By Philip Bump
National correspondent
Today at 11:17 a.m. EST
One challenge for the House select committee investigating the riot at the Capitol on Jan. 6 is that its mandate was narrowly drawn. It was established to “investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,” including “influencing factors that contributed to the domestic terrorist attack.” The details of the Proud Boys showing up and breaking windows is squarely within that scope. The months-long effort by Donald Trump and his allies to subvert the election results, less directly.
Put another way, the path to accountability for those who participated in the Capitol riot is clear. The path to accountability for the president that stoked the day's anger and called his supporters to the city, less so.
We have a much better picture of what unfolded in the weeks after the election than we did at the end of June, when the select committee was formed. That’s in part thanks to the information gathered by the committee and in part because of external reporting exploring what the White House and allies of the then-president were doing. But it also makes clear the ways in which a focus centered on the Capitol on Jan. 6 risks obscuring the broader effort in which Trump was engaged.
On Sunday, the committee recommended that former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows face criminal contempt charges for his failure to offer testimony related to the events of Jan. 6. In its referral to the House, the committee details new information gleaned from emails and documents Meadows did turn over. That material included a now-infamous PowerPoint presentation created by a retired U.S. Army colonel named Phil Waldron that included nonsensical claims about foreign interference in the election and recommendations for derailing Joe Biden's presidency using the National Guard, if necessary. The material also included two previously unreported messages, one in which Meadows informed someone that the Guard would be on-hand on Jan. 6 to “protect pro Trump people” and one in which an organizer of the rally at the Ellipse that morning told Meadows that the situation had “gotten crazy and I desperately need some direction.”
In the aggregate, those details help firm up a rough taxonomy of the post-election period. It can be broken out into three often overlapping segments: the efforts of Trump and his close advisers, those of his allies and hangers-on and the events of Jan. 6 itself. At times, this is a distinction without a difference, as when we consider whether the Capitol riot would have happened without Trump’s efforts — it would not have. But at times it’s clarifying, allowing a focus on how Trump did and didn’t plan to use institutional power to retain power.
What we currently understand about the White House’s effort is that it was largely focused on the finalization of the electoral vote. On Jan. 6, that culminated with Trump’s attempts to pressure Vice President Mike Pence into rejecting the submitted votes from several states, either overtly declaring them invalid in an attempt to give Trump a victory with what remained or demanding that the states reconsider what had been submitted. This effort sat on the foundation of months of false claims from Trump about voter fraud and operated in parallel with efforts by Trump and his allies to get institutional buy-in on those assertions. His consideration of overhauling the leadership at the Justice Department to put pressure on Georgia, his call to officials in that state, his embrace of debunked allegations from there and elsewhere: all of it was aimed at having states elevate false concerns about the results that could then be used to undercut the submitted electoral votes.
At the same time, there was an enormous and robust economy for other nonsense and conspiratorial thinking outside of the administration. Again, this wasn't entire distinct from Trump's inner circle; despite his recent insistences, his formal legal team at one point included Sidney Powell, whose, um, exotic claims about the election became staples of networks of ridiculous assertions about what had occurred the preceding November. Trump himself tweeted false claims about the security of electronic voting machines that overlapped with Powell's claims.
But other outside claims went further. A PowerPoint presentation that circulated online last week and which reportedly has some overlap with the one sent to Meadows includes a recommendation that a national emergency be declared. Such rumblings had been heard at other points, too. Shortly before Trump left office, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell came to the White House with a document that included a mention of declaring martial law to prevent Biden’s ascent. Former national security adviser Michael Flynn had already introduced the idea of having the military rerun the election, something that Trump apparently floated during a contentious meeting at the White House last December. (The select committee’s contempt referral makes similar reference to this meeting.) And for every wild theory that percolated into the White House, there were scores more that sluiced through the sympathetic sewers of pro-Trump conspiracy theorizing.
Then there was the violence on Jan. 6, an occurrence that was entirely a function of Trump’s claims about the election and his calls for people to show up in Washington on that day. There remain a number of questions about how, even given that fomentation, the violence might have been prevented and the ways in which the government was unprepared to contain the rioters. We know that Trump sought the use of the National Guard to protect his supporters, certainly operating in part under his long-standing and facile belief that only those on the left posed any risk of violence. (In both November and December, protests in Washington had devolved into violence involving right-wing actors.) It’s also clear that Trump and his allies saw the violence that day as effective at delaying the finalization of Biden’s victory, as Trump had wanted.
One particularly telling aspect of Jan. 6 is the number of people who saw the violence and tumult as being something that Trump could end even if it didn’t begin at his direct demand. The select committee’s referral for contempt includes that reference to the organizer of the Ellipse rally appealing to Meadows — and certainly, by extension, the White House — to help figure out a path forward. There are numerous other known efforts to contact the White House and get Trump to quell the violence as it unfolded, leading only belatedly to a tepid comment from the then-president.
There was a very real and very focused effort by Trump and his allies for him to retain power despite losing the 2020 presidential election. There’s little question that he would have deployed any tactic he thought might be successful and that he deployed a number that weren’t. It’s also clear that there was an entire ecosystem ginning up attention and cash contributions by promoting more egregious efforts to leverage federal power in service of that effort, including the deployment of the military. And it’s clear that many of the rioters on Jan. 6, stoked both by Trump and by that outside universe of claims, believed that they were the final line of defense in that effort — something that Trump was obviously perfectly content to have them believe in the moment.
The challenge for the select committee and by extension the United States is that it’s not clear what process exists to hold Trump and his allies accountable for their post-election efforts. It’s not clear that there was any serious effort to deploy the military as part of Trump’s effort to retain power, but it’s clear that this effort nonetheless took place in a concerted and complicated way.
The Jan. 6 committee is unmasking the effort. But then what?
National correspondent
Today at 11:17 a.m. EST
One challenge for the House select committee investigating the riot at the Capitol on Jan. 6 is that its mandate was narrowly drawn. It was established to “investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,” including “influencing factors that contributed to the domestic terrorist attack.” The details of the Proud Boys showing up and breaking windows is squarely within that scope. The months-long effort by Donald Trump and his allies to subvert the election results, less directly.
Put another way, the path to accountability for those who participated in the Capitol riot is clear. The path to accountability for the president that stoked the day's anger and called his supporters to the city, less so.
We have a much better picture of what unfolded in the weeks after the election than we did at the end of June, when the select committee was formed. That’s in part thanks to the information gathered by the committee and in part because of external reporting exploring what the White House and allies of the then-president were doing. But it also makes clear the ways in which a focus centered on the Capitol on Jan. 6 risks obscuring the broader effort in which Trump was engaged.
On Sunday, the committee recommended that former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows face criminal contempt charges for his failure to offer testimony related to the events of Jan. 6. In its referral to the House, the committee details new information gleaned from emails and documents Meadows did turn over. That material included a now-infamous PowerPoint presentation created by a retired U.S. Army colonel named Phil Waldron that included nonsensical claims about foreign interference in the election and recommendations for derailing Joe Biden's presidency using the National Guard, if necessary. The material also included two previously unreported messages, one in which Meadows informed someone that the Guard would be on-hand on Jan. 6 to “protect pro Trump people” and one in which an organizer of the rally at the Ellipse that morning told Meadows that the situation had “gotten crazy and I desperately need some direction.”
In the aggregate, those details help firm up a rough taxonomy of the post-election period. It can be broken out into three often overlapping segments: the efforts of Trump and his close advisers, those of his allies and hangers-on and the events of Jan. 6 itself. At times, this is a distinction without a difference, as when we consider whether the Capitol riot would have happened without Trump’s efforts — it would not have. But at times it’s clarifying, allowing a focus on how Trump did and didn’t plan to use institutional power to retain power.
What we currently understand about the White House’s effort is that it was largely focused on the finalization of the electoral vote. On Jan. 6, that culminated with Trump’s attempts to pressure Vice President Mike Pence into rejecting the submitted votes from several states, either overtly declaring them invalid in an attempt to give Trump a victory with what remained or demanding that the states reconsider what had been submitted. This effort sat on the foundation of months of false claims from Trump about voter fraud and operated in parallel with efforts by Trump and his allies to get institutional buy-in on those assertions. His consideration of overhauling the leadership at the Justice Department to put pressure on Georgia, his call to officials in that state, his embrace of debunked allegations from there and elsewhere: all of it was aimed at having states elevate false concerns about the results that could then be used to undercut the submitted electoral votes.
At the same time, there was an enormous and robust economy for other nonsense and conspiratorial thinking outside of the administration. Again, this wasn't entire distinct from Trump's inner circle; despite his recent insistences, his formal legal team at one point included Sidney Powell, whose, um, exotic claims about the election became staples of networks of ridiculous assertions about what had occurred the preceding November. Trump himself tweeted false claims about the security of electronic voting machines that overlapped with Powell's claims.
But other outside claims went further. A PowerPoint presentation that circulated online last week and which reportedly has some overlap with the one sent to Meadows includes a recommendation that a national emergency be declared. Such rumblings had been heard at other points, too. Shortly before Trump left office, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell came to the White House with a document that included a mention of declaring martial law to prevent Biden’s ascent. Former national security adviser Michael Flynn had already introduced the idea of having the military rerun the election, something that Trump apparently floated during a contentious meeting at the White House last December. (The select committee’s contempt referral makes similar reference to this meeting.) And for every wild theory that percolated into the White House, there were scores more that sluiced through the sympathetic sewers of pro-Trump conspiracy theorizing.
Then there was the violence on Jan. 6, an occurrence that was entirely a function of Trump’s claims about the election and his calls for people to show up in Washington on that day. There remain a number of questions about how, even given that fomentation, the violence might have been prevented and the ways in which the government was unprepared to contain the rioters. We know that Trump sought the use of the National Guard to protect his supporters, certainly operating in part under his long-standing and facile belief that only those on the left posed any risk of violence. (In both November and December, protests in Washington had devolved into violence involving right-wing actors.) It’s also clear that Trump and his allies saw the violence that day as effective at delaying the finalization of Biden’s victory, as Trump had wanted.
One particularly telling aspect of Jan. 6 is the number of people who saw the violence and tumult as being something that Trump could end even if it didn’t begin at his direct demand. The select committee’s referral for contempt includes that reference to the organizer of the Ellipse rally appealing to Meadows — and certainly, by extension, the White House — to help figure out a path forward. There are numerous other known efforts to contact the White House and get Trump to quell the violence as it unfolded, leading only belatedly to a tepid comment from the then-president.
There was a very real and very focused effort by Trump and his allies for him to retain power despite losing the 2020 presidential election. There’s little question that he would have deployed any tactic he thought might be successful and that he deployed a number that weren’t. It’s also clear that there was an entire ecosystem ginning up attention and cash contributions by promoting more egregious efforts to leverage federal power in service of that effort, including the deployment of the military. And it’s clear that many of the rioters on Jan. 6, stoked both by Trump and by that outside universe of claims, believed that they were the final line of defense in that effort — something that Trump was obviously perfectly content to have them believe in the moment.
The challenge for the select committee and by extension the United States is that it’s not clear what process exists to hold Trump and his allies accountable for their post-election efforts. It’s not clear that there was any serious effort to deploy the military as part of Trump’s effort to retain power, but it’s clear that this effort nonetheless took place in a concerted and complicated way.
The Jan. 6 committee is unmasking the effort. But then what?
