How can anyone think this a good deal!
Only Obama, john Kerry or Shite Muslims think this a true Inspection!
Only Obama, john Kerry or Shite Muslims think this a true Inspection!
Iran can block inspectors for 14 days then it goes to a commission!
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It's up to 24 days prior notice if Iran drags it out. I can hardly wait for the usual suspects to defend this provision - it ought to be comical.
To BHO and left that's the very same thing as "any where, any time. Like ACA, this agreement is owned lock, stock and barrel by the Dems and the extreme left in this country . History will show the truth
Here are the steps for the inspections process related to undeclared sites[10]:
- “Request for clarification” (Day 0): If the IAEA has concerns about undeclared nuclear activities or sites, or any potential violations of the agreement, it will first “provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.”
- “Request for access” (Days 1-14): If Iran’s explanations do not satisfy the IAEA, the Agency may submit a request to access the suspicious sites in question. The IAEA “will provide the reasons for access in writing and make available any relevant information.” Within 14 days, Iran and the IAEA must either 1) agree on the procedures to inspect the sites in question, or 2) resolve the IAEA’s concerns by alternative arrangements without inspections.
- “Dispute resolution” (Days 15-21): If Iran and the IAEA cannot reach a resolution within 14 days of the IAEA’s request for access, the issue will be brought before the Joint Commission established by the agreement for dispute resolution. A consensus of 5 of the 8 members of the Joint Commission (the P5+1 nations, plus Iran, plus the EU High Representative) would issue a ruling and determine the course of action within 7 days. This means, Iran, China, and Russia could not block a consensus without the support of one Western country.
- “Implementation” (Days 22-24): Following the determination of the Joint Commission, Iran would have 3 additional days to implement the decision
Thanks for clearing that up Fred. The bolded part was where I was off on my info, as I thought it was a 6 member commission.
That said, this is still an awful deal. If they are doing nothing wrong, why do we have to wait at least 24 days to have access to the site? This whole things stinks.
One other thing I read that I didn't like was
The IAEA will have a team of 130-150 designated inspectors for Iran. According to the agreement, Iran “will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran”—meaning Iran would bar inspectors from the United States and could also wield limited veto power over certain inspectors
http://www.iranwatch.org/our-public...will-inspections-work-iran-under-nuclear-deal
The deal clinched in Vienna ensures that the IAEA has round-the-clock access to Iran's nuclear facilities and is allowed to maintain state-of-the-art sensors, cameras and other surveillance equipment on site. The expectation of some for "anywhere, anytime inspections" on Iran's facilities, Shea says, is something of a misnomer, given that's hardly been common verification practice in the past. It also appears that the Iranians have backed down from an earlier position refusing inspections of the country's sensitive military sites.
The Economist explains:
Inspectors will not be able to conduct “anywhere, any time” visits. Instead, they will have to give grounds for their concerns about prohibited activities and give the Iranians an opportunity to address them before access is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this must take place within two weeks. Refusal by Iran to provide inspectors access that persisted for more than another week would be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore subject to re-imposition of sanctions.
My colleagues Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung offer more detail:
Once it submits a request to Iran to visit an “undeclared” facility, the IAEA and Iran will have 14 days to agree on the terms of access. If IAEA concerns are not met within that period, a joint commission made up of the seven negotiating countries — Iran and the United States and its partners — plus the European Union, will have up to seven days to review the dispute and decide what Iran needs to do.
Only five of the eight members need to agree, effectively ensuring that Iran, Russia and China cannot prevail if they vote together. Iran then has three days to implement the decision. If it does not, “then we can begin snap-back” of sanctions, a [U.S.] administration official said.
The process may seem cumbersome, and another former IAEA official has expressed concerns over the days it may take to wrangle permission for access. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of the deal's most outspoken critics, told NPR on Wednesday that this procedure is "like telling a drug dealer: ‘We’re going to check your meth lab in 24 days.'"
But the IAEA, argues Shea, with logistical help from other member states, is well positioned to detect whether Iran is in breach of its commitments or conducting clandestine work on a nuclear weapon.
It has learned from its shortcomings in the 1990s, when regimes in North Korea and Iraq exposed weaknesses in the U.N. agency's safeguards and protocols. It commands a wide spectrum of tools —from highly-sophisticated commercial satellite technology, to infrared and radar imaging to its own laboratories where tests of environmental samples can be carried out — that can be brought to bear.
"There's no comparison between the technologies available now and those 20 years ago," says Shea.
Combined with the likely cooperation of foreign intelligence organizations with the IAEA, the scrutiny on Iran would make it difficult for the regime to hide the construction of another subterranean nuclear facility like the Fordow enrichment plant, which is perched beneath a mountain near the holy city of Qom.
Moreover, the IAEA will have oversight over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from its uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies. As Shea notes in a June report posted on the Web site of the Arms Control Association, the U.N. agency will be monitoring Iran's potential "use of black markets or front companies" should Tehran attempt to secretly obtain specialized material for its nuclear program.
"The beauty of this agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and we get to take out all the furniture," writes Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, which pushes for nonproliferation, and a proponent of the nuclear deal with Iran. He sums up the checks in place:
Iran might want to set up a covert enrichment plant, but where would it get the uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the scientists? If a 100 scientists suddenly don’t show up for work at Natanz, it will be noticed. If the uranium in the gas doesn’t equal the uranium mined, it will be noticed. If the parts made for centrifuges don’t end up in new centrifuges, it will be noticed. Iran might be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance that it could evade all the overlapping levels will be remote.
Shea says the IAEA is a scientific institution and will approach the task in "an impassioned way," focused on whether Iran, as a signatory to a raft of agreements (including a new "roadmap" with the IAEA itself), has set out to undermine the accord.
But he is personally "hopeful" that the current deal will mark the beginning of a less acrimonious phase in the IAEA's dealings with the Islamic Republic.
"Iran, through a painstaking negotiated agreement, has established a very formal understanding with six of the most important countries in the planet," said Shea. "To expect Iran would violate this from the outset is somewhat hard to imagine."
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blog...cheating-according-to-a-former-u-n-inspector/
The Economist explains:
Inspectors will not be able to conduct “anywhere, any time” visits. Instead, they will have to give grounds for their concerns about prohibited activities and give the Iranians an opportunity to address them before access is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this must take place within two weeks. Refusal by Iran to provide inspectors access that persisted for more than another week would be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore subject to re-imposition of sanctions.
My colleagues Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung offer more detail:
Once it submits a request to Iran to visit an “undeclared” facility, the IAEA and Iran will have 14 days to agree on the terms of access. If IAEA concerns are not met within that period, a joint commission made up of the seven negotiating countries — Iran and the United States and its partners — plus the European Union, will have up to seven days to review the dispute and decide what Iran needs to do.
Only five of the eight members need to agree, effectively ensuring that Iran, Russia and China cannot prevail if they vote together. Iran then has three days to implement the decision. If it does not, “then we can begin snap-back” of sanctions, a [U.S.] administration official said.
The process may seem cumbersome, and another former IAEA official has expressed concerns over the days it may take to wrangle permission for access. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of the deal's most outspoken critics, told NPR on Wednesday that this procedure is "like telling a drug dealer: ‘We’re going to check your meth lab in 24 days.'"
But the IAEA, argues Shea, with logistical help from other member states, is well positioned to detect whether Iran is in breach of its commitments or conducting clandestine work on a nuclear weapon.
It has learned from its shortcomings in the 1990s, when regimes in North Korea and Iraq exposed weaknesses in the U.N. agency's safeguards and protocols. It commands a wide spectrum of tools —from highly-sophisticated commercial satellite technology, to infrared and radar imaging to its own laboratories where tests of environmental samples can be carried out — that can be brought to bear.
"There's no comparison between the technologies available now and those 20 years ago," says Shea.
Combined with the likely cooperation of foreign intelligence organizations with the IAEA, the scrutiny on Iran would make it difficult for the regime to hide the construction of another subterranean nuclear facility like the Fordow enrichment plant, which is perched beneath a mountain near the holy city of Qom.
Moreover, the IAEA will have oversight over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from its uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies. As Shea notes in a June report posted on the Web site of the Arms Control Association, the U.N. agency will be monitoring Iran's potential "use of black markets or front companies" should Tehran attempt to secretly obtain specialized material for its nuclear program.
"The beauty of this agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and we get to take out all the furniture," writes Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, which pushes for nonproliferation, and a proponent of the nuclear deal with Iran. He sums up the checks in place:
Iran might want to set up a covert enrichment plant, but where would it get the uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the scientists? If a 100 scientists suddenly don’t show up for work at Natanz, it will be noticed. If the uranium in the gas doesn’t equal the uranium mined, it will be noticed. If the parts made for centrifuges don’t end up in new centrifuges, it will be noticed. Iran might be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance that it could evade all the overlapping levels will be remote.
Shea says the IAEA is a scientific institution and will approach the task in "an impassioned way," focused on whether Iran, as a signatory to a raft of agreements (including a new "roadmap" with the IAEA itself), has set out to undermine the accord.
But he is personally "hopeful" that the current deal will mark the beginning of a less acrimonious phase in the IAEA's dealings with the Islamic Republic.
"Iran, through a painstaking negotiated agreement, has established a very formal understanding with six of the most important countries in the planet," said Shea. "To expect Iran would violate this from the outset is somewhat hard to imagine."
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blog...cheating-according-to-a-former-u-n-inspector/
As I recall, the main reason why Saddam kicked out the inspectors in the late 90s was because he thought we were sending inspector teams with CIA operatives wherever we wanted to spy - whether or not the sites had anything to do with nukes. This turned out to be true.
Let's be clear about this. This is what Iran expects us to do again. And even if they can exclude US reps from the inspection teams they know we will get the Brits or others to do that kind of spying.
If you can, ask yourself what you would do if you were Iran. Would you allow anytime, anywhere inspections of any facilities, knowing that, for example, the defensive capabilities of that site would quickly end up in the hands of Israel - which has repeatedly said it reserves the right to attack you?
We apparently have all the access we need of the known sites. This only applies to the sites that are not known to have nuclear programs or capabilities. We are basically going through a structured process similar to getting a search warrant.
I agree that it seems to take way too long. But I'm glad that we have a procedure that can lead to inspections of non-nuclear sites.
Note that if this provision weren't in the deal, we might never notice. But we were smart enough to insist on it and now, sadly, it's become a target of complaint.
Let's be clear about this. This is what Iran expects us to do again. And even if they can exclude US reps from the inspection teams they know we will get the Brits or others to do that kind of spying.
If you can, ask yourself what you would do if you were Iran. Would you allow anytime, anywhere inspections of any facilities, knowing that, for example, the defensive capabilities of that site would quickly end up in the hands of Israel - which has repeatedly said it reserves the right to attack you?
We apparently have all the access we need of the known sites. This only applies to the sites that are not known to have nuclear programs or capabilities. We are basically going through a structured process similar to getting a search warrant.
I agree that it seems to take way too long. But I'm glad that we have a procedure that can lead to inspections of non-nuclear sites.
Note that if this provision weren't in the deal, we might never notice. But we were smart enough to insist on it and now, sadly, it's become a target of complaint.
It is good/adequate. It is actually nice to see some diplomacy happen in the Middle East, and it is good to see some dialogue with Iran.
Does anyone understand this well enough to clarify for me?
1. Does this request process apply only to undeclared, non-military, non-nuclear sites?
2. Is there anytime, anywhere access to declared, military and nuclear sites?
Understanding this will greatly impact my feelings on this deal.
1. Does this request process apply only to undeclared, non-military, non-nuclear sites?
2. Is there anytime, anywhere access to declared, military and nuclear sites?
Understanding this will greatly impact my feelings on this deal.
I would certainly trust Netanyahu any day before Obama.
I'm sure you are excited at the thought of dead Israeli's because of this. Or are you dumb or dishonest enough to say this is a good thing for relations with Israel and their simple desire to stay aliive?
Fine. Iran can withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, just like North Korea did in 2003, and give the world the finger. But, if they want to bargain there are consequences. Can't have it both ways.
I have no sympathy for the Iranian government.
Where do I start? Read the link and I'll copy some highlights.
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/nuclear-deal-silent-on-irans-parchin-military-plant-bushehr/
The Iranian nuclear deal reached in Vienna contains no reference to the Parchin military facility where most of Iran’s past nuclear arms-related work was carried out.
Additionally, the draft agreement made public on Tuesday contains no stated limits on Iran’s Russian-made Bushehr nuclear power facility that analysts say could produce plutonium for dozens of bombs.
Also, the accord will lift international sanctions on several Iranian entities currently engaged in supporting terrorism and building ballistic missiles, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Air Force Al Ghadir Missile Command.
The Tehran-based command is a key element in developing nuclear-tipped missiles and is considered to be in operational control of Iranian missiles.
The lifting of sanctions in eight or fewer years will also include removing sanctions on Parchin Chemical Industries—a firm involved in the past in Iranian ballistic missile and chemical explosive work that was possibly related to nuclear arms applications.
United Nations arms sanctions blocking military sales to and from Iran will be lifted in five years under the deal, and sanctions prohibiting sales of ballistic missiles to Tehran will end in eight years. U.S. restrictions will remain.
Iran and some non-Iranian participants in the Vienna talks had pushed for immediate end to both arms and missile sales.
China and Russia, however, could begin selling arms to Iran covertly right away. Both nations have done so in the past.
President Obama praised the accord as a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran “that will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”
“This deal demonstrates that American diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change, change that makes our country and the world safer and more secure,” he said, vowing to veto any legislation blocking the agreement.
It seems rather silly to object to any agreement with anyone on the grounds that someone might violate the agreement.
It will be interesting to here these points debated and defended. If you learn more, please let us know. TiA.
1. Are we better off or worse off without this agreement?
2. Do you honestly believe a better agreement was there for the taking?
3. If 2, what is that agreement, and why haven't we heard about it from all those who complain about this one?
4. Why is it that the US, the long-time champion of free trade - and in particular our conservative free-marketeers - are insisting on sanctions and restrictions on trade?
5. Why do people act like we are giving Iran money if we drop the sanctions. Yes, they will get access to some money. But it's THEIR money.
2. Do you honestly believe a better agreement was there for the taking?
3. If 2, what is that agreement, and why haven't we heard about it from all those who complain about this one?
4. Why is it that the US, the long-time champion of free trade - and in particular our conservative free-marketeers - are insisting on sanctions and restrictions on trade?
5. Why do people act like we are giving Iran money if we drop the sanctions. Yes, they will get access to some money. But it's THEIR money.
That is what your seditious marching order suppliers want. I am fairly confident Israel can take care of themselves too. They have showed that very ability over time.
Well, that pretty much says all anyone needs to know about your lack of good judgement.
As big of a liberal as you are, why would you, Cigaretteboy and others think it is a good idea to deal with Iran without addressing their human rights atrocities. Heck, naturalmwa would be thrown off a building in Tehran. (that is if he is lucky)
yet here you guys are-crickets.
So other places like Syria and Jordan et. al. try to exterminate Israel so they fight back and actually expand their footprint and Israel is the bad guy?That is what your seditious marching order suppliers want. I am fairly confident Israel can take care of themselves too. They have showed that very ability over time.
Israel has even given back a great deal of real estate with the peace in mind but it isn't good enough for antisemitic leftists and Muslims.
This is how I feel about the Salvation Army, but I think I'd prioritize nukes over homophobia. Baby steps.
Listen to Parser in this one cons. As a resident libertarian bad ass, I will say that he is in fact correct.
Iran isn't a threat because they are actually a threat. They are simply being spotlighted because they aren't playing the game we want them to play. That's it, end of story, the end.
It's about making sure they share their oil the way we want them to share it. Israel is simply a reason given to start ish with them. Using old atrocities from ww2 to gain sympathy for Israel.
This is a real life game of risk, nothing more, nothing less.
You're being steered towards tyranny and justifying it through a false fear of Iran.
All in the name of spreading our empire.
It isn't troubling at all. Anyone who thinks you can dismantle a nuclear processing facility and hide all the evidence including residual radiation in 24 days is...well, the kindest term I can use is ignorant. Not to mention there would be eyes in the sky on any such facility, monitoring every tiny bit of movement.
Don't confuse antisemitism with not being supportive of Israel.
A point often confused, and used as an arguing point. Like I said before Israel loves to use that certain moment in history as a shield.
I think a great many of us would admit to being pretty ignorant of the nuclear bomb building process.
