This might be a little tougher than Putin thought...
- Thread starter Nole Lou
- Start date
Never seen "jankiest" in a headline but it's an apt description.
Russia’s jankiest armored fighting vehicle is evolving. A recent Russian media report from the brutal battle for Avdiivka, a Ukrainian stronghold in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, depicts at least one old MT-LB armored tractor armed with an old 2M-3 naval turret fitted with over-under 25-millimeter autocannons.
We’ve seen these MT-LB-2M-3s before. Sitting outside the workshop that apparently helps to produce them. Riding trains from Russia into the Ukraine war zone. Standing guard alongside civilian construction crews in occupied Ukraine, apparently in order to protect the crews—then busy digging fortifications for the Russians—from Ukrainian drones.
But the MT-LB-2M-3 in the recent media report is different than most of its vehicular kin. The 2M-3’s guns are more flush with the hull of the MT-LB. The turret, in other words, is somewhat integrated with the vehicle that carries it.
This is a change for the line of do-it-yourself MT-LB fire-support vehicles, which should be able to hurl 1.5-pound shells out to a distance of 2,500 yards at a rate of 300 rounds per minute per gun.
The Russians began cobbling together the weird vehicles back in the spring, mixing and matching old stored hulls and turrets in what obviously was a desperate bid to make good escalating losses of modern combat vehicles in the now 22-month wider Russian war on Ukraine.
The vehicular Frankenstein’s monsters—Frankenvehicles—are an emergency expedient. And their design reflects that urgency.
In most cases, the 1950s-vintage MT-LBs and their even older 2M-3 turrets have been minimally integrated. Technicians apparently have just welded or bolted the two-ton turrets to the tractors without blending their hydraulics and electrical systems—and without rebalancing the MT-LB’s center of mass.
www.forbes.com
Russia’s jankiest armored fighting vehicle is evolving. A recent Russian media report from the brutal battle for Avdiivka, a Ukrainian stronghold in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, depicts at least one old MT-LB armored tractor armed with an old 2M-3 naval turret fitted with over-under 25-millimeter autocannons.
We’ve seen these MT-LB-2M-3s before. Sitting outside the workshop that apparently helps to produce them. Riding trains from Russia into the Ukraine war zone. Standing guard alongside civilian construction crews in occupied Ukraine, apparently in order to protect the crews—then busy digging fortifications for the Russians—from Ukrainian drones.
But the MT-LB-2M-3 in the recent media report is different than most of its vehicular kin. The 2M-3’s guns are more flush with the hull of the MT-LB. The turret, in other words, is somewhat integrated with the vehicle that carries it.
This is a change for the line of do-it-yourself MT-LB fire-support vehicles, which should be able to hurl 1.5-pound shells out to a distance of 2,500 yards at a rate of 300 rounds per minute per gun.
The Russians began cobbling together the weird vehicles back in the spring, mixing and matching old stored hulls and turrets in what obviously was a desperate bid to make good escalating losses of modern combat vehicles in the now 22-month wider Russian war on Ukraine.
The vehicular Frankenstein’s monsters—Frankenvehicles—are an emergency expedient. And their design reflects that urgency.
In most cases, the 1950s-vintage MT-LBs and their even older 2M-3 turrets have been minimally integrated. Technicians apparently have just welded or bolted the two-ton turrets to the tractors without blending their hydraulics and electrical systems—and without rebalancing the MT-LB’s center of mass.
The Russians Stuck 1950s Turrets On 1950s Tractors To Produce The Ukraine War’s Worst Fighting Vehicles. Now They’re Improving Them.
This MT-LB’s 2M-3 turret is much shorter than the turrets on previous versions. Technicians either removed the base, or sank it into the MT-LB’s passenger compartment.
www.forbes.com
Ukraine war: are both sides preparing for stalemate?
US president Joe Biden took to the pages of the Washington Post last week to assure the American people that continuing economic and military support to Ukraine is an investment in US security. On October 20, the US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, visited Kyiv to give the Ukrainian leadership a similar assurance together with the promise of an additional US$100 million (£80 million) in military aid.
A day later, his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, announced a new €1.3 billion (£1.1 billion) support package, focused on defensive equipment including four more IRIS-T SLM air defence systems and anti-tank mines.
This is an indication of a growing realisation that western emphasis is shifting to sustaining Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression – contrary to the insistence by Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest political allies that victory on the battlefield is not just possible but probable. This view is now even contested in Kyiv.
In an interview with The Economist, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.” The US defence secretary echoed this view in Kyiv, emphasising that Ukraine needs to “make the right adjustments” to its strategy.
Similar doubts have been voiced in western capitals for months. In July 2023, the then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, warned that that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, then in its fourth week, would be “very long” and “very, very bloody”.
Less than two weeks later, a Nato communique after its summit in Vilnius [failed to provide] more than the vague promise of future membership. The next day, the G7 leaders’ joint declaration of support for Ukraine noted that G7 members were launching negotiations on “bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements” to support Ukraine.
There are further sobering signs of a significant reset of western strategy on Ukraine. An article in Time magazine painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle over how difficult the war will be to win.
Meanwhile, an NBC story revealed mounting western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.
Bilateral security guarantees – especially from the US, UK, Germany and France – would go some way in assuring Ukraine that the west would continue to have its back while kicking the thorny issue of Nato membership into the long grass.
The west could also remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s peace formula. And support for EU membership – likely to be a long and slow process – could also continue and assist Ukraine with both reforms and recovery. Such an approach would anchor Ukraine more clearly in the west in ways that might be less unacceptable to Russia than Nato membership.
Both sides would also need to have grounds to believe that they have the political will and material resources to at least sustain the status quo. They must also be able to credibly signal this to the other side.
For Ukraine, the recent G7 statement, Biden’s article in the Washington Post, and Austin’s comments in Kyiv all contribute to this message without contradicting Zelensky’s stance of no surrender, which still has clear majority support in Ukraine.
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine 20 months ago. It has been a year since any significant movements on the battlefield. No major third-party peace initiatives are on the horizon that could change the calculations of the belligerents. Taken together, a status quo is emerging on the ground.
For this to become a preference for both Moscow and Kyiv over futile and costly attempts of escalation, several conditions need to be met.
For Ukraine, the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ joint declaration of support are required. For Russia, it would mean no Ukrainian Nato membership and no significant escalation of western support that could give Kyiv the technological edge it might need to defeat Moscow on the battlefield.
Making the current stalemate sustainable would imply thinking about the situation on the ground – not so much in terms of temporary stalemate to be overcome through military escalation, but more in terms of an acceptable, if imperfect, status quo that is worth preserving.
In practical terms, this would imply no significant fighting and no further mobilisations. As such, it would also likely have an immediate and tangible effect on the lives of people on both sides of the lines of contact.
Progress in this direction will not be linear, especially given upcoming presidential elections in Russia, the US, and – possibly – Ukraine. As the election campaigns get underway, there will be periods of escalation not only along the frontline but also in rhetoric. Neither side is likely to commit in public to a ceasefire. And neither side will disown their articulated maximum demands.
Yet, beyond this, there appears to be a realisation now on all sides that a stable status quo is in everybody’s interest. Moscow, Kyiv, and the west are likely to work towards such stabilisation, pursue humanitarian issues and possibly begin negotiations on a ceasefire.
None of this is equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. But it does embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.
theconversation.com
US president Joe Biden took to the pages of the Washington Post last week to assure the American people that continuing economic and military support to Ukraine is an investment in US security. On October 20, the US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, visited Kyiv to give the Ukrainian leadership a similar assurance together with the promise of an additional US$100 million (£80 million) in military aid.
A day later, his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, announced a new €1.3 billion (£1.1 billion) support package, focused on defensive equipment including four more IRIS-T SLM air defence systems and anti-tank mines.
This is an indication of a growing realisation that western emphasis is shifting to sustaining Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression – contrary to the insistence by Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest political allies that victory on the battlefield is not just possible but probable. This view is now even contested in Kyiv.
In an interview with The Economist, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.” The US defence secretary echoed this view in Kyiv, emphasising that Ukraine needs to “make the right adjustments” to its strategy.
Similar doubts have been voiced in western capitals for months. In July 2023, the then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, warned that that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, then in its fourth week, would be “very long” and “very, very bloody”.
Less than two weeks later, a Nato communique after its summit in Vilnius [failed to provide] more than the vague promise of future membership. The next day, the G7 leaders’ joint declaration of support for Ukraine noted that G7 members were launching negotiations on “bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements” to support Ukraine.
There are further sobering signs of a significant reset of western strategy on Ukraine. An article in Time magazine painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle over how difficult the war will be to win.
Meanwhile, an NBC story revealed mounting western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.
No appetite for endless conflict
The underlying premise of this reset in western attitudes is that the outcome of this war will ultimately not be decided for a long time.Bilateral security guarantees – especially from the US, UK, Germany and France – would go some way in assuring Ukraine that the west would continue to have its back while kicking the thorny issue of Nato membership into the long grass.
The west could also remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s peace formula. And support for EU membership – likely to be a long and slow process – could also continue and assist Ukraine with both reforms and recovery. Such an approach would anchor Ukraine more clearly in the west in ways that might be less unacceptable to Russia than Nato membership.
Stalemate reached?
All of this, however, is predicated on the assumption of a stalemate on the ground, which Moscow and Kyiv would need to accept. It also assumes that neither side can see a clear opportunity to either escalate militarily to victory or do enough to have the advantage should the two sides end up at the negotiation table.Both sides would also need to have grounds to believe that they have the political will and material resources to at least sustain the status quo. They must also be able to credibly signal this to the other side.
For Ukraine, the recent G7 statement, Biden’s article in the Washington Post, and Austin’s comments in Kyiv all contribute to this message without contradicting Zelensky’s stance of no surrender, which still has clear majority support in Ukraine.
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine 20 months ago. It has been a year since any significant movements on the battlefield. No major third-party peace initiatives are on the horizon that could change the calculations of the belligerents. Taken together, a status quo is emerging on the ground.
For this to become a preference for both Moscow and Kyiv over futile and costly attempts of escalation, several conditions need to be met.
For Ukraine, the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ joint declaration of support are required. For Russia, it would mean no Ukrainian Nato membership and no significant escalation of western support that could give Kyiv the technological edge it might need to defeat Moscow on the battlefield.
Making the current stalemate sustainable would imply thinking about the situation on the ground – not so much in terms of temporary stalemate to be overcome through military escalation, but more in terms of an acceptable, if imperfect, status quo that is worth preserving.
In practical terms, this would imply no significant fighting and no further mobilisations. As such, it would also likely have an immediate and tangible effect on the lives of people on both sides of the lines of contact.
Progress in this direction will not be linear, especially given upcoming presidential elections in Russia, the US, and – possibly – Ukraine. As the election campaigns get underway, there will be periods of escalation not only along the frontline but also in rhetoric. Neither side is likely to commit in public to a ceasefire. And neither side will disown their articulated maximum demands.
Yet, beyond this, there appears to be a realisation now on all sides that a stable status quo is in everybody’s interest. Moscow, Kyiv, and the west are likely to work towards such stabilisation, pursue humanitarian issues and possibly begin negotiations on a ceasefire.
None of this is equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. But it does embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.
Ukraine war: are both sides preparing for stalemate?
After nearly two years of bloody battle, there are signs that both sides are nearing exhaustion and might be prepared, for now, to accept a stalemate and an end to the fighting.
theconversation.com
The White House is concerned Iran may provide ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine
WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House voiced concern Tuesday that Iran may provide Russia with ballistic missiles for use in its war against Ukraine, a development that likely would be disastrous for the Ukrainian people, a U.S. national security official said.
National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby noted that Iran already has been providing Russia with unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, guided aerial bombs and artillery ammunition, and may be preparing “to go a step further in its support for Russia.”
Kirby highlighted a September meeting in which Iran hosted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to show off a range of ballistic missile systems, sparking U.S. concern.
We are therefore concerned that Iran is considering providing Russia with ballistic missiles now for use in Ukraine,” Kirby told reporters during a conference call. “In return for that support, Russia has been offering Tehran unprecedented defense cooperation, including on missiles, electronics and air defense.”
Kirby’s warning came as President Joe Biden’s request for more than $61 billion in emergency U.S. funding to continue to support Ukraine’s defense remained stalled in Congress. The additional aid for Ukraine is part of a larger $106 billion funding request from the Democratic president that also would support Israel, Taiwan and the U.S. operations on the border with Mexico.
A growing group of lawmakers in the Republican Party, which controls the House of Representatives, opposes sending more money to Ukraine.
Kirby and other top U.S. officials have been urging Congress to pass aid for Ukraine, saying existing funding is drying up.
He also noted Iran’s announcement earlier this year that it had finalized a deal to buy Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, and said Iran is looking to buy additional military equipment from Russia, including attack helicopters, radars and combat-trainer aircraft.
“In total, Iran is seeking billions of dollars worth of military equipment from Russia to strengthen its military capabilities,” Kirby said. “Russia has also been helping Iran develop and maintain its satellite collection capabilities and other space-based programs.”
He said the burgeoning military partnership between Iran and Russia is harmful to Ukraine, Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East and “quite frankly to the international community.”
At the direction of the Russian government, Kirby said the Wagner mercenary group was preparing to provide an air-defense capability to either Hezbollah or Iran. He said the U.S. would be watching to see whether that happens and was prepared to use “counterterrorism sanctions authority against Russian individuals or entities that might make these destabilizing transfers.” Russia has used Wagner in the past when it has wanted to be able to deny involvement, especially in foreign military operations.
The U.S. says the Kremlin’s reliance on Iran, as well as North Korea — countries largely isolated on the international stage for their nuclear programs and human rights records — shows desperation. That comes in the face of Ukrainian resistance and the success of the global coalition in disrupting Russian military supply chains and denying replacements for weapons lost on the battlefield. The White House has said Russia has turned to North Korea for artillery.
U.S. officials say Iran has also provided Russia with artillery and tank rounds for its invasion of Ukraine.
The White House is concerned Iran may provide ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine
The White House says it's very concerned that Iran may provide ballistic missiles to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby says it would be a disastrous development for the Ukrainian people if that were to happen.
apnews.com
"The invaders are running, hustling, and the drones are flying!Great job knocking the Russians out of cover with your FPVs.A feast for the eyes"
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Where Are Russia’s Missing Tanks?
Russia's fleet of T-90A tanks, one of their most modern types, seems to have gone AWOL on Ukraine. One possible explanation is that they never existed.
UNPOSSIBLE
They have ALL of those tanks (somewhere) along with thousands of ICBMs ready to launch and "fully operational"....
hawkeyetraveler
HB Heisman
This should be required viewing prior to any house decision/vote on Ukrainian aid. Similar to the 9/11 documentary I will eventually watch it because I feel an obligation as a human to witness the horror the Russians are unleashing. None the less I wish we lived in a world where such things did not happen.The preview game me chills...
A harrowing film exposes the brutality of Russia’s war in Ukraine
A conversation with a Ukrainian journalist who documented the siege of Mariupol.www.vox.com
Never seen "jankiest" in a headline but it's an apt description.
Russia’s jankiest armored fighting vehicle is evolving. A recent Russian media report from the brutal battle for Avdiivka, a Ukrainian stronghold in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, depicts at least one old MT-LB armored tractor armed with an old 2M-3 naval turret fitted with over-under 25-millimeter autocannons.
We’ve seen these MT-LB-2M-3s before. Sitting outside the workshop that apparently helps to produce them. Riding trains from Russia into the Ukraine war zone. Standing guard alongside civilian construction crews in occupied Ukraine, apparently in order to protect the crews—then busy digging fortifications for the Russians—from Ukrainian drones.
But the MT-LB-2M-3 in the recent media report is different than most of its vehicular kin. The 2M-3’s guns are more flush with the hull of the MT-LB. The turret, in other words, is somewhat integrated with the vehicle that carries it.
This is a change for the line of do-it-yourself MT-LB fire-support vehicles, which should be able to hurl 1.5-pound shells out to a distance of 2,500 yards at a rate of 300 rounds per minute per gun.
The Russians began cobbling together the weird vehicles back in the spring, mixing and matching old stored hulls and turrets in what obviously was a desperate bid to make good escalating losses of modern combat vehicles in the now 22-month wider Russian war on Ukraine.
The vehicular Frankenstein’s monsters—Frankenvehicles—are an emergency expedient. And their design reflects that urgency.
In most cases, the 1950s-vintage MT-LBs and their even older 2M-3 turrets have been minimally integrated. Technicians apparently have just welded or bolted the two-ton turrets to the tractors without blending their hydraulics and electrical systems—and without rebalancing the MT-LB’s center of mass.
The Russians Stuck 1950s Turrets On 1950s Tractors To Produce The Ukraine War’s Worst Fighting Vehicles. Now They’re Improving Them.
This MT-LB’s 2M-3 turret is much shorter than the turrets on previous versions. Technicians either removed the base, or sank it into the MT-LB’s passenger compartment.
Desperation.
What is the origin of the expression: kick things into long grass? I hear of it in the context of political inaction.
hawkeyetraveler
HB Heisman
So I started watching it. Made it 20 minutes and it overwhelmed me. Putin is a bastard and anyone that does not see the necessity of standing against such aggression, oppression and violence is a traitor to humankind.
The people who need to watch it won’t. Or, they will watch it and say the bad guys were Ukrainians dressed up as Russians in a false flag attack. Or, mumble something about a lap top.
CNN Exclusive: Inside Ukraine’s fight for the Dnipro River
As Serhiy Ostapenko hunkered down in his pickup truck, hiding under trees for cover in the dead of night, the crashing booms of Russian bombardment rumbled around him.“The enemy is shelling us 24 hours a day. I don’t remember the last time there was silence for more than an hour,” said the 32-year-old Ukrainian drone pilot, speaking from the right bank of the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine – one of the new frontlines in a grinding war that’s now entering its second winter.
Ostapenko is a member of the “Sons of Thunder” drone unit, part of Ukraine’s operation to cross the Dnipro, pushing back Russian forces and establishing a sustained presence on the left bank. Earlier this month, Ukraine said it had “gained a foothold” on the bank, a potentially significant advance in what has so far been a lackluster counteroffensive.
But during CNN’s exclusive access with Ostapenko, his night mission had just been aborted because the Russians had identified his unit’s position on the right bank – forcing them to take shelter.
“That’s another one – I think it was a rocket,” he told CNN as another boom rang out, his face lit only by a dim red light. “Every time I enter this zone … I say goodbye to my life every time, because I realize that my life can be ended at any moment, because either a rocket or a shell will strike. You get used to it, but it is unpleasant.”
Advancing on the Dnipro
The 2,200 kilometer (1,400 mile) long Dnipro is Europe’s fourth longest river, flowing from Russia, through Belarus and Ukraine to the Black Sea.It winds through the marshlands of Russian-occupied Kherson region – with Russian troops forced to retreat across the river last November after being pushed out from Kherson city by Ukrainian fighters.
The liberation of the city, after eight months of brutal occupation, was a euphoric victory and a key moment in Ukraine’s war effort. But the year since has brought little relief, with Kherson city and its surrounding region still under relentless bombardment by Russian forces across the river.
The Dnipro, which at some points stretches a mile wide, serves as a natural defensive barrier for Russian troops – which is partly why it has become a major target for Kyiv. Ukrainian forces have previously staged cross-river raids, but establishing a firm bridgehead across the river and pushing back the Russians could help better protect Kherson city by putting more distance between civilians and enemy artillery.
And – at least theoretically – an advance on the left bank could give Kyiv a launching place to push further south toward occupied Crimea, the peninsula Russia illegally annexed in 2014.
Ukrainian armed forces say they’ve pushed back Russian troops 3 to 8 kilometers (2 to 5 miles) back from the river.
“Now our (troops) are advancing on the other side of the Dnipro. It is very difficult, we are making a lot of effort to make it possible and to build up our strength on the other side of the Dnipro,” said Ostapenko.
He added that “certain connections” had been established across the river, allowing Ukrainian troops to transport “weapons, ammunition, food, fuel” to their partners “on the other side.”
His aerial reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, works to provide cover for soldiers crossing the river, to surveil Russian troops and movements, and to help mask the locations of Ukrainian troops and equipment.
It’s dangerous work; Ostapenko described facing a daily barrage of “kamikaze drones, I think it’s Shaheds, rockets, most likely Grad rocket launcher, mortars, and tanks.”
But, he added, the bombardment could be seen as a good sign: “The enemy is trying to resist as much as possible, which indicates that we are doing everything right. We are causing them many problems, and (they are) trying to fight it.”
‘We have to survive’
All the while, in Kherson city, the jubilation of last year’s liberation has faded for some residents as they focus on just getting through each day.“When it is quiet, it is even scarier than when there is shelling,” said 54-year-old Inna Balyoha. “You’re waiting, you’re constantly listening, turning the radio down. So that you can hear the sounds outside the window, so that you can react in time to the shelling.”
She’s one of roughly 73,000 residents still in Kherson – less than a quarter of its original population of 300,000. Between having to care for her 4-year-old grandson and frail 87-year-old mother, “the decision not to leave was made a long time ago,” she said.
But living in the midst of war has taken its toll. One of her grandson’s first words was “alarm,” she said. “He knows how to react if there is an air raid siren. He knows where to go. If explosions are heard outside the window, he has a little hiding place in the hallway.”
The shelling has gotten so bad that they’ve stopped going outside for short walks, mostly staying at home now. “Right now, I’m doing everything that depends on me to keep the child safe,” she said. “Our main task is to survive. That was the main task during the occupation. And it is now. We have to survive.”
Attacks on Kherson have intensified in the past month, at one point reaching 700 incoming rounds in one day, according to Oleksandr Prokudin, the head of Kherson region’s military administration.
Russian troops are “hitting residential areas more often because our defenders are advancing, and they are trying to intimidate ordinary citizens in places close to the Dnipro River,” said Prokudin. “This is revenge, and now it is felt more, because our soldiers are already on the left bank of the Kherson region. The civilians of the Kherson region feel this revenge more.”
But, he added, each Kherson resident was an “example of courage.” As tough as conditions are, Kherson is still free from Russian occupation – meaning people can “communicate freely, walk freely on our land,” he said. “Home gives people strength. They are holding on because they are at home.”
