This might be a little tougher than Putin thought...
- Thread starter Nole Lou
- Start date
Good read if you have the time....
First, a priority for both sides is now to take out enemy capacity.
Part of the frustration for Ukraine up until now has been its limited counter-battery fire, which undermined its ability to deal with Russian artillery. With the new weapons systems arriving, they should be able to strike Russian artillery. The most valuable targets, however, may be Russian ammunition dumps, and there have been regular reports over the past week of these being hit. Over time this will degrade the effectiveness of Russian artillery.
For their part the Russians are also anxious to find the incoming Ukrainian kit (including its ammunition stocks) and eliminate it before it can do too much damage. This requires both good intelligence as well as accurate systems. The Ukrainians are going to great lengths to conceal the weapons and ammunition, moving them regularly and distributing them in small packets. But when you have only a few long-range pieces, however much individually they are more capable than their Russian equivalents, the loss of a few could make a big difference.
Second, the Ukrainian tactics will not replicate those of the Russians when it comes to taking territory.
The Russians have advanced by pummelling the areas it wants to occupy. Some of the areas Ukraine wishes to take back have already been ruined and depopulated, and here the tactics may be similar. But other areas, including the vital city of Kherson, are relatively unscathed, and the Russians have based artillery there. Although the city is within artillery range for Ukraine, they will not want to destroy civilian areas. They will therefore have to use different tactics: making the most of the accuracy of their new weapons by concentrating on supply lines, bases and command centres; making opportunistic advances; and using guerrilla tactics in the city against the occupying forces, leaving Russian troops uncertain about where the next attack is coming from. Politically, Zelensky will want to show both his people and his donors that Ukraine can recover lost territory and start taking the war to the Russians. Hence reports that Ukraine has been striking at a Russian base by the airport in the city of Melitopol.
[See also: The banality of Vladimir Putin]
A tangible demonstration of the difference that the new systems can make was seen in the battle for the tiny Snake Island in the Black Sea, not far from the Ukrainian mainland. This was seized by Russia at the start of the war. The Russians brought air defence systems to the island. After a harpoon anti-ship missile destroyed a Russian tugboat delivering weapons and personnel, on 29 June Ukrainian missiles and artillery took out air defence systems deployed on the island. This was not really a surprise. The vulnerability of the island to artillery force had been obvious for some time and it was strange that the Russians kept on putting men and equipment there. On 30 June, the Russians bowed to the inevitable and announced a retreat from the island, describing it, somewhat lamely, as a “gesture of goodwill” (a similar claim was made when they retreated from the north).
Third, the Russians are unlikely to keep on fighting should it become clear that they will likely be defeated.
One lesson from the Snake Island episode, as well as the withdrawal from Kyiv, is that the Russian commanders can recognise when they are in a losing position and withdraw rather than take unnecessary punishment. Because we have been through a period of slow, grinding advances from Russia there is a tendency to assume that Ukraine will also have to overcome a tenacious Russian defence, and that the third stage may look like the second, except with the roles reversed.
This is not as obvious as it may seem. Not only will Ukrainian tactics likely differ but, if they start being pushed back, the Russians will need to decide how much they really want to hold on to territory at the expense of preserving what is left of their army. If the Russian command sees only adverse trends ahead, they may consider the long-term need to maintain their armed force to deal with future threats other than Ukraine. Russia cannot afford an inch-by-inch retreat to the border, taking losses all the way. At some point it may need to cut its losses. This would be the point at which Russian commanders might urge Putin to engage in serious negotiations (for example, reviving earlier proposals on a form of neutrality in return for full withdrawal) to provide political cover for their withdrawal.
Whether or not we get to this stage is a different matter. The challenge for Ukraine is to develop momentum, to the point where there is no readily available way for it to be reversed by the Russians. This is challenging because the Ukrainians will need to advance by means that do not solely involve direct assaults on Russian positions. Over the next few weeks we should get some sense of whether Ukraine can start to take the initiative and impose its own priorities on Russia rather than the other way round, and how well the Russians are able to respond to the steady improvement of Ukrainian capabilities. Should Ukrainian forces gather any momentum, the situation could move in their favour very quickly. Can the Ukrainians win? Yes. Will the Ukrainians win? Not yet clear, but the possibility should not be dismissed.
www.newstatesman.com
First, a priority for both sides is now to take out enemy capacity.
Part of the frustration for Ukraine up until now has been its limited counter-battery fire, which undermined its ability to deal with Russian artillery. With the new weapons systems arriving, they should be able to strike Russian artillery. The most valuable targets, however, may be Russian ammunition dumps, and there have been regular reports over the past week of these being hit. Over time this will degrade the effectiveness of Russian artillery.
For their part the Russians are also anxious to find the incoming Ukrainian kit (including its ammunition stocks) and eliminate it before it can do too much damage. This requires both good intelligence as well as accurate systems. The Ukrainians are going to great lengths to conceal the weapons and ammunition, moving them regularly and distributing them in small packets. But when you have only a few long-range pieces, however much individually they are more capable than their Russian equivalents, the loss of a few could make a big difference.
Second, the Ukrainian tactics will not replicate those of the Russians when it comes to taking territory.
The Russians have advanced by pummelling the areas it wants to occupy. Some of the areas Ukraine wishes to take back have already been ruined and depopulated, and here the tactics may be similar. But other areas, including the vital city of Kherson, are relatively unscathed, and the Russians have based artillery there. Although the city is within artillery range for Ukraine, they will not want to destroy civilian areas. They will therefore have to use different tactics: making the most of the accuracy of their new weapons by concentrating on supply lines, bases and command centres; making opportunistic advances; and using guerrilla tactics in the city against the occupying forces, leaving Russian troops uncertain about where the next attack is coming from. Politically, Zelensky will want to show both his people and his donors that Ukraine can recover lost territory and start taking the war to the Russians. Hence reports that Ukraine has been striking at a Russian base by the airport in the city of Melitopol.
[See also: The banality of Vladimir Putin]
A tangible demonstration of the difference that the new systems can make was seen in the battle for the tiny Snake Island in the Black Sea, not far from the Ukrainian mainland. This was seized by Russia at the start of the war. The Russians brought air defence systems to the island. After a harpoon anti-ship missile destroyed a Russian tugboat delivering weapons and personnel, on 29 June Ukrainian missiles and artillery took out air defence systems deployed on the island. This was not really a surprise. The vulnerability of the island to artillery force had been obvious for some time and it was strange that the Russians kept on putting men and equipment there. On 30 June, the Russians bowed to the inevitable and announced a retreat from the island, describing it, somewhat lamely, as a “gesture of goodwill” (a similar claim was made when they retreated from the north).
Third, the Russians are unlikely to keep on fighting should it become clear that they will likely be defeated.
One lesson from the Snake Island episode, as well as the withdrawal from Kyiv, is that the Russian commanders can recognise when they are in a losing position and withdraw rather than take unnecessary punishment. Because we have been through a period of slow, grinding advances from Russia there is a tendency to assume that Ukraine will also have to overcome a tenacious Russian defence, and that the third stage may look like the second, except with the roles reversed.
This is not as obvious as it may seem. Not only will Ukrainian tactics likely differ but, if they start being pushed back, the Russians will need to decide how much they really want to hold on to territory at the expense of preserving what is left of their army. If the Russian command sees only adverse trends ahead, they may consider the long-term need to maintain their armed force to deal with future threats other than Ukraine. Russia cannot afford an inch-by-inch retreat to the border, taking losses all the way. At some point it may need to cut its losses. This would be the point at which Russian commanders might urge Putin to engage in serious negotiations (for example, reviving earlier proposals on a form of neutrality in return for full withdrawal) to provide political cover for their withdrawal.
Whether or not we get to this stage is a different matter. The challenge for Ukraine is to develop momentum, to the point where there is no readily available way for it to be reversed by the Russians. This is challenging because the Ukrainians will need to advance by means that do not solely involve direct assaults on Russian positions. Over the next few weeks we should get some sense of whether Ukraine can start to take the initiative and impose its own priorities on Russia rather than the other way round, and how well the Russians are able to respond to the steady improvement of Ukrainian capabilities. Should Ukrainian forces gather any momentum, the situation could move in their favour very quickly. Can the Ukrainians win? Yes. Will the Ukrainians win? Not yet clear, but the possibility should not be dismissed.
Can Ukraine win the war with Russia?
As Russia takes the city of Lysychansk, Ukraine needs to develop momentum with its better, Western-sourced weapons.
www.newstatesman.com
'The Armed Forces of Ukraine use the Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzer and send 155mm shells at the Russian occupiers."
LOL-please try that!
LOL-please try that!
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We’ll see….wouldn’t anticipate a huge change but you never know.
We knew what we had in regards to Johnson though….regardless of his other failings
"Russian repair plants refuse to repair military heavy armored vehicles returned from the war in Ukraine. This includes mostly tanks and armored vehicles for the infantry. The reason: much of the equipment is returned with burnt bodies and repair is impossible. This is stated in a report of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine"
True
I do think the British people back him on this, and would probably push a successor to continue.
But, point taken.
This makes it sound like it had become a maritime hazard and Russia tried to sink it.
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"There is another, more prudent way to proceed. Instead of challenging the Russian Black Sea Fleet with NATO combatants, the Biden administration should provide Ukraine with whatever military equipment it will take to protect its own shipping lanes, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). After supplying Kyiv with HIMARS and MLRS, the transfer of UAVs would not dramatically alter the U.S. approach of providing security assistance. It is important to note that the recent transfer of more potent weapons to Ukraine by the United States, France, and other Western countries has not prompted Russia to escalate the conflict to NATO.
The four MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs announced by the Biden administration as part of its most recent $40 billion aid package to Ukraine could break Russia’s blockade. These unmanned fixed-wing aircraft—about twice the size of a Bayraktar and armed with powerful Hellfire missiles or GPS-guided bombs—can fly for about 25 hours at 160 knots, giving them the range and lethality to clear the transit lanes or, by using two Gray Eagles, escort ships between the Port of Odesa and the Bosphorus. (The UAVs previously supplied by the United States—loitering munitions such as the Switchblade and smaller drones such as the Phoenix Ghost—are not large enough to threaten a ship.) Since the original announcement, unfortunately, the Biden administration has blocked the sale of Gray Eagles to Ukraine after officials at the Defense Technology Security Administration raised concerns about the possibility of the Gray Eagle’s advanced radar and surveillance components falling into Russian hands."
(FWIW it doesn't seem practical to me.)
The four MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs announced by the Biden administration as part of its most recent $40 billion aid package to Ukraine could break Russia’s blockade. These unmanned fixed-wing aircraft—about twice the size of a Bayraktar and armed with powerful Hellfire missiles or GPS-guided bombs—can fly for about 25 hours at 160 knots, giving them the range and lethality to clear the transit lanes or, by using two Gray Eagles, escort ships between the Port of Odesa and the Bosphorus. (The UAVs previously supplied by the United States—loitering munitions such as the Switchblade and smaller drones such as the Phoenix Ghost—are not large enough to threaten a ship.) Since the original announcement, unfortunately, the Biden administration has blocked the sale of Gray Eagles to Ukraine after officials at the Defense Technology Security Administration raised concerns about the possibility of the Gray Eagle’s advanced radar and surveillance components falling into Russian hands."
(FWIW it doesn't seem practical to me.)
Dumskaya → After the strike of the Armed Forces on the Russian base in occupied Melitopol, collaborators are afraid to go to work http://dlvr.it/STV7DY news Odesa #новини #Odessa #Ukraine
EDIT: The bottom line here, is that the ONLY way this ends well for the West is a total and complete defeat of Russia.
If Putin is able to retain a foothold in Eastern Ukraine, his successors will simple rebuild their military and use that as the staging point to take more territory in another decade or two. Precisely what he has done with Crimea after he was able to take that w/o any response from the West.
ONLY way the Russian leadership learns here is complete and utter defeat and isolation. They know that if they can just "outlast" the West and sanctions, they will ultimately win.
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NATO allies will not help Warsaw if it independently sends troops to Ukraine and finds itself under the threat of direct military clashes with Russia, ex-deputy of the Polish Sejm Mateusz Piskorski said in an interview with Ukraina.ru.
He noted that even the closest allies of Poland did not support the idea of Warsaw to send militants to the territory of the former Soviet republic under the guise of a peacekeeping mission, and in the Czech Republic they directly indicated to Poland that peacekeepers were brought into the conflict zone after the end of hostilities, and not during them.
The politician recalled that the danger for Warsaw lies in the fact that Russia is conducting a special military operation throughout Ukraine and the entry of Polish troops even into the western regions of the country will mean an open conflict with Moscow.
See more at https://english.pravda.ru/news/world/152836-nato/
NATO isn't "triggered" to help any other NATO country in some random battle; it only triggers when they are invaded.
So, not sure why this is controversial. If Russia decided to either invade or shoot missiles directly into Polish territory, that's a NATO Alliance trigger. If Poland sends forces into Ukraine, then NATO isn't required to get involved if those forces are attacked outside of NATO territories.
Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht has rejected the delivery of Fuchs armored personnel carriers to Ukraine , citing Germany's own security interests. »We support Ukraine with everything that is possible and responsible. But we have to ensure Germany's ability to defend itself," the SPD minister told the dpa news agency, responding to demands from the Union.
Lambrecht went on to explain: "It is therefore irresponsible to want to plunder the Bundeswehr , especially in these times, and to want to ignore the military advice of the Inspector General."
Inspector General sees no leeway
Inspector General Eberhard Zorn - Germany's highest-ranking soldier - had previously stated that he saw no leeway for leaving the tanks to Ukraine.
“Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again,” the adage goes, “and expecting different results.” How else to describe the effort of France’s President Emmanuel Macron to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by constantly seeking to reengage with Russia’s dictator Vladimir Putin?
Other than confirming the well-established fact that Putin is a malevolent and bad-faith actor, there is not much new to be learned from the transcript of a phone conversation between Macron and Putin, held four days before the invasion. The text has been made public as part of a television documentary authorized by the Élysée, in hope of burnishing Macron’s credentials as a global dealmaker."
Other than confirming the well-established fact that Putin is a malevolent and bad-faith actor, there is not much new to be learned from the transcript of a phone conversation between Macron and Putin, held four days before the invasion. The text has been made public as part of a television documentary authorized by the Élysée, in hope of burnishing Macron’s credentials as a global dealmaker."
Glee in Russia and sadness in Ukraine as Boris Johnson quits | Boris Johnson | The Guardian
Kremlin gloats as oligarch Oleg Deripaska welcomes end of ‘stupid clown’ but Zelenskiy pays tribute to ‘true friend’Boris Johnson resigns: latest updates
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