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This might be a little tougher than Putin thought...

I caught most of Scott Pelley's segment tonight on 60 Minutes in which he revisited Bucha. It was very difficult to watch. I know that there is going to be a lot of pressure on Ukraine to take some form of settlement so the gas can flow freely again, but there is going to be very little desire to accept anything less than Russia leaving all Ukrainian territory, and return all Ukrainian citizens from Russia.
Any Western politician or commentator who talks about how Russia's hand was forced by NATO, or that a deal is just good for everyone, should be sent to Bucha, or Izium to talk to those who survived.
 
Russian, or Belarus? Belarus with an assist? Perhaps this is simply a campaign of misinformation by the Russians? I don't see how they can organize an effective offensive on a new front right now.
As far as Belarus, I will repeat something I've posted several times. Lukashenko was almost overthrown last year, and he had to get Putin to send in crack troops to prop him up. If Belarus gets into this thing I can see Lukashenko going out like Ceausescu or Mussolini.
I could also see Belarus sending in it's troops and equipment but with Russian markings.
 
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ruSSian Nuke threats are part of a targeted manipulation strategy.


“This is not, however, crude brinksmanship. Central to Russian strategy is Reflexive Control, a sophisticated theory of psychological manipulation within a long Soviet/Russian tradition of ‘Active Measures’. Reflexive Control plays to the fear, greed and self-regard of the target, tailoring threats, offers and blandishments to an adversary’s psychological-emotional-intellectual pressure points. Fear of nukes, greed for cheap gas, and an accompanying plausible, and clever rationale that seduces Western polities to reflexively go along with its own atavistic, instinctive leanings. And all the better if some credible Western voices can parrot the Kremlin’s lines.

Russia must employ Reflexive Control to win informationally because it is losing on the battlefield. Putin’s war has gone badly wrong. Diagnoses of strategic stalemate, so popular in the summer, have fallen flat. Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson offensives retook thousands of square-miles from Russia, retaking Kherson itself is now a probability. Ukraine has severely damaged the Kerch Bridge, at once the crucial logistical link for Russian forces in southern Ukraine and a symbol of Putin’s imperial power. Mobilisation will not help: all the evidence indicates that Russia’s new soldiers are poorly trained and equipped, have low morale, and in many cases have little stomach to fight the committed Ukrainians. Putin is losing the war on the ground.

Years of informational preparation undergird Putin’s nuclear threats. The Russian military integrates nuclear use into its major exercises – indeed, three separate nuclear related events accompanied February’s invasion to remind the West of Russia’s nuclear menace and to keep out of it. Ever since, Russian military theorists and Western defence analysts have emphasised Moscow’s willingness to use low-yield ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons in a range of circumstances. “Escalate-to-deescalate” has entered the popular lexicon.”
 
Remember when our previous president told Iran to go **** themselves and by the way deals off?

The Iran nuclear deal was always a joke because Iran could just trade drones or whatever with Russia for a nuclear weapon anytime it wants.
 
Countries like China, India, and Turkey are proving eager partners for the Russian fuel industry, with Turkey doubling Russian oil imports this year and vying to become a hub for Russian LNG transfers into Europe after damage to the Nord Stream pipelines.

Between April and July, China — the world’s top energy consumer and biggest customer for crude oil — had purchased 17 percent more Russian crude oil than it had during the same period in 2021, according to Reuters. And despite major discounts, the price of oil is still much higher than it was in 2020, pre-coronavirus, allowing Russia to bring in more money from oil exports even though production is down, according to research by Frank Umbach for the Liechtenstein-based think tank Geopolitical Intelligence Services.

 
One thing that would be interesting to see is more information about Russian troop and equipment levels across all of Russia and their satellites. As we see what appears to be new equipment being deployed to Belarus, I am reminded of the few tidbits in this thread about Russia deploying equipment from Syria and Kaliningrad to be used in the war. Are they painfully thin in other areas as Putin goes all in?
 
I saw Petro Poroshenko on TV this morning, and he called out Israel for not providing technology to assist in shooting down the Iranian supplied drones. He's a pretty interesting dude in all of this.
 
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