If trump tells the military to take back the canal, will they listen? If there was a real danger to the canal I'm sure they would but to start a conflict for no apparent reason should set off alarms at the Pentagon. I suppose trump could pull a Putin and have our special ops blow something up down there to get us involved.
This is from 2021....for context.
Q2: What is China’s influence in the Panama Canal?
A2: Chinese companies have been heavily involved in infrastructure-related contracts in and around the Canal in Panama’s logistics, electricity, and construction sectors. These projects fit naturally with China’s BRI vision, onto which Panama was the first Latin American country to
sign in 2018. This, along with Panama’s recognition of China, boosted China’s already existent footprint in the Canal, and Chinese companies have since positioned themselves at either end of the Panama Canal through port concession agreements. In 2016, in a $900 million deal, the China-based Landbridge Group acquired control of
Margarita Island, Panama’s largest port on the Atlantic side and in the Colón Free Trade Zone, the largest free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere. The deal established the Panama-Colón Container Port (PCCP) as a deep-water port for megaships, and the construction and expansion was
carried out by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a company also active in China’s island-building initiatives in the South China Sea, and the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC). The location of the port on the Canal has since allowed China to capitalize on Canal expansion. Additionally, in March 2021 the Panamanian government
began the process of renewing the lease of Hutchison Ports PPC, a subsidiary of Hong Kong–based CK Hutchison Holdings, which serves as operator for the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, two major hubs of the Canal’s Pacific and Atlantic outlets, respectively.
Furthermore, in 2018, a Chinese consortium led by CHEC and CCCC
announced it was awarded a $1.4 billion contract for the Canal’s fourth bridge, which then-president Varela
called “the fifth most important project in the history of the country.” More recently, China Construction Americas finished the Amador Convention Center along the Pacific side of the Canal, a project contracted under the Varela government and
funded by Chinese loans. China has also invested in energy-related facilities along the Canal. For example, the Chinese group Shanghai Gorgeous
invested $900 million to build a natural gas–fired electricity generation facility. As an economic foothold into Latin America, the Panama Canal is no doubt an important
gateway for China’s bid for broader presence and a logistical hub for Chinese goods entering the region.
Aside from infrastructure projects, water management efforts are also a key source of entry for Chinese players. A
plan announced in September 2020 would establish a water management system to combat against drought, which threatens the operation of the Canal, but also would impact local access to water for the next 50 years. This presents another opportunity for Chinese investors to increase their presence in Panama beyond the Canal.
In the first and second quarters of 2020, China strayed from traditional infrastructure and business investments to focus on supporting Panama’s fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. Between February and June 2020 alone, Panama received almost
$2 million of aid in the form of healthcare-related supplies from China. This interest in Panama’s healthcare resources likely stemmed from the way that the onset of the pandemic in
March 2020 brought multiple infrastructure projects, including the Canal’s fourth bridge, to a halt. Some work restarted in late 2020, but progress generally remains delayed.
Q4: What are the implications for the United States?
A4: China’s BRI expansion into port-related facilities has stirred alarm for the United States over ambitions seen as endangering the neutrality of the Canal. Of those goods transiting the Canal, over
60 percent originate in or end up in U.S. markets, intrinsically tying free and fair Canal access to U.S. national security and economic interests in the country. Accordingly, the Canal is a major commercial asset, acting as gateway between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and a provider of lower shipping costs for U.S. and global trade.
With the expansion of Chinese influence in the waterway, the Canal will likely continue to be a point of
tension in U.S.-China relations. China does not operate the Canal, it only manages the two ports on either end, meaning it does not interact or influence
all goods transiting the Canal. However, the increase of Chinese companies’ control over transshipment cargo operations bound for the United States and other countries is a point of contention.
China’s expanded reach in the Panama Canal has slowed recently, mostly due to U.S. pushback and the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, the Panama Ministry of Public Works' plans for the announced fourth bridge over the Canal was
scaled back in 2020. In 2018, U.S. and domestic pressure ended China’s
plans to construct a large embassy at the mouth of the Canal. In fact,
numerous initiated projects have been canceled, postponed, or scaled back during the current administration of President Laurentino Cortizo. This scaling back of Chinese projects by the Cortizo administration indicates that there not only exists a desire to maintain open relations with the United States, as embodied by Panamanians’ access to “
Global Entry international trusted traveler” status for entering the United States, but also an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in the geopolitical competition surrounding the Panama Canal.
The Panama Canal sits at the nexus of international political and economic concerns.
www.csis.org