an IAEA delegation. The public radio station quoted the agreement as saying that Iran "will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran."
Since the U.S. and Iran broke off ties after the 1979 Islamic revolution, it appears unlikely that any American inspectors will be getting a first-hand look at the Iranian nuclear facilities.
Trevor Findlay of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs says it is not necessary and, perhaps, not helpful, to have American inspectors inside Iran.
"In the Iraq case that was a significant point of controversy," Findlay told NPR. The presence of US inspectors in UN teams in Iraq "caused political difficulties and in the end was counterproductive." [NPR, 7/18/15]
http://mediamatters.org/research/2015/08/11/four-demonstrably-false-claims-about-the-iran-d/204881
Center On Arms Control And Non-Proliferation: Confidential Inspections Have Proven Trustworthy And Shield Informants Who Help Ensure Effective Inspections. According to the Center On Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP), bilateral confidential agreements like the one in the just-concluded Iran nuclear deal have featured in many nuclear arms reduction deals - most recently with Libya. CACNP has warned that revealing information about agreements between the IAEA and Iran could jeopardize potential informants.
Under the deal, Iran must submit a full report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear history before it can receive any sanctions relief. The IAEA will review the report and follow-up with Iran in order to conclude its investigation. The IAEA has said that it expects to complete this report by the end of 2015.
Some critics are calling this a secret side deal between the IAEA and Iran; however, this is standard operating procedure, and every such agreement the IAEA has with other countries is also confidential. This was even true during the IAEA's inspections into Libya. While the general public is not privy to the details of the arrangement, it is safe to assume that the United States government has been fully briefed on the procedures.
The arrangement specifies procedural information regarding how the IAEA will conduct its investigation into Iran's past nuclear history, including mentioning the names of informants who will be interviewed. Releasing this information would place those informants, and the information they hold, at risk. [Center On Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 8/3/15]
The United States Is a Key Member Of The IAEA And Will Analyze Iranian Inspection Data At Vienna Headquarters. While the IAEA is a non-aligned United Nations organization, its 164 members control inspections protocol. The United States is a charter member of the IAEA - the agency was created in response to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech at the UN in 1953 -- and supplies a large portion of its experts and funding.
Thomas Shea, who spent more than two decades as an IAEA inspector, says Iran does not accept any American inspectors today. He recently told the Atlantic Council that he hopes that will change.
"I do think that there's a need for more Americans on the staff," he said, pointing out that the U.S. pays a quarter of the IAEA's $380 million annual budget. Shea says this should entitle the U.S. to have one out of four of the inspector jobs.
[...]
The IAEA needs to make sure that its reports on Iran are viewed around the world as objective, [Trevor Findlay of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs] said. He thinks the U.S. could do more in Vienna, where the inspectors' reports are analyzed and where the IAEA's task force on Iran is based.
"The United States often provides cost-free experts to the agency, they provide technology, they provide intelligence information, so the role of the United States is critical," Findlay said. [NPR,7/18/15; IAEA, accessed 8/7/15]
NPR: Absence Of U.S.-Iranian Diplomatic Relations Excludes Americans From On-The-Ground Inspections. According to NPR, because the U.S. does not maintain normal diplomatic relations with Iran, American inspectors are unable to obtain the necessary visas to enter Iran as part of an IAEA delegation. The public radio station quoted the agreement as saying that Iran "will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran."
Since the U.S. and Iran broke off ties after the 1979 Islamic revolution, it appears unlikely that any American inspectors will be getting a first-hand look at the Iranian nuclear facilities.
Trevor Findlay of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs says it is not necessary and, perhaps, not helpful, to have American inspectors inside Iran.
"In the Iraq case that was a significant point of controversy," Findlay told NPR. The presence of US inspectors in UN teams in Iraq "caused political difficulties and in the end was counterproductive." [NPR, 7/18/15]
http://mediamatters.org/research/2015/08/11/four-demonstrably-false-claims-about-the-iran-d/204881
It's a scam if I every saw one. We give the terrorists millions and millions of dollars, we give them nukes and we give them ICBM's to deliver the nukes and we get nothing in return.
Only in Obamaworld would this be considered a good deal.
LOL. Nice spin job by Media Matters, but one would expect nothing less. Obama said this deal wouldn't rely on trust but rather verification, this side deal (and there may be others similar in this Iran deal) relies of trust, not verification. No verification via on-site inspections. As Simon Henderson said, "“If we are not confident that we know what Iran has done in the past, then we cannot accurately estimate how long it would take Iran to break out.” You have to know what they've been doing in the past to use it as a baseline.
Because the minions have swallowed the line that it's either this deal or war.
So you don't like sovereignty? You're scared that the kid down the street MAY get a gun, when you have an armys worth of guns at your disposal? Maybe, if you don't pick on the kid for lunch money, he won't ever point it your way. You think?
