This time, when Bashar al-Assad started to fall, Russia was not there to catch him.
Russia largely watched from the sidelines as Syrian rebels swept through the country in less than 10 days, overtaking Aleppo, Hama and Homs before entering Damascus, the capital, on Sunday. Mr. al-Assad is now gone, his departure celebrated by crowds of ecstatic Syrians. In Russia, where Mr. al-Assad has fled, the fall of his government amounts to a devastating loss. Decades of Russian military and political investment to carve out a foothold in the Mediterranean are now at risk. Vladimir Putin may yet manage to retain some stakes in a post-Assad Syria, but there’s no way around it: He just suffered a significant defeat.
Russia’s ties with the Assad family go back to the 1970s, when Hafez al-Assad — Bashar’s father — solidified Syria’s place in the Soviet orbit. When the younger Mr. al-Assad met a peaceful uprising with a violent crackdown that escalated into a bloody conflict, Russia responded, in early 2012, by vetoing a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on him to resign. The year before, Mr. Putin, then prime minister, had lambasted a separate U.N. resolution authorizing airstrikes against the Libyan dictator Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi as a “medieval call for a crusade” and was said to be livid when Colonel Qaddafi was killed. He was determined that Mr. al-Assad not suffer the same fate.
Mr. Putin has given the younger Mr. al-Assad substantial military assistance in the years since. By 2015 Mr. al-Assad’s forces controlled barely 20 percent of Syria’s territory and Russia launched a military operation to save him. In 2017 Russia helped negotiate temporary cease-fires in parts of Syria, then enabled regime forces to gobble up many of those places. Its military presence eventually morphed into a smaller force suitable to managing low-level conflict, but Russia never withdrew from Syria even after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine eclipsed all other foreign policy priorities. By that point, maintaining a presence there, including the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval base, was also critical to Russia’s military operations in Libya, the Central African Republic and the Sahel — a new frontier for Russian power projection.
Russia’s military support was complemented by patient political backing. Mr. Putin and Mr. al-Assad remained as thick as thieves throughout several rounds of arduous peace conferences that attempted to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. In 2013, Mr. Putin had emerged as Mr. al-Assad’s knight in shining armor — and incidentally exposed the weakness of President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria — by vouching for the destruction of Mr. al-Assad’s chemical weapons within a year and heading off the prospect of American airstrikes. (A few years later, more than 80 Syrian civilians would be killed in a sarin attack that the United States attributed to the regime’s forces.)
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In early 2018, Russia hosted a Syrian congress in the resort town of Sochi that was mostly attended by pro-Assad delegates and diluted ambitious visions of a political transition to questions of constitutional reform. Once the war in Syria cooled, Moscow’s diplomats pivoted to lobbying for the three Rs: reconstruction support, refugee return and the rehabilitation of Mr. al-Assad.
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Throughout, Russia was often frustrated with the Assad regime’s refusals to make even the smallest concessions — as evidenced by Mr. Putin’s own occasional shows of contempt for Mr. al-Assad.
But Russia never threw in the towel — until Syria’s war suddenly reheated last month. If Mr. al-Assad’s persistent obstinacy had stretched Russia’s patience, the dynamics of the past weeks did the rest. Many of Mr. al-Assad’s own forces simply got out of the rebels’ way, and it quickly became clear that the Iranians, who had also backed him for years, weren’t coming either. Russia telegraphed its growing concern and intensified bombardments in the rebel-held northwest province of Idlib, but it did nothing to reinforce its presence in Syria. As the rebels advanced, it became obvious that Russia would not intervene in any major way. With Russia’s military capacity consumed in Ukraine, its calculus had changed: Mr. Putin probably realized that it was time to cut Mr. al-Assad loose and to prioritize retaining Russia’s military bases in a new Syria.
But Mr. al-Assad’s fall is still a loss. The Sunni Arab states had loathed Mr. Putin’s coming to the rescue of Mr. al-Assad, an Alawite, in a conflict they viewed as part of a wider struggle with Shiite Iran. But Mr. Putin had earned respect across the region and beyond, especially among autocratic leaders, by standing with his ally and showing it to the Americans. That respect is now in jeopardy, and Mr. Putin’s decision to grant Mr. al-Assad asylum may be a last-ditch effort to signal that he does not abandon his own.
Russia could always justify setbacks in Ukraine by claiming that it is fighting the “collective West.” It could explain its abandonment of its ally Armenia during Azerbaijan’s offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh last year on the basis of shifting regional realities, while hoping that few would take note. But Syria is different. No amount of rhetorical gymnastics by Russia’s spin doctors can distract from the fact that the abandonment of Mr. al-Assad is the clearest sign, since Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine, that there are new limits on Russian power projection.
Besides seeing its partner Iran weakened, Russia will lose leverage to other regional heavyweights, especially Israel and Turkey. Russia’s partnership with Mr. al-Assad and Hezbollah made it an Israeli “neighbor to the north,” which meant that Israel had to inform Russia when it was conducting strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel also had to navigate with caution on Ukraine, even as Russia moved closer to Iran and adopted a pro-Palestinian position on the Gaza war. With Mr. al-Assad gone and the Iranians sidelined in Syria, Israel has more room to maneuver.
With Turkey, with which Russia has a longstanding rivalry, the loss is arguably greater. Having already accumulated leverage over Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey could have formidable bargaining power in any negotiations over Russia’s future influence in Syria thanks to its patronage of Syria’s armed opposition.
Mr. al-Assad’s ouster could also lead to the more tangible loss of the bases, Hmeimim and Tartus. Russia will do all it can to retain the bases, of course. The shift in its language when talking about its new Syrian interlocutors — from “terrorists” to “armed opposition” — suggests diplomatic efforts are already underway.
In that, Russia may succeed. But its influence in Syria — and the regional clout that came with it — will never be quite the same.
Russia largely watched from the sidelines as Syrian rebels swept through the country in less than 10 days, overtaking Aleppo, Hama and Homs before entering Damascus, the capital, on Sunday. Mr. al-Assad is now gone, his departure celebrated by crowds of ecstatic Syrians. In Russia, where Mr. al-Assad has fled, the fall of his government amounts to a devastating loss. Decades of Russian military and political investment to carve out a foothold in the Mediterranean are now at risk. Vladimir Putin may yet manage to retain some stakes in a post-Assad Syria, but there’s no way around it: He just suffered a significant defeat.
Russia’s ties with the Assad family go back to the 1970s, when Hafez al-Assad — Bashar’s father — solidified Syria’s place in the Soviet orbit. When the younger Mr. al-Assad met a peaceful uprising with a violent crackdown that escalated into a bloody conflict, Russia responded, in early 2012, by vetoing a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on him to resign. The year before, Mr. Putin, then prime minister, had lambasted a separate U.N. resolution authorizing airstrikes against the Libyan dictator Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi as a “medieval call for a crusade” and was said to be livid when Colonel Qaddafi was killed. He was determined that Mr. al-Assad not suffer the same fate.
Mr. Putin has given the younger Mr. al-Assad substantial military assistance in the years since. By 2015 Mr. al-Assad’s forces controlled barely 20 percent of Syria’s territory and Russia launched a military operation to save him. In 2017 Russia helped negotiate temporary cease-fires in parts of Syria, then enabled regime forces to gobble up many of those places. Its military presence eventually morphed into a smaller force suitable to managing low-level conflict, but Russia never withdrew from Syria even after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine eclipsed all other foreign policy priorities. By that point, maintaining a presence there, including the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval base, was also critical to Russia’s military operations in Libya, the Central African Republic and the Sahel — a new frontier for Russian power projection.
Russia’s military support was complemented by patient political backing. Mr. Putin and Mr. al-Assad remained as thick as thieves throughout several rounds of arduous peace conferences that attempted to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. In 2013, Mr. Putin had emerged as Mr. al-Assad’s knight in shining armor — and incidentally exposed the weakness of President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria — by vouching for the destruction of Mr. al-Assad’s chemical weapons within a year and heading off the prospect of American airstrikes. (A few years later, more than 80 Syrian civilians would be killed in a sarin attack that the United States attributed to the regime’s forces.)
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In early 2018, Russia hosted a Syrian congress in the resort town of Sochi that was mostly attended by pro-Assad delegates and diluted ambitious visions of a political transition to questions of constitutional reform. Once the war in Syria cooled, Moscow’s diplomats pivoted to lobbying for the three Rs: reconstruction support, refugee return and the rehabilitation of Mr. al-Assad.
Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Throughout, Russia was often frustrated with the Assad regime’s refusals to make even the smallest concessions — as evidenced by Mr. Putin’s own occasional shows of contempt for Mr. al-Assad.
But Russia never threw in the towel — until Syria’s war suddenly reheated last month. If Mr. al-Assad’s persistent obstinacy had stretched Russia’s patience, the dynamics of the past weeks did the rest. Many of Mr. al-Assad’s own forces simply got out of the rebels’ way, and it quickly became clear that the Iranians, who had also backed him for years, weren’t coming either. Russia telegraphed its growing concern and intensified bombardments in the rebel-held northwest province of Idlib, but it did nothing to reinforce its presence in Syria. As the rebels advanced, it became obvious that Russia would not intervene in any major way. With Russia’s military capacity consumed in Ukraine, its calculus had changed: Mr. Putin probably realized that it was time to cut Mr. al-Assad loose and to prioritize retaining Russia’s military bases in a new Syria.
But Mr. al-Assad’s fall is still a loss. The Sunni Arab states had loathed Mr. Putin’s coming to the rescue of Mr. al-Assad, an Alawite, in a conflict they viewed as part of a wider struggle with Shiite Iran. But Mr. Putin had earned respect across the region and beyond, especially among autocratic leaders, by standing with his ally and showing it to the Americans. That respect is now in jeopardy, and Mr. Putin’s decision to grant Mr. al-Assad asylum may be a last-ditch effort to signal that he does not abandon his own.
Russia could always justify setbacks in Ukraine by claiming that it is fighting the “collective West.” It could explain its abandonment of its ally Armenia during Azerbaijan’s offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh last year on the basis of shifting regional realities, while hoping that few would take note. But Syria is different. No amount of rhetorical gymnastics by Russia’s spin doctors can distract from the fact that the abandonment of Mr. al-Assad is the clearest sign, since Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine, that there are new limits on Russian power projection.
Besides seeing its partner Iran weakened, Russia will lose leverage to other regional heavyweights, especially Israel and Turkey. Russia’s partnership with Mr. al-Assad and Hezbollah made it an Israeli “neighbor to the north,” which meant that Israel had to inform Russia when it was conducting strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel also had to navigate with caution on Ukraine, even as Russia moved closer to Iran and adopted a pro-Palestinian position on the Gaza war. With Mr. al-Assad gone and the Iranians sidelined in Syria, Israel has more room to maneuver.
With Turkey, with which Russia has a longstanding rivalry, the loss is arguably greater. Having already accumulated leverage over Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey could have formidable bargaining power in any negotiations over Russia’s future influence in Syria thanks to its patronage of Syria’s armed opposition.
Mr. al-Assad’s ouster could also lead to the more tangible loss of the bases, Hmeimim and Tartus. Russia will do all it can to retain the bases, of course. The shift in its language when talking about its new Syrian interlocutors — from “terrorists” to “armed opposition” — suggests diplomatic efforts are already underway.
In that, Russia may succeed. But its influence in Syria — and the regional clout that came with it — will never be quite the same.
