The 2024 election is shaping up to be much more than a likely rematch between President Biden and former president Donald Trump — or even as a test of their competing visions for U.S. democracy. To a greater extent than perhaps any other moment since the 1920 debate over U.S. entry into the League of Nations, this country’s role in the world will be on the ballot. At the same time, the United States faces critical global challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East, East Asia and elsewhere.
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Assuming they do end up facing each other in November, Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump will offer voters a stark choice between the former’s support for the network of alliances and international institutions the United States helped create after World War II and the latter’s “America First” approach. In that sense, U.S. voters will not be choosing a direction for their country alone but for the world as a whole.
The assumption underlying such institutions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the mutual defense agreements that bind the United States with Japan and South Korea is that security is not a zero-sum proposition. By committing resources over extended periods and combining them, taking mutual advantage of differing capabilities, countries can make themselves far safer than would have been possible if they acted unilaterally or in temporary concert. Mr. Biden believes this is still a workable model, which is why he is trying to apply and expand it to deter the challenge to NATO posed by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Mr. Trump, by contrast, has repeatedly depicted security alliances not as prudent long-term investments but as free rides for allies who get U.S. protection but do not shoulder their fair share of the defense burden. This is why Mr. Trump is pushing to end America’s support for Ukraine and hinting at a separate peace of some kind with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. His campaign website promises “fundamentally reevaluating NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission.”
Self-absorbed and easily swayed by honeyed words and calculated attention from autocrats such as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, he inconsistently directs venom at China’s predatory trade practices and admiration for that country’s leader, Xi Jinping. This sows uncertainty not just in Taiwan but also the wider range of allies and partners that includes Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia and India. The Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy, has warned that a Trump return would raise foundational questions about America’s trustworthiness as well as “the credibility of its commitments to foreign partners, and the durability of its role as the [linchpin] of the global security order.” We wish it were exaggerating.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...c_magnet-opforeignpolicy_inline_collection_20
We say this in full awareness of the fact that Mr. Biden’s record is hardly perfect. Also, there are weaknesses in the U.S.-sponsored global security and economic architecture, such as the European allies’ neglect of military contributions to NATO and China’s mercantilist exploitation of its membership in the World Trade Organization. Mr. Trump has exploited these valid issues, albeit by exaggerating them. But if his harsh words helped force Europe to boost spending, well and good. In the case of trade, there is less disagreement between him and Mr. Biden than there is on alliances and security — unfortunately. Mr. Trump’s protectionist bent actually represents a point of convergence between him and the president who has, alas, maintained many of Mr. Trump’s tariffs and even alienated European allies by using subsidies designed to steer green energy investment to the United States.
At the same time, Mr. Trump’s brand of America First is ascendant within the GOP but not unanimous. Nikki Haley, former ambassador to the U.N. and governor of South Carolina, is still running against him and speaking for the Republican Party’s internationalist wing. Most Senate Republicans still support Ukraine. Part of what’s so concerning about the prospect of an isolationist second Trump presidency is that it would defy majority sentiment: Sixty-five percent of Americans want the United States to play a “leading” or “major” role in world affairs, according to the most recent Gallup Poll.
In short, U.S. foreign policy has evolved but still can rely on its time-tested essentials. Mr. Biden is far likelier to make sure of that than Mr. Trump. One way to gauge the radical changes that might lie in store is through the anticipatory words and deeds of leaders abroad. Mr. Putin shows no signs of backing down in Ukraine or negotiating peace because he obviously hopes for a better deal from Mr. Trump. Democratic leaders in Europe, by contrast, speak nervously of hedging against Trump Round 2. Whether or not he wins, Mr. Trump has already created a more dangerous world, in which the power and principles of the United States are seen not as constants but as variables.
Sign up for Prompt 2024 to get opinions on the biggest questions about the 2024 election cycleAssuming they do end up facing each other in November, Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump will offer voters a stark choice between the former’s support for the network of alliances and international institutions the United States helped create after World War II and the latter’s “America First” approach. In that sense, U.S. voters will not be choosing a direction for their country alone but for the world as a whole.
The assumption underlying such institutions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the mutual defense agreements that bind the United States with Japan and South Korea is that security is not a zero-sum proposition. By committing resources over extended periods and combining them, taking mutual advantage of differing capabilities, countries can make themselves far safer than would have been possible if they acted unilaterally or in temporary concert. Mr. Biden believes this is still a workable model, which is why he is trying to apply and expand it to deter the challenge to NATO posed by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Mr. Trump, by contrast, has repeatedly depicted security alliances not as prudent long-term investments but as free rides for allies who get U.S. protection but do not shoulder their fair share of the defense burden. This is why Mr. Trump is pushing to end America’s support for Ukraine and hinting at a separate peace of some kind with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. His campaign website promises “fundamentally reevaluating NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission.”
Self-absorbed and easily swayed by honeyed words and calculated attention from autocrats such as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, he inconsistently directs venom at China’s predatory trade practices and admiration for that country’s leader, Xi Jinping. This sows uncertainty not just in Taiwan but also the wider range of allies and partners that includes Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia and India. The Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy, has warned that a Trump return would raise foundational questions about America’s trustworthiness as well as “the credibility of its commitments to foreign partners, and the durability of its role as the [linchpin] of the global security order.” We wish it were exaggerating.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...c_magnet-opforeignpolicy_inline_collection_11
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...c_magnet-opforeignpolicy_inline_collection_20
We say this in full awareness of the fact that Mr. Biden’s record is hardly perfect. Also, there are weaknesses in the U.S.-sponsored global security and economic architecture, such as the European allies’ neglect of military contributions to NATO and China’s mercantilist exploitation of its membership in the World Trade Organization. Mr. Trump has exploited these valid issues, albeit by exaggerating them. But if his harsh words helped force Europe to boost spending, well and good. In the case of trade, there is less disagreement between him and Mr. Biden than there is on alliances and security — unfortunately. Mr. Trump’s protectionist bent actually represents a point of convergence between him and the president who has, alas, maintained many of Mr. Trump’s tariffs and even alienated European allies by using subsidies designed to steer green energy investment to the United States.
At the same time, Mr. Trump’s brand of America First is ascendant within the GOP but not unanimous. Nikki Haley, former ambassador to the U.N. and governor of South Carolina, is still running against him and speaking for the Republican Party’s internationalist wing. Most Senate Republicans still support Ukraine. Part of what’s so concerning about the prospect of an isolationist second Trump presidency is that it would defy majority sentiment: Sixty-five percent of Americans want the United States to play a “leading” or “major” role in world affairs, according to the most recent Gallup Poll.
In short, U.S. foreign policy has evolved but still can rely on its time-tested essentials. Mr. Biden is far likelier to make sure of that than Mr. Trump. One way to gauge the radical changes that might lie in store is through the anticipatory words and deeds of leaders abroad. Mr. Putin shows no signs of backing down in Ukraine or negotiating peace because he obviously hopes for a better deal from Mr. Trump. Democratic leaders in Europe, by contrast, speak nervously of hedging against Trump Round 2. Whether or not he wins, Mr. Trump has already created a more dangerous world, in which the power and principles of the United States are seen not as constants but as variables.
