The novelty in the 2017 case is the use of an intelligence report to launch a domestic political operation, as opposed to a foreign invasion like Iraq. The ICA’s conclusion about Russia’s motives, and its inclusion of an appendix containing material from the controversial “Steele dossier,” became the pretext for four intelligence chiefs – Brennan, Clapper, FBI Director James Comey, and NSA chief Mike Rogers – to brief then-president-elect Trump on its contents.
However, there’s significant independent verification of the idea that the “Russia favored Trump” conclusion was indeed “cooked.” Former Director Brennan’s own book, Undaunted, describes how he not only overruled NSA director Mike Rogers but “two senior managers for the CIA mission center for Russia,” whom he decided had “not read all the available intelligence.”
It’s well-known that the NSA and Rogers never moved off their conclusion that there was not “sufficient evidence to support a high-confidence judgment that Russia supported Trump,” as Brennan put it. They expressed only “moderate” confidence in the idea.
Less well-remembered is that the FBI and then-director Comey appeared to change their minds. Days before the 2016 election, senior officials told the New York Times that the FBI was not only (correctly) disavowing reports of a “secret channel of email communication” between Trump and Russia’s Alfa Bank, but that “even the hacking into Democratic emails, F.B.I. and intelligence officials now believe, was aimed at disrupting the presidential election rather than electing Mr. Trump.”
In the first week of December, the CIA and FBI each gave secret briefings to the Senate. These presentations appeared to conflict so much on the question of whether or not the interference was to help Trump that the differing accounts were leaked to the Washington Post, which quickly published “FBI and CIA Give Differing Accounts on Russia’s Motives.”
A week later, on December 16th, 2016, the Post published a different story, called “FBI in agreement with CIA that Russia aimed to help Trump,” announcing the FBI's change of mind. Unnamed officials surfaced to explain that lawmakers who felt the FBI and CIA had differing accounts “misunderstood,” telling the paper, “The truth is they were never all that different in the first place.”
When Comey testified in the House and revealed the existence of an investigation into Trump in a blockbuster televised proceeding in March, 2020, he made a point of fixing the date of the FBI’s certainty about Russia’s motives in December 2016, i.e. after the election. This led to a little-noticed confrontation with former Texas Congressman Mike Conaway:
However, there’s significant independent verification of the idea that the “Russia favored Trump” conclusion was indeed “cooked.” Former Director Brennan’s own book, Undaunted, describes how he not only overruled NSA director Mike Rogers but “two senior managers for the CIA mission center for Russia,” whom he decided had “not read all the available intelligence.”
It’s well-known that the NSA and Rogers never moved off their conclusion that there was not “sufficient evidence to support a high-confidence judgment that Russia supported Trump,” as Brennan put it. They expressed only “moderate” confidence in the idea.
Less well-remembered is that the FBI and then-director Comey appeared to change their minds. Days before the 2016 election, senior officials told the New York Times that the FBI was not only (correctly) disavowing reports of a “secret channel of email communication” between Trump and Russia’s Alfa Bank, but that “even the hacking into Democratic emails, F.B.I. and intelligence officials now believe, was aimed at disrupting the presidential election rather than electing Mr. Trump.”
In the first week of December, the CIA and FBI each gave secret briefings to the Senate. These presentations appeared to conflict so much on the question of whether or not the interference was to help Trump that the differing accounts were leaked to the Washington Post, which quickly published “FBI and CIA Give Differing Accounts on Russia’s Motives.”
A week later, on December 16th, 2016, the Post published a different story, called “FBI in agreement with CIA that Russia aimed to help Trump,” announcing the FBI's change of mind. Unnamed officials surfaced to explain that lawmakers who felt the FBI and CIA had differing accounts “misunderstood,” telling the paper, “The truth is they were never all that different in the first place.”
When Comey testified in the House and revealed the existence of an investigation into Trump in a blockbuster televised proceeding in March, 2020, he made a point of fixing the date of the FBI’s certainty about Russia’s motives in December 2016, i.e. after the election. This led to a little-noticed confrontation with former Texas Congressman Mike Conaway:
CONAWAY: The conclusion that active measures were taken specifically to help President Trump's campaign, you had that -- by early December, you already had that conclusion?
COMEY: Correct, that they wanted to hurt our democracy, hurt her, help him. I think all three we were confident in, at least as early as December.
CONAWAY: The paragraph that gives me a little concern there… I'm not sure if we went back and got that exact same January assessment six months earlier, it would've looked the same.