And yet more from Stratfor:
It is obviously impossible to read the minds of the Islamic State's leaders to determine exactly how fervently they believe in the group's ideology. There are, nevertheless, some observable behaviors that can help in assessing their ideological commitment.
One indicator of the leaders' ideological frame of mind is their indefatigable persistence in their offensive operations despite casualties. Like pit bull terriers, once they get their teeth into something they simply will not let go. This was clearly reflected in their dogged insistence on taking the Syrian city of Kobani. Even though the city is a non-critical location on the battlefield, the Islamic State would not relent in its attempts to take Kobani and repeatedly poured reinforcements of men and weapons into the meat grinder the city became. This seemed to indicate that the group's leaders truly believed that they are inexorable and divinely blessed. The Kobani decision showed no signs that the group's leaders were making pragmatic decisions based solely on military considerations.
The Islamic State's leaders also have not been pragmatic in using policies of severe sectarianism and takfirism (the doctrine of deeming other Muslims as apostates and therefore acceptable targets for attacks) to pick fights with every ethnic and religious group the Islamic State has encountered. This stands in stark contrast with al Qaeda's philosophy of only attacking other groups if al Qaeda is attacked first and of focusing on one enemy at a time. The Islamic State has declared war on the world and has not shied away from attacking anyone (with the possible exception of the understanding the group seems have reached with Syrian President Bashar al Assad's government and the group's decision not to provoke Turkey until Islamic State supply routes were threatened). This often results in the group having to fight on multiple fronts at once.
In much the same way, the group's leaders have not been very sensible when it comes to making external enemies. While already engaged in brutal warfare on multiple fronts in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State intentionally provoked the United States and other foreign countries to enter into the fray.** Drawing the United States and other "crusader" countries into the conflict does help the Islamic State ideologically, but the group was not having any problems in recruiting foreign fighters prior to these outside powers' entering the fight. A more practical approach would have been to take care of local business before provoking external enemies.
**(Note that they've also now incited Russia into the mix)
Why the US would be 'invading Africa' to allegedly combat an ISIS threat that is both strategically incompetent, tactically inept and completely non-pragmatic in it's directives is simply nonsensical.
Which is why these are completely unrelated elements. Is the US attempting to limit the influence of unrelated terrorist groups as part of an overall strategy? Sure. But this discussion was about ISIS. Nothing else. And the premise that ISIS has a 'strategic avenue' to move into Africa is about a fact-based as them driving their Toyotas to the moon. Ain't happening.
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/how-baath-party-influences-islamic-state
As a side-note, I seriously doubt either you or HP have EVER read much from Stratfor, because most of what you try to claim is completely the opposite of the stuff you'll learn on that site or from their free mailings.
