Totally irrelevant. He could come out and say I wrote the entire law all by myself all this is what I meant and it still wouldn't matter. All that matters is what congress believed the law meant. We've seen this before with situations where phrma and other trade associations like the chamber of commerce wrote laws and their intent was disregard for congress.
A nation of laws no more
- Thread starter Lone Clone
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Totally irrelevant. He could come out and say I wrote the entire law all by myself all this is what I meant and it still wouldn't matter. All that matters is what congress believed the law meant. We've seen this before with situations where phrma and other trade associations like the chamber of commerce wrote laws and their intent was disregard for congress.
Like i said, this case has nothing to do with contract law.
I am saying that the intent was laid out in front of them and they made a decision on politics. That is what was done here. You can continue to do your pre-law contortion as you see fit.
Most justices on the Court are not believers in even legislative intent - they get purpose and intent from the text of the entire statute.
If they don't believe in legislative intent, they certainly aren't going to go down a couple more levels to the purported "architect" of the law.
As if only one person was responsible for any statute's language. Justice Scalia would find that funny. Laws are an amalgam of the work of hundreds of people, from congressional staffers, committees, committee attorneys, lobbyists, lobbyists' attorneys, committee members, then the full body of both house and senate, the entire amendment process, house and senate conference committees, conference committee attorneys, etc.
There is no way to say, in isolation, that Joe Smith wrote this section and he meant Section 9, Paragraph 7, Clause (iii)(a) to mean "x" ....
I understand that but the premise is that if something is in writing, and the intent of one part was different can't this be used?? I am not trying to be a Richard either, it just seems that if someone meant something different they could now say, Hey that is not what I meant and this opens up the court for interpretation on what you meant instead of what you said.
Contract law and statutory law are two different areas of law that have different rules. Google parole evidence rule.
Absolutely correct. All of the non-legal prose and embellishment by the dissents on this issue are actually rather embarrassing.
Any moderate, who sympathizes with the position of the religious side, can understand how they feel; but that is no reason to withhold the rights to a personal contract which conveys so many rights to opposite-sex married couples.
Also, note that no one went the route in legal proceedings to allow a 'separate, but equal' legal construction such as a 'civil union', because there is already ample precedent that 'separate but equal' is 'inherently unequal' in the eyes of the law. Thus, there is really a simple answer on this, and it unfortunately goes against the morals of many (alleged) religious people.
Could you please explain within the framework of the chevron analysis?
Maybe it's time to rethink the Chevron Doctrine according to which courts are supposed to defer to bureaucrats in interpreting the law. That doctrine applies if there is an ambiguity. There was no ambiguity in the words "established by the states."
Their decision was fatally flawed by sheer common misunderstanding of the English language.
"when conducting statutory analysis, “a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, [t]he meaning – or ambiguity – of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”
“The objective of Chevron step one is not to interpret and apply the statute to resolve a claim, but to determine whether Congress’s intent in enacting it was so clear as to foreclose any other interpretation.”
§ 1311’s directive that each State establish an Exchange cannot be understood literally in light of § 1321, which provides that a state may “elect” to do so. Section 1321(c) provides that if a state fails to establish an Exchange by January 1, 2014, the Secretary “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State and the Secretary shall take such actions as are necessary to implement such other requirements.”
In other words, the statute mandates the existence of state Exchanges, but directs HHS to establish such Exchanges when the states fail to do so themselves. In the absence of state action, the federal government is required to step in and create, by definition, “an American Health Benefit Exchange established under [§] 1311” on behalf of the state.
You might want to reread Chevron then study how it has been applied to similar cases.
Thanks for admitting chevron applies and for the suggestion. I've read the case numerous times both in law school and within the past few months but I'm open to hearing how you think it was applied in other cases.
You're correct. Unless there is an ambiquity you don't even get to Chevron. If this isn't obvious, here's two quote from the majority opinion in the King:
The Fourth Circuit viewed the Act as “ambiguous and subject to at least two different interpretations.” Id., at 372. The court therefore deferred to the IRS’s interpretation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). . . .
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute,we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 842–843. This approach “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000).
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute,we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 842–843. This approach “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000).
Completely wrong; the ambiguity determination is the first step.
At Chevron’s first step, a court looks to the “plain meaning” of the statute to determine if the regulation responds to it. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If it does, that is the end of the inquiry and the regulation stands. Id. However, if the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the court then moves to Chevron’s second step and defers to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843.
“The objective of Chevron step one is not to interpret and apply the statute to resolve a claim, but to determine whether Congress’s intent in enacting it was so clear as to foreclose any other interpretation.”
gordo, you're playing word games. The first step in analyzing any agency action is to determine whether it's authorized by statute. So reading the statute comes first, whether it's a preliminary matter or step one in Chevron - what difference does it make.
Your argument with Arbitr8 makes absolutely no sense if you are admitting that the ambiquity question comes first regardless. Where are you going with this?
Your argument with Arbitr8 makes absolutely no sense if you are admitting that the ambiquity question comes first regardless. Where are you going with this?
I think this is pretty straight forward:
“The objective of Chevron step one is not to interpret and apply the statute to resolve a claim, but to determine whether Congress’s intent in enacting it was so clear as to foreclose any other interpretation.”
Is that not ambiguity?
Actually, it was Roe v Wade. Even people who agree with the result of that one think it was nonsense.
So how was chevron applied in other cases?
What about the section that says that when a state doesn't create an exchange that the federal government shall create an exchange in the state?
How many of the 6 courts that heard this case held the language ambiguous?
I thought it was odd how he didn't apply chevron even though saying the statute was ambiguous. It was interesting that he felt it wasnt necessary to defer to administrative intent since the statute although ambiguous must have meant what congress intended. Seems using the second step of chevron would have made more sense.
