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Supreme Court accepts case that challenges authority of federal agencies

cigaretteman

HR King
May 29, 2001
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The Supreme Court on Monday said it would take up a case that could do away with a decades-old precedent that tells judges to defer to federal agencies when interpreting ambiguous federal laws, a deference long targeted by conservatives concerned about the power of the administrative state.

As the Supreme Court has become more conservative, the justices have grown less likely to defer to federal agencies under the 1984 precedent in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. But lower courts are bound to rely on the precedent because the Supreme Court has never officially renounced it.

A split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit used the Chevron doctrine in deciding the case the Supreme Court added to its docket Monday: whether the government can force herring fishermen off the coast of New England to fund a program that provides federal monitors for their operations. The program is overseen by the National Marine Fisheries Service.



Two fishing companies told the court in their petition that the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires vessel owners to make room on board for federal monitors, without requiring the owners to pay those monitors.
“But without any express statutory authorization, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has decided to go one very large step further and require petitioners to pay the salaries of government-mandated monitors who take up valuable space on their vessels and oversee their operations,” the petitions state.
Despite outrage from some, Congress reluctant to intervene on Supreme Court ethics
Two judges on a D.C. Circuit panel said the fisheries service was justified to interpret the statute as authorizing the payment program. But the third judge said his colleagues had mistaken silence in the statute for authority.

The decision “authorizes agencies to force the governed to quarter and pay for their regulatory overseers without clear congressional authorization,” said the companies’ petition. “And it perceives ambiguity in statutory silence, where the logical explanation for the statutory silence is that Congress did not intend to grant the agency such a dangerous and uncabined authority. Whether by clarifying Chevron or overruling it, this Court should grant review and reverse the clear agency overreach at issue here.”


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The Biden administration defended the fishing service and the Chevron doctrine. “Federal courts have invoked Chevron in thousands of reported decisions, and Congress has repeatedly legislated against its backdrop,” the government said in its brief. It said the doctrine “promotes political accountability, national uniformity, and predictability, and it respects the expertise agencies can bring to bear in administering complex statutory schemes.”
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, who served on the D.C. Circuit until last June, did not participate in the decision to take the case and, as is customary, did not say why she recused herself.
The court also said Monday that it would take a case focused on what financial whistleblowers must prove in retaliation lawsuits against their employers.
In other orders Monday, the court turned down a challenge to an Indiana law that requires the cremation or burial of embryonic or fetal remains following an abortion. There were no noted dissents to the decision not to review the law.

 
This does seem odd.

Two fishing companies told the court in their petition that the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires vessel owners to make room on board for federal monitors, without requiring the owners to pay those monitors.
“But without any express statutory authorization, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has decided to go one very large step further and require petitioners to pay the salaries of government-mandated monitors who take up valuable space on their vessels and oversee their operations,” the petitions state.
 
Some random thoughts…

Yeah, on its facts, the case certainly raises some eyebrows as to the limits of agency discretion.

This a paul Clement case, so it’ll be really well lawyered. I think his first post dobbs maybe.

Jackson recused herself from the petition, as she’d initially been in the panel that heard dc circuit argument but was replaced by cj Srinivasan when nominated. So, chevron probably has only two votes to start, at best. Personally I’d like to see her participate here as I’m just not persuaded that’s a basis for recusal (even if it is standard practice).

Important to remember that this is not a constitutional case, it’s a statutory one (both as to the merits and the apa question). So congress can act if it eventually feels it needs to (which I suppose is the whole point).

Regardless of whatever other cases they take, this is likely to be the most important case next term.
 
Some random thoughts…

Yeah, on its facts, the case certainly raises some eyebrows as to the limits of agency discretion.

This a paul Clement case, so it’ll be really well lawyered. I think his first post dobbs maybe.

Jackson recused herself from the petition, as she’d initially been in the panel that heard dc circuit argument but was replaced by cj Srinivasan when nominated. So, chevron probably has only two votes to start, at best. Personally I’d like to see her participate here as I’m just not persuaded that’s a basis for recusal (even if it is standard practice).

Important to remember that this is not a constitutional case, it’s a statutory one (both as to the merits and the apa question). So congress can act if it eventually feels it needs to (which I suppose is the whole point).

Regardless of whatever other cases they take, this is likely to be the most important case next term.

Isn't it refreshing to see someone who cares about ethics/appearances in this court?
 
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Isn't it refreshing to see someone who cares about ethics/appearances in this court?
Just to be clear, the practice of recusing oneself in matters where a justice participated in a case in a lower court before he/she was nominated is pretty much universal. Just from memory, at least both Gorsuch and Comey Barrett have done so.

Personally, I don't see why this is a basis for recusal, and so I'm not actually that refreshed by it. Appellate cases are decided on fixed records, and I'm no sure what the risk/indicia of bias is for a judge/justice to hear the very same case, again on appeal, again. Indeed, it happens all the time in cases that are reviewed by the circuits en banc following an initial panel decision. At best, the argument would be that the "justices" might be more deferential to their new colleague's lower court opinion. I don't find that particularly compelling, inasmuch as scotus justices are not exactly what I would call wilting violets when it comes to expressing their opinions or disagreeing with their colleagues.
 
This is job security for the court. Rule against the evil government and see lots and lots of cases on what is and isn’t correct according to their ideals, not necessarily the law.
Something tells me that people with lifetime appointments are not exactly worried about job security. Now as to the lawyers...
 
Just to be clear, the practice of recusing oneself in matters where a justice participated in a case in a lower court before he/she was nominated is pretty much universal. Just from memory, at least both Gorsuch and Comey Barrett have done so.

Personally, I don't see why this is a basis for recusal, and so I'm not actually that refreshed by it. Appellate cases are decided on fixed records, and I'm no sure what the risk/indicia of bias is for a judge/justice to hear the very same case, again on appeal, again. Indeed, it happens all the time in cases that are reviewed by the circuits en banc following an initial panel decision. At best, the argument would be that the "justices" might be more deferential to their new colleague's lower court opinion. I don't find that particularly compelling, inasmuch as scotus justices are not exactly what I would call wilting violets when it comes to expressing their opinions or disagreeing with their colleagues.
Yeah, I had no doubt that you wouldn't find it refreshing.
 
Yeah, I had no doubt that you wouldn't find it refreshing.
Don't get me wrong here, I think this is a case Jackson should participate in. It's the most important APA case probably in my lifetime, and there's really no reasonable basis to believe that she has either prejudged the case (she didn't actually write or sign on to an opinion below) or that her participation would compromise the independent judgment of her colleagues.
 
Some random thoughts…

Yeah, on its facts, the case certainly raises some eyebrows as to the limits of agency discretion.

This a paul Clement case, so it’ll be really well lawyered. I think his first post dobbs maybe.

Jackson recused herself from the petition, as she’d initially been in the panel that heard dc circuit argument but was replaced by cj Srinivasan when nominated. So, chevron probably has only two votes to start, at best. Personally I’d like to see her participate here as I’m just not persuaded that’s a basis for recusal (even if it is standard practice).

Important to remember that this is not a constitutional case, it’s a statutory one (both as to the merits and the apa question). So congress can act if it eventually feels it needs to (which I suppose is the whole point).

Regardless of whatever other cases they take, this is likely to be the most important case next term.
If you are correct, I believe precedent should be overturned if for no other reason than to make sure the people's will is what governs our country not the opinions of unelected bureaucrats. If a law needs to be changed or implemented, I want that done by elected representatives..
 
Isn't it refreshing to see someone who cares about ethics/appearances in this court?
Yup. Seems you're a big fan of Barrett and Kavanaugh as they have the best ethics. God for you!
90
 
If you are correct, I believe precedent should be overturned if for no other reason than to make sure the people's will is what governs our country not the opinions of unelected bureaucrats. If a law needs to be changed or implemented, I want that done by elected representatives..
At the 50,000 foot level, that's actually what a lot of these big administrative regulatory cases are really about -- whether they be major questions, appointment clause, or Chevron -- ensuring that the system incentives are such that the politically accountable people are the ones who make decisions. We are a process-based governmental system, and the question "who decides" (rather than "what they decide") is a the root of many cases before the Court.
 
50 years ago the concept of deferring to the expertise of the various federal agencies seemed not only reasonable idea, but also necessary one. However, more recently our dysfunctional Congress has been off-loading its duties to agencies and in doing so, essentially bypassing representative democratic government as envisioned by the Constitution. I think the Court will be motivated to reign in agency independence to assure that Congress actually legislates.
 
50 years ago the concept of deferring to the expertise of the various federal agencies seemed not only reasonable idea, but also necessary one. However, more recently our dysfunctional Congress has been off-loading its duties to agencies and in doing so, essentially bypassing representative democratic government as envisioned by the Constitution. I think the Court will be motivated to reign in agency independence to assure that Congress actually legislates.
I find your conclusion to be assbackwards. You seem to be implying that if SCOTUS tells Congress to actually to its job, it will suddenly dispense with the performance art and get down to the business of governing. Not to mention the fact that in light of Citizens United, SCOTUS is telling Congress to regulate the entities who are largely responsible for providing their employment and salary. Of course, this has always been the objective of our corporate overlords, and now they are about to achieve it.
 
The Supreme Court on Monday said it would take up a case that could do away with a decades-old precedent that tells judges to defer to federal agencies when interpreting ambiguous federal laws, a deference long targeted by conservatives concerned about the power of the administrative state.

As the Supreme Court has become more conservative, the justices have grown less likely to defer to federal agencies under the 1984 precedent in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. But lower courts are bound to rely on the precedent because the Supreme Court has never officially renounced it.

A split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit used the Chevron doctrine in deciding the case the Supreme Court added to its docket Monday: whether the government can force herring fishermen off the coast of New England to fund a program that provides federal monitors for their operations. The program is overseen by the National Marine Fisheries Service.



Two fishing companies told the court in their petition that the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires vessel owners to make room on board for federal monitors, without requiring the owners to pay those monitors.
“But without any express statutory authorization, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has decided to go one very large step further and require petitioners to pay the salaries of government-mandated monitors who take up valuable space on their vessels and oversee their operations,” the petitions state.
Despite outrage from some, Congress reluctant to intervene on Supreme Court ethics
Two judges on a D.C. Circuit panel said the fisheries service was justified to interpret the statute as authorizing the payment program. But the third judge said his colleagues had mistaken silence in the statute for authority.

The decision “authorizes agencies to force the governed to quarter and pay for their regulatory overseers without clear congressional authorization,” said the companies’ petition. “And it perceives ambiguity in statutory silence, where the logical explanation for the statutory silence is that Congress did not intend to grant the agency such a dangerous and uncabined authority. Whether by clarifying Chevron or overruling it, this Court should grant review and reverse the clear agency overreach at issue here.”


ADVERTISING

The Biden administration defended the fishing service and the Chevron doctrine. “Federal courts have invoked Chevron in thousands of reported decisions, and Congress has repeatedly legislated against its backdrop,” the government said in its brief. It said the doctrine “promotes political accountability, national uniformity, and predictability, and it respects the expertise agencies can bring to bear in administering complex statutory schemes.”
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, who served on the D.C. Circuit until last June, did not participate in the decision to take the case and, as is customary, did not say why she recused herself.
The court also said Monday that it would take a case focused on what financial whistleblowers must prove in retaliation lawsuits against their employers.
In other orders Monday, the court turned down a challenge to an Indiana law that requires the cremation or burial of embryonic or fetal remains following an abortion. There were no noted dissents to the decision not to review the law.


Gotta get them "abortion pills" off the market one way or another, yo.
 
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