By 1 p.m. on Jan. 6, 2021, Donald Trump and those focused on helping him retain power had to switch to what might be called Plan B.
For days before Congress was set to convene and count submitted electoral votes, formalizing Trump’s loss to Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election, Trump had been pressuring Vice President Mike Pence to simply reject slates of electors from states Trump had lost narrowly. According to the indictment obtained by special counsel Jack Smith on Monday, the pressure campaign was already underway by the holidays. When Pence called the president to wish him a merry Christmas, Trump allegedly began hectoring him about rejecting electors.
Sign up to get email alerts for political commentary, insights and stories from Jennifer Rubin right as she publishes.
So it went. Trump called Pence on Jan. 1, the indictment alleges, pointing to notes taken contemporaneously by Pence. When Pence rejected the plan once again, Trump allegedly said he was “too honest.” As the date neared, the encounters allegedly accelerated, with Trump and such allies as his attorney John Eastman trying to cajole Pence into enacting the scheme. On the evening of Jan. 5, Trump allegedly had his campaign put out a statement suggesting that Pence and he were “in total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act.”
The next morning, the morning of Jan. 6, Trump tried once again. Pence again refused.
“Immediately after the call,” the indictment alleges, “the Defendant decided to single out the Vice President in public remarks he would make within the hour, reinserting language that he had personally drafted earlier that morning — falsely claiming that the Vice President had authority to send electoral votes to the states — but that advisors had previously successfully advocated be removed.”
That language included telling the crowd at his speech on Jan. 6 that “if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.” Pence was made into the linchpin. But then, at 1 p.m., the vice president released a statement dismissing the idea that he would reject submitted electors. So: Plan B.
Sign up for How To Read This Chart, a weekly data newsletter from Philip Bump
Plan B was related to Plan A. In essence, it involved cajoling members of the House and the Senate to reject electors submitted by states Trump presented as “contested.” In a speech before Trump’s on Jan. 6, his attorney Rudy Giuliani insisted (falsely, the indictment notes) that the campaign had “letters from five legislatures begging us” to return elector slates for reconsideration. Trump broached this in his comments, too — again pinning it on Pence.
“States want to revote. The states got defrauded,” he said. “ … All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the states to recertify [their results] and we become president and you are the happiest people.”
Once Pence rejected the plan, though, Trump and his allies — particularly Giuliani — scrambled to go the official route: increasing the number of senators willing to oppose the recognition of the electors. They already had about a dozen, thanks to the willingness of Sens. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) and Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) to object to electors from Arizona and Pennsylvania. Expanding that pool of legislators became the Alamo, the last stand.
They had help. As Trump was speaking, his supporters were heading to the Capitol and, in at least one place, pushed past police. By quarter past 2 p.m., they were inside the building.
According to the indictment — and in concordance with the findings of the House select committee that probed the riot — Trump didn’t do much at first. But he was quickly active in one regard: rejecting calls to condemn the violence.
Press Enter to skip to end of carousel
“The Defendant repeatedly refused to approve a message directing rioters to leave the Capitol, as urged by his most senior advisors — including the White House Counsel, a Deputy White House Counsel, the Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and a Senior Advisor,” the indictment alleges. “Instead, the Defendant issued two Tweets that did not ask rioters to leave the Capitol but instead falsely suggested that the crowd at the Capitol was being peaceful.”
At 3 p.m., the indictment notes, Trump called House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and complained that McCarthy wasn’t as upset about the election results as the rioters.
A bit after 4 p.m., Trump released a video finally calling on rioters to leave the building. It wasn’t secured until 8 p.m. The indictment notes that the count of electoral votes was delayed for about six hours.
During this period, Trump and his allies worked the phones, according to the indictment.
Trump “attempted to reach two United States Senators at 6:00 p.m.,” it alleges. Around 7 p.m., Giuliani “placed calls to five United States Senators and one United States Representative.” The indictment alleges that another co-conspirator, a political consultant, tried to get Giuliani an additional six phone numbers for senators at Trump’s direction.
One of the most remarkable allegations of the day’s events comes in that same period.
“At 7:01 p.m., while [Giuliani] was calling United States Senators on behalf of the Defendant, the White House Counsel called the Defendant” — that is, Trump — “to ask him to withdraw any objections and allow the certification,” the indictment reads. “The Defendant refused.”
In other words, Plan B was still in effect, even as law enforcement was still trying to secure the building.
Congress reconvened its joint session at about 11:30 p.m., according to the indictment. Fifteen minutes later, Eastman emailed Pence’s attorney, asking that Pence “consider one more relatively minor violation [of the Electoral Count Act] and adjourn for 10 days to allow the legislatures to finish their investigations, as well as to allow a full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred here.” That didn’t occur. After rejecting a few attempts to block submitted electors, Biden was declared the winner of the presidential election at 3:41 a.m.
There is one notable thing that Trump did in the period immediately after the rioters broke into the Capitol. Almost immediately after a Fox News segment in which a Trump supporter disparaged Pence’s decision not to subvert the electoral-vote process, Trump tweeted an attack on his vice president.
“Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,” Trump wrote, “not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify.”
“One minute later, at 2:25 p.m.,” the indictment notes, “the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.”
The tweet was probably born partly of frustration. It was also certainly aimed at reinforcing to the world — and to members of Congress — that perhaps there was something suspect about the election results.
But, intentionally or not, it also meant that Pence needed to be moved farther from the place where the electoral votes would be counted. By targeting Pence, Trump bought himself more time. And he and his team allegedly used it.
For days before Congress was set to convene and count submitted electoral votes, formalizing Trump’s loss to Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election, Trump had been pressuring Vice President Mike Pence to simply reject slates of electors from states Trump had lost narrowly. According to the indictment obtained by special counsel Jack Smith on Monday, the pressure campaign was already underway by the holidays. When Pence called the president to wish him a merry Christmas, Trump allegedly began hectoring him about rejecting electors.
Sign up to get email alerts for political commentary, insights and stories from Jennifer Rubin right as she publishes.
So it went. Trump called Pence on Jan. 1, the indictment alleges, pointing to notes taken contemporaneously by Pence. When Pence rejected the plan once again, Trump allegedly said he was “too honest.” As the date neared, the encounters allegedly accelerated, with Trump and such allies as his attorney John Eastman trying to cajole Pence into enacting the scheme. On the evening of Jan. 5, Trump allegedly had his campaign put out a statement suggesting that Pence and he were “in total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act.”
The next morning, the morning of Jan. 6, Trump tried once again. Pence again refused.
“Immediately after the call,” the indictment alleges, “the Defendant decided to single out the Vice President in public remarks he would make within the hour, reinserting language that he had personally drafted earlier that morning — falsely claiming that the Vice President had authority to send electoral votes to the states — but that advisors had previously successfully advocated be removed.”
That language included telling the crowd at his speech on Jan. 6 that “if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.” Pence was made into the linchpin. But then, at 1 p.m., the vice president released a statement dismissing the idea that he would reject submitted electors. So: Plan B.
Sign up for How To Read This Chart, a weekly data newsletter from Philip Bump
Plan B was related to Plan A. In essence, it involved cajoling members of the House and the Senate to reject electors submitted by states Trump presented as “contested.” In a speech before Trump’s on Jan. 6, his attorney Rudy Giuliani insisted (falsely, the indictment notes) that the campaign had “letters from five legislatures begging us” to return elector slates for reconsideration. Trump broached this in his comments, too — again pinning it on Pence.
“States want to revote. The states got defrauded,” he said. “ … All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the states to recertify [their results] and we become president and you are the happiest people.”
Once Pence rejected the plan, though, Trump and his allies — particularly Giuliani — scrambled to go the official route: increasing the number of senators willing to oppose the recognition of the electors. They already had about a dozen, thanks to the willingness of Sens. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) and Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) to object to electors from Arizona and Pennsylvania. Expanding that pool of legislators became the Alamo, the last stand.
They had help. As Trump was speaking, his supporters were heading to the Capitol and, in at least one place, pushed past police. By quarter past 2 p.m., they were inside the building.
According to the indictment — and in concordance with the findings of the House select committee that probed the riot — Trump didn’t do much at first. But he was quickly active in one regard: rejecting calls to condemn the violence.
Press Enter to skip to end of carousel
“The Defendant repeatedly refused to approve a message directing rioters to leave the Capitol, as urged by his most senior advisors — including the White House Counsel, a Deputy White House Counsel, the Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and a Senior Advisor,” the indictment alleges. “Instead, the Defendant issued two Tweets that did not ask rioters to leave the Capitol but instead falsely suggested that the crowd at the Capitol was being peaceful.”
At 3 p.m., the indictment notes, Trump called House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and complained that McCarthy wasn’t as upset about the election results as the rioters.
A bit after 4 p.m., Trump released a video finally calling on rioters to leave the building. It wasn’t secured until 8 p.m. The indictment notes that the count of electoral votes was delayed for about six hours.
During this period, Trump and his allies worked the phones, according to the indictment.
Trump “attempted to reach two United States Senators at 6:00 p.m.,” it alleges. Around 7 p.m., Giuliani “placed calls to five United States Senators and one United States Representative.” The indictment alleges that another co-conspirator, a political consultant, tried to get Giuliani an additional six phone numbers for senators at Trump’s direction.
One of the most remarkable allegations of the day’s events comes in that same period.
“At 7:01 p.m., while [Giuliani] was calling United States Senators on behalf of the Defendant, the White House Counsel called the Defendant” — that is, Trump — “to ask him to withdraw any objections and allow the certification,” the indictment reads. “The Defendant refused.”
In other words, Plan B was still in effect, even as law enforcement was still trying to secure the building.
Congress reconvened its joint session at about 11:30 p.m., according to the indictment. Fifteen minutes later, Eastman emailed Pence’s attorney, asking that Pence “consider one more relatively minor violation [of the Electoral Count Act] and adjourn for 10 days to allow the legislatures to finish their investigations, as well as to allow a full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred here.” That didn’t occur. After rejecting a few attempts to block submitted electors, Biden was declared the winner of the presidential election at 3:41 a.m.
There is one notable thing that Trump did in the period immediately after the rioters broke into the Capitol. Almost immediately after a Fox News segment in which a Trump supporter disparaged Pence’s decision not to subvert the electoral-vote process, Trump tweeted an attack on his vice president.
“Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts,” Trump wrote, “not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify.”
“One minute later, at 2:25 p.m.,” the indictment notes, “the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.”
The tweet was probably born partly of frustration. It was also certainly aimed at reinforcing to the world — and to members of Congress — that perhaps there was something suspect about the election results.
But, intentionally or not, it also meant that Pence needed to be moved farther from the place where the electoral votes would be counted. By targeting Pence, Trump bought himself more time. And he and his team allegedly used it.
