The spirit of Munich hovers over European capitals just as the Munich Security Conference takes place,” remarked the Vice-Rector of Finland’s National Defence University at a recent international seminar on Russia. His reference to Europe’s catastrophic 1938 deal with Nazi Germany encapsulates the growing unease in the continent over discussions of a potential US-Russia “peace” settlement for Ukraine. That unease turned into outright shock following the explosive confrontation between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office on Friday.
The Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine rests on a dangerously flawed premise: that Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war and that Kyiv could have negotiated an earlier settlement. Some within the administration now argue that, given Russia’s economic and military losses, Moscow may be prepared to accept a deal under new US leadership. But the fundamental question remains: Is Russia truly seeking to end the war, or is it merely angling for an “operational pause” to regroup and rearm?
Between ambiguity and structural constraints
A closer look at Moscow’s strategic thinking suggests that the West risks misinterpreting Russian intentions. Unlike Western notions of war and peace as distinct phases, Russian military doctrine treats them as part of a continuum. Its “New Generation Warfare” blurs the line between peacetime and wartime, seeing war as an ongoing struggle against the adversary’s system. Since 2022, Russia’s war aims have remained ambiguous, shifting in rhetoric but consistent in substance: preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership, toppling the Zelensky government, destroying Ukraine’s demographic and territorial fabric, annexing territories, weakening NATO, and restoring imperial influence. Globally, Moscow seeks to challenge Western hegemony and promote a multipolar world. Russian propaganda terms like “denazification” and “demilitarization” remain vague, leaving Western negotiators uncertain whether these are specific objectives or mere justifications for broader imperial ambitions. Russian officials speak in multiple voices – sometimes advocating diplomacy, at other times hinting at total war and nuclear escalation.
But ambiguity alone does not explain why Moscow is unlikely to pursue genuine peace. Since 2022, Russia has undergone a profound transformation into a militarized economy and society. The defense sector has overtaken traditional industries, with Russia’s GDP growing by 3% in Q3 of 2023, largely due to arms production. Military factories now operate on 24-hour shifts, and hundreds of thousands of new workers have been absorbed into the war economy.
Beyond economics, war has impacted Russia’s societal fabric. In disenfranchised regions, particularly those with ethnic minorities, military service has become one of the few pathways to upward mobility. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has fostered an elite class that profits from the forced expropriation of Western businesses. The war has also reinforced the logic of authoritarian rule, with no major elite defections despite occasional crises. Meanwhile, youth militarization is expanding, with 1.75 million members in the Kremlin-backed Yunarmiya movement, a long-term investment in ideological control.
This fusion of economic, political, and social incentives makes ending the war a daunting task for the risk-averse Kremlin. A negotiated settlement could provoke internal resistance from war profiteers, security elites, and nationalist factions who have become deeply invested in the conflict. For Putin, the war is no longer just a geopolitical gamble – it has become a regime survival mechanism.
Unruly veterans and power struggles
Even if the Kremlin sought an off-ramp, post-war Russia would face significant instability. The reintegration of returning troops – including regular soldiers, mercenaries, released convicts, and paramilitary fighters – could fracture the state. Figures like Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, whose “personal army” has tripled in size and gained unprecedented operational experience, may leverage their power in post-war elite struggles. Meanwhile, regional elites and private militias – some backed by oligarchs – could evolve into competing security forces, exacerbating instability. Russia’s failure to integrate its veterans could further brutalize society. The Kremlin’s reliance on the “proxyfication” of its armed forces means that any demobilization would be fraught with risks. Fighters accustomed to wartime privilege may resist reintegration into civilian life, while radicalized factions could become a destabilizing force within Russia itself.
Brutal mechanism of control
Contrary to Trump administration claims, current negotiations could grant Russia a much-needed operational pause, allowing it to regroup, rebuild its military, and prepare for a greater confrontation with Ukraine and the West. Given Russia’s war-driven economy, entrenched power structures, and ideological trajectory, ending the war will not be as simple – or as bloodless – as some Western policymakers wish to believe. The notion that Russia will accept a diplomatic settlement ignores the deeper transformations the war has triggered within the country. War has become a stabilizing force for the Kremlin, a brutal mechanism of control that has reshaped Russia’s economy, society, and political order. The regime has not just absorbed the costs – human, economic, and geopolitical – it has normalized them.
The lessons of Munich have never been more relevant. As President Zelensky rightly challenged President Trump and Vice President Vance during their heated February 28 exchange in the Oval Office: What kind of diplomacy is possible with Putin’s Russia? A settlement that rewards Russian aggression would not bring peace; it would only reset the countdown to the next war, one that the West may be even less prepared to fight.
About the Author
Dr. Sarah Fainberg serves as Senior Researcher and Head of Research Program at Tel Aviv University’s Elrom Center for Air and Space Studies.
The Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine rests on a dangerously flawed premise: that Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war and that Kyiv could have negotiated an earlier settlement. Some within the administration now argue that, given Russia’s economic and military losses, Moscow may be prepared to accept a deal under new US leadership. But the fundamental question remains: Is Russia truly seeking to end the war, or is it merely angling for an “operational pause” to regroup and rearm?
Between ambiguity and structural constraints
A closer look at Moscow’s strategic thinking suggests that the West risks misinterpreting Russian intentions. Unlike Western notions of war and peace as distinct phases, Russian military doctrine treats them as part of a continuum. Its “New Generation Warfare” blurs the line between peacetime and wartime, seeing war as an ongoing struggle against the adversary’s system. Since 2022, Russia’s war aims have remained ambiguous, shifting in rhetoric but consistent in substance: preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership, toppling the Zelensky government, destroying Ukraine’s demographic and territorial fabric, annexing territories, weakening NATO, and restoring imperial influence. Globally, Moscow seeks to challenge Western hegemony and promote a multipolar world. Russian propaganda terms like “denazification” and “demilitarization” remain vague, leaving Western negotiators uncertain whether these are specific objectives or mere justifications for broader imperial ambitions. Russian officials speak in multiple voices – sometimes advocating diplomacy, at other times hinting at total war and nuclear escalation.
But ambiguity alone does not explain why Moscow is unlikely to pursue genuine peace. Since 2022, Russia has undergone a profound transformation into a militarized economy and society. The defense sector has overtaken traditional industries, with Russia’s GDP growing by 3% in Q3 of 2023, largely due to arms production. Military factories now operate on 24-hour shifts, and hundreds of thousands of new workers have been absorbed into the war economy.
Beyond economics, war has impacted Russia’s societal fabric. In disenfranchised regions, particularly those with ethnic minorities, military service has become one of the few pathways to upward mobility. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has fostered an elite class that profits from the forced expropriation of Western businesses. The war has also reinforced the logic of authoritarian rule, with no major elite defections despite occasional crises. Meanwhile, youth militarization is expanding, with 1.75 million members in the Kremlin-backed Yunarmiya movement, a long-term investment in ideological control.
This fusion of economic, political, and social incentives makes ending the war a daunting task for the risk-averse Kremlin. A negotiated settlement could provoke internal resistance from war profiteers, security elites, and nationalist factions who have become deeply invested in the conflict. For Putin, the war is no longer just a geopolitical gamble – it has become a regime survival mechanism.
Unruly veterans and power struggles
Even if the Kremlin sought an off-ramp, post-war Russia would face significant instability. The reintegration of returning troops – including regular soldiers, mercenaries, released convicts, and paramilitary fighters – could fracture the state. Figures like Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, whose “personal army” has tripled in size and gained unprecedented operational experience, may leverage their power in post-war elite struggles. Meanwhile, regional elites and private militias – some backed by oligarchs – could evolve into competing security forces, exacerbating instability. Russia’s failure to integrate its veterans could further brutalize society. The Kremlin’s reliance on the “proxyfication” of its armed forces means that any demobilization would be fraught with risks. Fighters accustomed to wartime privilege may resist reintegration into civilian life, while radicalized factions could become a destabilizing force within Russia itself.
Brutal mechanism of control
Contrary to Trump administration claims, current negotiations could grant Russia a much-needed operational pause, allowing it to regroup, rebuild its military, and prepare for a greater confrontation with Ukraine and the West. Given Russia’s war-driven economy, entrenched power structures, and ideological trajectory, ending the war will not be as simple – or as bloodless – as some Western policymakers wish to believe. The notion that Russia will accept a diplomatic settlement ignores the deeper transformations the war has triggered within the country. War has become a stabilizing force for the Kremlin, a brutal mechanism of control that has reshaped Russia’s economy, society, and political order. The regime has not just absorbed the costs – human, economic, and geopolitical – it has normalized them.
The lessons of Munich have never been more relevant. As President Zelensky rightly challenged President Trump and Vice President Vance during their heated February 28 exchange in the Oval Office: What kind of diplomacy is possible with Putin’s Russia? A settlement that rewards Russian aggression would not bring peace; it would only reset the countdown to the next war, one that the West may be even less prepared to fight.
About the Author
Dr. Sarah Fainberg serves as Senior Researcher and Head of Research Program at Tel Aviv University’s Elrom Center for Air and Space Studies.
