This might be a little tougher than Putin thought...
- Thread starter Nole Lou
- Start date
"New salvo of Russian strikes on Ukrainian electrical installations, here on the Dnieper hydroelectric station, oblast of #Zaporizhzhia . About fifty Russian cruise missiles were fired."
"In the recording #UAV a group of (Orc) infantry soldiers on the front #Bachmut , Donetsk Oblast, shot at #ATGM by
@SFSofUkraine
@SFSofUkraine
How does anyone negotiate with someone who’s word means nothing?
hawkeyetraveler
HB Heisman
Feels like this can’t be real can it? I know Ukraine has been piss-pounding them for months, but Russia can’t be down to pre-WW1 equipment at this point can they? Unreal if so.
Wikipedia article about the model of gun in the tweet
Wikipedia article about the model of gun in the tweet
When the trap was sprung on Kherson a month ago, people estimated 25k Russian troops would be encircled west of River. It sure seems like over 10k of them are now dead.
If true, and there is other evidence of some WWI artillery being in battlefield, then Russia’s army was a complete fraud and all the money and equipment were sold or never even actually built due to corruption and stealing money by thousands of people in the military and government. Which can only make you wonder how well they maintained the quality of their nukes. We have spent 2 trillion dollars maintaining and refreshing the warheads on our arsenal…
Pretty interesting article...I think the bolded is what's going to cause a rift in the coming months.
In the eight months since the Russian invasion, the Biden administration’s support has allowed Ukraine to retake territory and inflict heavy damage on Russian forces while keeping the risk of large-scale escalation relatively low. The administration has also carefully avoided talking about what comes next, claiming that it is up to Ukrainians to decide what is in their best interest. But maintaining that position is becoming more difficult now that Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on the war and made blatant nuclear threats against the West. Putin has chosen to take significant new risks rather than to back down, suggesting that this war will not end through simple Russian capitulation. Though these risks seem manageable for now, the time may come when negotiations are necessary to forestall catastrophe.
At the same time, the economic fallout of the war is rapidly growing. In Ukraine, public finances have been ravaged; the country is running out of cash. As the economic historian Adam Tooze put it in September, “Unless Ukraine’s allies step up their financial assistance, there is every reason to fear both a social and a political crisis on the home front.” Europe, meanwhile, is trapped in its own tightening noose, as surging energy prices exacerbate inflation and raise the prospect of a deep recession. All this makes the administration’s position—that Kyiv alone will decide when the war ends—increasingly untenable.
In reality, the question is not whether negotiations are needed to end the war but when and how they should unfold. Yet policymakers must contend with a catch-22: the better Ukrainian forces perform on the battlefield, the more difficult it is to discuss a negotiated settlement, even though it is to Ukraine’s advantage to negotiate from a position of strength. As the risk of Russian escalation grows, so does the prospect that any Western leader who talks about ending the war will be portrayed as unrealistic, immoral, or caving to “nuclear blackmail.” But internal discussions on acceptable settlement terms now would better position all parties when the opportunity for such a deal does arise.
This does not mean that the West should push Ukraine to concede, as some have argued. But it does suggest that the United States and its partners should provide future aid with an eye to putting Ukraine in the best negotiating position, not simply continuing the war. For example, Ukraine and its allies must focus on core interests, such as preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting its population. These goals should be narrow by design: rather than trying to retake all of its pre-2014 territory or to punish Russian leaders, Ukraine should pursue objectives that are less likely to produce dramatic escalation and more likely to result in a durable peace. Washington should encourage pursuing those objectives, and should also make clear to Kyiv, at least in private, where the limits of American support lie and what the White House perceives as unacceptable escalation risks. Setting clear expectations now reduces the risk of misperception in Kyiv.
American policymakers must also consider Ukrainian and Russian domestic politics, since internal support in both countries will be vital to making any settlement last. History suggests that a power transition in Moscow is possible but by no means likely or inevitable. Thus, policymakers need to focus on Putin and the small group of elites around him and consider what settlement they might be willing to accept. Given Putin’s mobilization of several hundred thousand additional frontline troops, it seems increasingly clear that he will seek to avoid a complete, devastating loss at any cost. But like many other authoritarians before him, he can sell a poor result as a win. This means that it may be possible to find some face-saving deal in which de facto realities, such as Russian legal control of Crimea, could be recognized, and which the Kremlin could portray to the Russian public as genuine concessions by the West.
In Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a more open, contentious political environment, as the divisions of Ukrainian politics begin to reemerge. Nonetheless, he faces a similar dilemma. Ukraine’s population has become more unified since February, rallying around a national struggle against invasion. After asking so much of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian government will find it difficult to compromise in any way that seems to reward the enemy. If Zelensky accepts an unpopular settlement, it could lead to his defeat at the ballot box. In these circumstances, a deal in which Ukrainians feel that they have largely triumphed is more likely to succeed. This makes it all the more important to manage expectations now. Washington should encourage Kyiv to take a more moderate stance on issues, such as Crimea, that are likely to figure in a future settlement; to tone down triumphalist talk; and to emphasize the economic rewards that Ukraine stands to receive through international reconstruction aid and European economic integration under a settlement.
www.foreignaffairs.com
In the eight months since the Russian invasion, the Biden administration’s support has allowed Ukraine to retake territory and inflict heavy damage on Russian forces while keeping the risk of large-scale escalation relatively low. The administration has also carefully avoided talking about what comes next, claiming that it is up to Ukrainians to decide what is in their best interest. But maintaining that position is becoming more difficult now that Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on the war and made blatant nuclear threats against the West. Putin has chosen to take significant new risks rather than to back down, suggesting that this war will not end through simple Russian capitulation. Though these risks seem manageable for now, the time may come when negotiations are necessary to forestall catastrophe.
At the same time, the economic fallout of the war is rapidly growing. In Ukraine, public finances have been ravaged; the country is running out of cash. As the economic historian Adam Tooze put it in September, “Unless Ukraine’s allies step up their financial assistance, there is every reason to fear both a social and a political crisis on the home front.” Europe, meanwhile, is trapped in its own tightening noose, as surging energy prices exacerbate inflation and raise the prospect of a deep recession. All this makes the administration’s position—that Kyiv alone will decide when the war ends—increasingly untenable.
In reality, the question is not whether negotiations are needed to end the war but when and how they should unfold. Yet policymakers must contend with a catch-22: the better Ukrainian forces perform on the battlefield, the more difficult it is to discuss a negotiated settlement, even though it is to Ukraine’s advantage to negotiate from a position of strength. As the risk of Russian escalation grows, so does the prospect that any Western leader who talks about ending the war will be portrayed as unrealistic, immoral, or caving to “nuclear blackmail.” But internal discussions on acceptable settlement terms now would better position all parties when the opportunity for such a deal does arise.
DURABLE, NOT MAXIMAL
To lay the groundwork for a settlement, American policymakers must act to ensure that Ukrainian, American, and European interests do not diverge. Ukrainian interests are not necessarily identical to those of its Western partners. For Kyiv, the stakes are higher, and—with the Ukrainian economy already in shambles—it may determine that it has little to lose in risking escalation or continuing the war. But Ukraine’s efforts are made possible by Western arms, funding, and intelligence. European states are bearing substantial economic costs from the war. And any risk of escalation or nuclear exchange poses a direct threat to the West itself. Ukraine’s Western backers have a strong stake in the war; they should have a say in how it ends.This does not mean that the West should push Ukraine to concede, as some have argued. But it does suggest that the United States and its partners should provide future aid with an eye to putting Ukraine in the best negotiating position, not simply continuing the war. For example, Ukraine and its allies must focus on core interests, such as preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting its population. These goals should be narrow by design: rather than trying to retake all of its pre-2014 territory or to punish Russian leaders, Ukraine should pursue objectives that are less likely to produce dramatic escalation and more likely to result in a durable peace. Washington should encourage pursuing those objectives, and should also make clear to Kyiv, at least in private, where the limits of American support lie and what the White House perceives as unacceptable escalation risks. Setting clear expectations now reduces the risk of misperception in Kyiv.
American policymakers must also consider Ukrainian and Russian domestic politics, since internal support in both countries will be vital to making any settlement last. History suggests that a power transition in Moscow is possible but by no means likely or inevitable. Thus, policymakers need to focus on Putin and the small group of elites around him and consider what settlement they might be willing to accept. Given Putin’s mobilization of several hundred thousand additional frontline troops, it seems increasingly clear that he will seek to avoid a complete, devastating loss at any cost. But like many other authoritarians before him, he can sell a poor result as a win. This means that it may be possible to find some face-saving deal in which de facto realities, such as Russian legal control of Crimea, could be recognized, and which the Kremlin could portray to the Russian public as genuine concessions by the West.
In Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a more open, contentious political environment, as the divisions of Ukrainian politics begin to reemerge. Nonetheless, he faces a similar dilemma. Ukraine’s population has become more unified since February, rallying around a national struggle against invasion. After asking so much of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian government will find it difficult to compromise in any way that seems to reward the enemy. If Zelensky accepts an unpopular settlement, it could lead to his defeat at the ballot box. In these circumstances, a deal in which Ukrainians feel that they have largely triumphed is more likely to succeed. This makes it all the more important to manage expectations now. Washington should encourage Kyiv to take a more moderate stance on issues, such as Crimea, that are likely to figure in a future settlement; to tone down triumphalist talk; and to emphasize the economic rewards that Ukraine stands to receive through international reconstruction aid and European economic integration under a settlement.
The Ukraine War Will End With Negotiations
Now is not the time for talks, but America must lay the groundwork.
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This entire made up war that did not have to happen is one of the stupidest wars in all history. The way they have refused to walk away and keep destroying their entire army, again, for a made up war is beyond belief. I can only think that it in part is Putin is operating in a bubble and nobody is telling him just how bad it really is out of fear. He is, ironically, a victim of his own propaganda machine he created.
Assuming we all don’t die in nuclear war, when this is all done and Russia is completely ruined financially and militarily, there will be conspiracies that this was all an elaborate trap created from within to go to war with what they thought was easy target that turned out was more than ready and quickly armed and proficient in using NATO weapons.
"Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Petr Fiala arrives in Kyiv A joint meeting of the Ukrainian and Czech governments will be held today in Kyiv."
I'm more cynical-I think Putin knows how bad things are but cannot back out because it will be the end of him. He is sacrificing his country to live longer.
Russian officers complain about equipment theft by soldiers
Russian officers are complaining about thefts of military equipment by their own soldiers in Ukraine: they’re steal thermal imagers and send them home, one officer said in an intercepted phone call shared by Ukrainian intelligence on Telegram on Oct. 30.
"Sweden will deliver more advanced weaponry to Ukraine as an illustration of its new defence policy, Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson announced on Sunday.
Sweden is to support Kyiv more actively in its war against Russia, Jonson, from the Moderate party, said in an interview with Dagens Nyheter on Sunday. “My first bilateral meeting was with [Ukrainian] Defence Minister Oleksej Reznikov,” he added.
The Swedish government has not yet specified which advanced weapons Sweden will send, but the Christian Democrats’ defence policy spokesman Mikael Oscarsson previously highlighted two weapon systems as two of the most relevant: the Air defence missile 70 and the Archer system.
The Air defence missile 70 is a lightweight missile system that is “small and easy to move around,” according to the Swedish Armed Forces, and the Archer system is a Swedish self-propelled gun on wheels.
According to Jonson, these declarations illustrate the three priorities put forward by the new Swedish government last week, all linked to the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson’s three general policy declarations are the war in Ukraine, rapid investment in Sweden’s defence, and Sweden’s NATO application.
Kristersson mentioned NATO eleven times in his government statement and promised to complete the accession process together with Finland.
The Swedish announcement to send more heavy weapons to Ukraine happened at a moment when some voices were raised in the US, NATO’s lead country, in discussing military support for Ukraine, which could be challenged if the Republicans win the majority after the 8 November midterm elections."
Sweden to finally send advanced weapons to Ukraine
www.euractiv.com
Pretty interesting article...I think the bolded is what's going to cause a rift in the coming months.
In the eight months since the Russian invasion, the Biden administration’s support has allowed Ukraine to retake territory and inflict heavy damage on Russian forces while keeping the risk of large-scale escalation relatively low. The administration has also carefully avoided talking about what comes next, claiming that it is up to Ukrainians to decide what is in their best interest. But maintaining that position is becoming more difficult now that Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on the war and made blatant nuclear threats against the West. Putin has chosen to take significant new risks rather than to back down, suggesting that this war will not end through simple Russian capitulation. Though these risks seem manageable for now, the time may come when negotiations are necessary to forestall catastrophe.
At the same time, the economic fallout of the war is rapidly growing. In Ukraine, public finances have been ravaged; the country is running out of cash. As the economic historian Adam Tooze put it in September, “Unless Ukraine’s allies step up their financial assistance, there is every reason to fear both a social and a political crisis on the home front.” Europe, meanwhile, is trapped in its own tightening noose, as surging energy prices exacerbate inflation and raise the prospect of a deep recession. All this makes the administration’s position—that Kyiv alone will decide when the war ends—increasingly untenable.
In reality, the question is not whether negotiations are needed to end the war but when and how they should unfold. Yet policymakers must contend with a catch-22: the better Ukrainian forces perform on the battlefield, the more difficult it is to discuss a negotiated settlement, even though it is to Ukraine’s advantage to negotiate from a position of strength. As the risk of Russian escalation grows, so does the prospect that any Western leader who talks about ending the war will be portrayed as unrealistic, immoral, or caving to “nuclear blackmail.” But internal discussions on acceptable settlement terms now would better position all parties when the opportunity for such a deal does arise.
DURABLE, NOT MAXIMAL
To lay the groundwork for a settlement, American policymakers must act to ensure that Ukrainian, American, and European interests do not diverge. Ukrainian interests are not necessarily identical to those of its Western partners. For Kyiv, the stakes are higher, and—with the Ukrainian economy already in shambles—it may determine that it has little to lose in risking escalation or continuing the war. But Ukraine’s efforts are made possible by Western arms, funding, and intelligence. European states are bearing substantial economic costs from the war. And any risk of escalation or nuclear exchange poses a direct threat to the West itself. Ukraine’s Western backers have a strong stake in the war; they should have a say in how it ends.
This does not mean that the West should push Ukraine to concede, as some have argued. But it does suggest that the United States and its partners should provide future aid with an eye to putting Ukraine in the best negotiating position, not simply continuing the war. For example, Ukraine and its allies must focus on core interests, such as preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting its population. These goals should be narrow by design: rather than trying to retake all of its pre-2014 territory or to punish Russian leaders, Ukraine should pursue objectives that are less likely to produce dramatic escalation and more likely to result in a durable peace. Washington should encourage pursuing those objectives, and should also make clear to Kyiv, at least in private, where the limits of American support lie and what the White House perceives as unacceptable escalation risks. Setting clear expectations now reduces the risk of misperception in Kyiv.
American policymakers must also consider Ukrainian and Russian domestic politics, since internal support in both countries will be vital to making any settlement last. History suggests that a power transition in Moscow is possible but by no means likely or inevitable. Thus, policymakers need to focus on Putin and the small group of elites around him and consider what settlement they might be willing to accept. Given Putin’s mobilization of several hundred thousand additional frontline troops, it seems increasingly clear that he will seek to avoid a complete, devastating loss at any cost. But like many other authoritarians before him, he can sell a poor result as a win. This means that it may be possible to find some face-saving deal in which de facto realities, such as Russian legal control of Crimea, could be recognized, and which the Kremlin could portray to the Russian public as genuine concessions by the West.
In Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a more open, contentious political environment, as the divisions of Ukrainian politics begin to reemerge. Nonetheless, he faces a similar dilemma. Ukraine’s population has become more unified since February, rallying around a national struggle against invasion. After asking so much of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian government will find it difficult to compromise in any way that seems to reward the enemy. If Zelensky accepts an unpopular settlement, it could lead to his defeat at the ballot box. In these circumstances, a deal in which Ukrainians feel that they have largely triumphed is more likely to succeed. This makes it all the more important to manage expectations now. Washington should encourage Kyiv to take a more moderate stance on issues, such as Crimea, that are likely to figure in a future settlement; to tone down triumphalist talk; and to emphasize the economic rewards that Ukraine stands to receive through international reconstruction aid and European economic integration under a settlement.
The Ukraine War Will End With Negotiations
Now is not the time for talks, but America must lay the groundwork.
If Ukraine gives concessions to end the war it should be accompanied by them being brought into the NATO fold immediately so that Russia doesn't use the peace as a temporary ceasefire in order to re-arm itself and invade again.
And honestly Ukraine should probably get it's hands on a few nukes.
Link?
Seriously, ever notice ‘regime change’ doesn’t seem to go the way we intend, or hope?
Ben Hodges, who served as commanding general of the United States Army Europe, told Express.co.uk that it may be better if Putin does remain Russian president.
Mr Hodges argues that, while Putin has a track record of extreme aggression, someone even more violent could replace him should be removed from power.
The military expert said: "There is no shortage of super-hawk right-wing nationalists in Russia who are completely in sync with what Putin says, which is why I personally don't advocate for regime change because you never know who is coming up behind him.”
Navel gazing over that form of Russian Roulette is pretty crazy.
Sure. Russia has no reason to downplay the casualties same as Ukraine had no reason to use the highest estimate....
It's not my quote - putin said it. It's a fact. Stop arguing it, you're wrong. End of discussion.
Wouldn't be surprised. Firearms and cartridge design is one arena where tech isn't all that different now vs early 1900s.
They are not estimates of the same category, which was the point. Ukraine releases estimates of KIAs, not total deaths, because once the wounded leave the battlefield, they cannot track what happens to most of the wounded. Everything I have read indicates that Ukraine does not count the merely wounded as KIA; I posted links to this effect what is now probably several hundred pages ago.
Finland's National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) said it has received preliminary information that criminals in Finland might have captured military arms, such as assault rifles, meant for Ukrainian forces.
"Weapons shipped [by various countries] to Ukraine have also been found in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands," NBI Detective Superintendent Christer Ahlgren told Yle.
International media outlets have reported that the European law enforcement agency Europol has anticipated criminal gangs stashing weapons in border areas. This past summer Europol issued a statement warning that the proliferation of firearms and explosives in Ukraine could lead to an increase in firearms and munitions trafficked into the EU via established smuggling routes or online platforms.
"We've seen signs of these weapons already finding their way to Finland," Ahlgren said.
The NBI has not released more details about weapons trafficked to Finland, saying that investigations are ongoing.
The routes and contacts for trafficking illegal weapons from Ukraine to Finland are, however, already in place, according to Ahlgren.
"Three of the world's largest motorcycle gangs—that are part of larger international organisations—are active in Finland. One of these is Bandidos MC, which has a unit in every major Ukrainian city," he explained. "We know that contacts and routes are being warmed up, so that they're in place."
Since the war in Yugoslavia, Balkan countries have dealt with illegal arms trafficking.
"Ukraine has received a large volume of weapons and that's good, but we're going to be dealing with these arms for decades and pay the price here," Ahlgren said.
"Weapons shipped [by various countries] to Ukraine have also been found in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands," NBI Detective Superintendent Christer Ahlgren told Yle.
International media outlets have reported that the European law enforcement agency Europol has anticipated criminal gangs stashing weapons in border areas. This past summer Europol issued a statement warning that the proliferation of firearms and explosives in Ukraine could lead to an increase in firearms and munitions trafficked into the EU via established smuggling routes or online platforms.
"We've seen signs of these weapons already finding their way to Finland," Ahlgren said.
The NBI has not released more details about weapons trafficked to Finland, saying that investigations are ongoing.
The routes and contacts for trafficking illegal weapons from Ukraine to Finland are, however, already in place, according to Ahlgren.
"Three of the world's largest motorcycle gangs—that are part of larger international organisations—are active in Finland. One of these is Bandidos MC, which has a unit in every major Ukrainian city," he explained. "We know that contacts and routes are being warmed up, so that they're in place."
Since the war in Yugoslavia, Balkan countries have dealt with illegal arms trafficking.
"Ukraine has received a large volume of weapons and that's good, but we're going to be dealing with these arms for decades and pay the price here," Ahlgren said.
Does Russia have the forces to stop the convoy? Getting too close to Ukraine and they'd get pounded. Plus, it's kind of direct for them to intervene with the transit of the convoy with forces under the Russian flag. My guess is a bunch of mines are going to be deployed. We need to be watching for their ships to be out in the traffic lanes.
Russia loses 6,000 units of equipment, suffering from lack of spare parts — NYT
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost 6,000 units of equipment and is expending munitions at such a rate that it cannot restock, the New YorkTimes reported on Oct. 14, citing a recent U.S. government report.
english.nv.ua
- Sep 13, 2002
- 99,604
- 209,635
- 113
I understand the fears but still feel that Russians should feel some of this type of pain-lack of power and water.
