Now, the traits that make Tua a good RPO passer don’t vanish on other plays. His quickness and efficiency in the pocket are maximized on RPOs, but they are present elsewhere, which allows the Dolphins to dip their toes into the water of more traditional offensive games. On this third-and-6 against the Panthers, for example, Tua hits Waddle with great accuracy and timing against tight man coverage.
Or on this play-action dropback with immediate pressure, Tua’s able to get his platform set and get the ball to his checkdown quickly, such that the run-after-catch creates an explosive play.
These traits matter, and they are strong in Tua—strong enough to get him drafted in the top five without a prototypical frame or prototypical arm strength. They’ve served him well in the NFL. Against the Panthers, Next Gen Stats had Tua as 19-for-19 on passes with a time to throw of under 2.5 seconds—what we might anecdotally call quick-game passes—which is the best quick-game performance in the NGS era. Pro Football Focus uses the same cutoff of 2.5 seconds to divide passing attempts, and we can see a season-long trend there. Tua is third fastest in average time to throw at 2.48 seconds, behind only Ben Roethlisberger and Tom Brady; over 56 percent of his dropbacks have the ball out in under 2.5 seconds, the sixth-highest number in the league. On such dropbacks, his completion percentage is 76.4 percent (10th highest), his yards per attempt is 6.8 (12th highest), and he’s one of three quarterbacks without a turnover-worthy play. Of course, RPOs are included in these plays as well—but because he’s recorded 143 total dropbacks under 2.5 seconds, we can say with confidence that Tua excels in the quick game, both with and without RPOs.
These are all impressive numbers. So what’s the problem? The numbers when Tua is not throwing quick passes reinforce a different reality: that Tua struggles to be much else besides that quick-game passer. On dropbacks of longer than 2.5 seconds, Tua’s average depth of target is 9.8—fifth lowest in the league—and his turnover-worthy play rate is 7.9 percent, which is second worst. He’s still impressively accurate (62.4 completion percentage, tied for ninth best), but the longer dropbacks don’t really help the offense get downfield—Tua’s yards per attempt only jumps from 6.8 to 8.0.
Both of those numbers are lower than Tua’s yards per attempt on RPOs alone, which is 9.3—and that isn’t all. Tua averages only 8.8 yards per attempt on play-action passes, which is below his RPO average—his depth of target of 6.5 yards on play-action is tied for third lowest in the league. Even on straight intermediate targets—any passes that travel from 10 to 19 air yards downfield—Tua’s yards per attempt sits at 8.9. For the Miami Dolphins, if it isn’t a shot play, it doesn’t rip off as much yardage as an RPO does.
This is the problem with Miami’s offensive approach. It’s not that they should have drafted any differently—they did it the right way. It’s not that they should have brought in a different offensive coordinator—they’re building the offense the right way. It’s not that Tua has been uncharacteristically accurate or decisive these past few weeks—this is how he’s always played. It’s that this is all they are, and all they can be. This isn’t the 2017 Eagles, who were running an RPO offense incessantly when no defense could stop it; or the 2018 Chiefs, who ran RPOs on 25 percent of their 2018 dropbacks with Patrick Mahomes at the helm. Those offenses had quarterbacks in Carson Wentz and Mahomes who could do it all, and RPOs were one of the tools in their tool chest. The 2021 Dolphins have only RPOs.
Sure, Tua made this style of offense look explosive and sustainable at Alabama—but it’s easier in college. Offensive linemen are allowed farther downfield, which means the quarterback can hold the ball a little longer, and receivers can release farther downfield. The hashes are wider, which makes spacing more difficult for college defenses to handle on the wide side of the field. And of course, Alabama’s talent comes out head and shoulders above almost any defense, no matter the scheme they’re running.
In the NFL, the margins are thinner, and the Dolphins are discovering that in real time. With a dominant defense and a healthy Tua, they had just enough juice on offense to squeak out wins over AFC contenders the Patriots and Ravens—but those were far from decisive victories. And it’s been hard to keep Tagovailoa healthy in part because of all the shots he takes on these option dropbacks. It’s also hard to rely on dominant defense, week in and week out, in a league rife with talented and explosive offenses.
But this is how it was always supposed to look for Miami; this was the plan, and with a few bumps and bruises along the way (looking at you, offensive line), it’s largely been executed well. The Dolphins made their bed when they drafted Tua; now they’re lying in it, with a 5-7 record and a 9 percent chance to make the playoffs. This is how they wanted their offense to go, and the returns of 2021 might just be enough to justify further investment and development in 2022: better run blockers, more YAC threats. The RPO took the league by storm a few seasons ago—now, Miami’s trying to figure out just how much power that storm has.
The second-year pro has surged recently. But he’ll need more in his arsenal than just run-pass options to become the Dolphins’ franchise QB.
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