This might be a little tougher than Putin thought...
- Thread starter Nole Lou
- Start date
- Sep 13, 2002
- 96,607
- 199,187
- 113
The presence of Western special forces in Ukraine has been the subject of quiet speculation for more than a year. But it's never been confirmed, until now.
The US Department of Defense is still dealing with the consequences of one of the largest leaks of classified material in recent years, most of it relating to the war in Ukraine.
The documents, some marked "top secret", paint a detailed picture of the war, including highly sensitive details of Ukraine's preparations for a spring counter-offensive against Russian forces.
It says that the UK is among a number of countries with special forces operating in Ukraine. According to the document, dated 23 March, the UK has the largest contingent (50), followed by Latvia (17), France (15), the US (14) and the Netherlands (1).
The document does not say where the forces are located or what they're doing.
The numbers of personnel may be small, and will doubtless fluctuate. But special forces are by their very nature highly effective. Their presence in Ukraine is likely to be seized upon by Moscow, which has in recent months argued that it is not just confronting Ukraine, but Nato as well.
In line with its standard policy on such matters, the UK's Ministry of Defence has not commented, but in a tweet on Tuesday said the leak of alleged classified information had demonstrated what it called a "serious level of inaccuracy".
"Readers should be cautious about taking at face value allegations that have the potential to spread misinformation," it said.
It didn't elaborate, or suggest which specific documents it was referring to. However, Pentagon officials are quoted as saying the documents are real.
One document, which detailed the number of casualties suffered in Ukraine on both sides, did appear to have been doctored.
UK special forces are made up of several elite military units with distinct areas of expertise, and are regarded to be among the most capable in the world.
The British government has a policy of not commenting on its special forces, in contrast to other countries including the US.
The UK has been vociferous in its support of Ukraine, and is the second largest donor after the US of military aid to Kyiv.
www.bbc.com
The US Department of Defense is still dealing with the consequences of one of the largest leaks of classified material in recent years, most of it relating to the war in Ukraine.
The documents, some marked "top secret", paint a detailed picture of the war, including highly sensitive details of Ukraine's preparations for a spring counter-offensive against Russian forces.
It says that the UK is among a number of countries with special forces operating in Ukraine. According to the document, dated 23 March, the UK has the largest contingent (50), followed by Latvia (17), France (15), the US (14) and the Netherlands (1).
The document does not say where the forces are located or what they're doing.
The numbers of personnel may be small, and will doubtless fluctuate. But special forces are by their very nature highly effective. Their presence in Ukraine is likely to be seized upon by Moscow, which has in recent months argued that it is not just confronting Ukraine, but Nato as well.
In line with its standard policy on such matters, the UK's Ministry of Defence has not commented, but in a tweet on Tuesday said the leak of alleged classified information had demonstrated what it called a "serious level of inaccuracy".
"Readers should be cautious about taking at face value allegations that have the potential to spread misinformation," it said.
It didn't elaborate, or suggest which specific documents it was referring to. However, Pentagon officials are quoted as saying the documents are real.
One document, which detailed the number of casualties suffered in Ukraine on both sides, did appear to have been doctored.
UK special forces are made up of several elite military units with distinct areas of expertise, and are regarded to be among the most capable in the world.
The British government has a policy of not commenting on its special forces, in contrast to other countries including the US.
The UK has been vociferous in its support of Ukraine, and is the second largest donor after the US of military aid to Kyiv.
Ukraine war: Leak shows Western special forces on the ground
The UK has the largest contingent of military special forces in Ukraine, according to a leaked file.
www.bbc.com
Figures....incel nerds
www.theguardian.com
Pentagon leak traced to video game chat group users arguing over war in Ukraine
Analysis suggests top-secret documents were first shared on closed gamer chatrooms hosted by Discord
Just want to add that the presence of the special forces could be one of the things that may have been altered in the documents. It soothes Russia's ego if they are losing against NATO and not UkraineThe presence of Western special forces in Ukraine has been the subject of quiet speculation for more than a year. But it's never been confirmed, until now.
The US Department of Defense is still dealing with the consequences of one of the largest leaks of classified material in recent years, most of it relating to the war in Ukraine.
The documents, some marked "top secret", paint a detailed picture of the war, including highly sensitive details of Ukraine's preparations for a spring counter-offensive against Russian forces.
It says that the UK is among a number of countries with special forces operating in Ukraine. According to the document, dated 23 March, the UK has the largest contingent (50), followed by Latvia (17), France (15), the US (14) and the Netherlands (1).
The document does not say where the forces are located or what they're doing.
The numbers of personnel may be small, and will doubtless fluctuate. But special forces are by their very nature highly effective. Their presence in Ukraine is likely to be seized upon by Moscow, which has in recent months argued that it is not just confronting Ukraine, but Nato as well.
In line with its standard policy on such matters, the UK's Ministry of Defence has not commented, but in a tweet on Tuesday said the leak of alleged classified information had demonstrated what it called a "serious level of inaccuracy".
"Readers should be cautious about taking at face value allegations that have the potential to spread misinformation," it said.
It didn't elaborate, or suggest which specific documents it was referring to. However, Pentagon officials are quoted as saying the documents are real.
One document, which detailed the number of casualties suffered in Ukraine on both sides, did appear to have been doctored.
UK special forces are made up of several elite military units with distinct areas of expertise, and are regarded to be among the most capable in the world.
The British government has a policy of not commenting on its special forces, in contrast to other countries including the US.
The UK has been vociferous in its support of Ukraine, and is the second largest donor after the US of military aid to Kyiv.
Ukraine war: Leak shows Western special forces on the ground
The UK has the largest contingent of military special forces in Ukraine, according to a leaked file.
Maybe. The concern expressed about the leaks across multiple governments including our own kind of points to a lot of factual stuff being leaked. Any way you cut it it ain’t good…Just want to add that the presence of the special forces could be one of the things that may have been altered in the documents. It soothes Russia's ego if they are losing against NATO and not Ukraine
- Sep 13, 2002
- 96,607
- 199,187
- 113
I do find the timing of the "leak" suspect, though.
If you were going to try to flood the zone with confusing disinformation right before a planned offensive, what better way to do so than this?
Mix in a little real, factual intelligence (that isn't super sensitive) with a bunch of bullshit and contribute to the fog of war before launching the offensive.
I dunno. I hope you’re right. Sure seems like this is an intelligence disaster, and whoever did it is a traitor.
Hopefully…I find that a little too Machiavellian to be believable though.
Just hope the Ukrainians running low on SAM’s is BS.
Look at the Int’l Math Olympiad for that answer.
I’d just as soon watch MSDNCIA than read the KI.
Russia’s performance really dropped off a cliff. Sad.
‘They’re starting to die’: fears Ukraine’s drone supremacy may soon be over | Ukraine | The Guardian
Frontline drone operators say Russia is close to countering their most popular models – setting off a race to find replacements
Dubai and Russia are butt buddies. If you've ever been to Dubai and don't run into a Russian who looks like a goon or spot a Russian hooker, you're either not trying or have visual issues. So it's no surprise UAE colludes with Russia. Dubai launders Russian cash.
The Germans fell for Patton,s inflatable ghost army in the lead up to D-Day. I think they were considerably smarter than today’s Russian military.
FIFYFigures....Racist, incel nerds
Pentagon leak traced to video game chat group users arguing over war in Ukraine
Analysis suggests top-secret documents were first shared on closed gamer chatrooms hosted by Discord
The leak is bad no matter what, but there is a lot of chatter that this came from a contractor. Again, the leak is bad no matter where it came from, but there had better be some hides tacked to a wall over this.
Look at the arm on this guy,
Dude is a legit imbecile.
"Native American volunteer in service of ZSU. He is from the Blackfeet Tribe. The drawing on his RPG means his arrows always fly straight."
"The special train of the railway force of the Western Military District." (New version)
We're gonna learn about the actual situation in this war in the next few weeks....a lot is riding on the expected Ukrainian offensive. Supposedly the ground should be ready for a offensive in the south of the country about now....in the north in a week or two.
CNN —
The highly classified leaked Pentagon documents posted to social media offer a pessimistic US viewpoint about the state of the war in Ukraine, highlighting weaknesses in Ukraine’s weaponry and air defenses and predicting a stalemate in the war for months to come.
The documents, which appear to date from February and March, detail many of Ukraine’s perceived military shortfalls as Kyiv prepares for a spring counteroffensive against Russia.
Several of the classified documents warn that Ukraine’s medium-range air defenses to protect front-line troops will be “completely reduced by May 23,” suggesting Russia could soon have aerial superiority and Ukraine could lose the ability to amass ground forces in a counteroffensive.
The documents also underscore lingering problems with Russia’s own military offensive, predicting that the result will be a stalemate between the two sides for the foreseeable future.
“Russia’s grinding campaign of attrition in the Donbas region is likely heading toward a stalemate, thwarting Moscow’s goal to capture the entire region in 2023,” states one of the classified documents.
CNN —
The highly classified leaked Pentagon documents posted to social media offer a pessimistic US viewpoint about the state of the war in Ukraine, highlighting weaknesses in Ukraine’s weaponry and air defenses and predicting a stalemate in the war for months to come.
The documents, which appear to date from February and March, detail many of Ukraine’s perceived military shortfalls as Kyiv prepares for a spring counteroffensive against Russia.
Several of the classified documents warn that Ukraine’s medium-range air defenses to protect front-line troops will be “completely reduced by May 23,” suggesting Russia could soon have aerial superiority and Ukraine could lose the ability to amass ground forces in a counteroffensive.
The documents also underscore lingering problems with Russia’s own military offensive, predicting that the result will be a stalemate between the two sides for the foreseeable future.
“Russia’s grinding campaign of attrition in the Donbas region is likely heading toward a stalemate, thwarting Moscow’s goal to capture the entire region in 2023,” states one of the classified documents.
Continuing my Debbie Downer binge (I'm starting to get pessimistic about this war )
General Sir Richard Barrons is a former commander of the British Joint Forces Command and is now chairman of the defense and security company, Universal Defense & Security Solutions.
He spoke to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about the constraints on both sides of Russia's war on Ukraine, the importance of industrial transformation in a drawn-out conflict, and offered a bleak forecast for the course of the war.
RFE/RL: What have we learned after one year of warfare in Ukraine? And where are we now?
Sir Richard Barrons: There are some lessons at a very high level, particularly for Europe. And the first of those is that we haven't somehow grown out of fighting in a way that some people wanted to believe at the end of the Cold War in 1990. And we're being reminded by the war in Ukraine that war is part of the human existence. And even if you would prefer it was not so, there is no guaranteed immunity from it. And as [Prussian] General von Clausewitz says, "You may not choose war, but war can choose you." And when it occurs, it is the same brutal, feral, dangerous, usually disappointing business it has been for millennia. And yet, at least once a generation, we feel the need to reacquaint ourselves with that thought.
And the second thing it has reminded us [of] is that big wars -- and the war in Ukraine is a big war -- are fought, won, and lost by civilians, as the war becomes not something that is just conducted by the professional, regular armed forces in the way Western armies principally took part in Iraq and Afghanistan and Balkan interventions in the 1990s. These big wars, where the survival of the state is at stake, which is the case in Ukraine, are fought by citizens who are mobilized and industry that is mobilized. And you can see that actually now, on both sides, in this war in Ukraine, that it's being fought by Ukrainian citizens who a year ago, in many cases less than a year ago, were teachers, nurses, mechanics, whatever; and increasingly, on the Russian side, the manpower is being mobilized from civil society. So again, people who were not professional soldiers.
RFE/RL: And if the tactics of the private Wagner mercenary group are employed, people who were not professional soldiers, but professional criminals.
Barrons: Yes. And that is a feature that is important to the Russian effort -- that there is a mixture of the Russian armed forces, increasingly mobilized civilians, and the Wagner Group, which has this extraordinary role in this war of a private enterprise mobilizing prisoners and mercenaries to fight alongside the Russian armed forces. And indeed, now they are locked in a competition about who is succeeding and who is failing, and actually who is to blame for failing. And you don't see that on the Ukrainian side.
And I think the third thing we're being reacquainted with is there is no logical rule that says these wars either have to be definitively successful for one or other party, or quick. And what we're essentially seeing playing out in Ukraine is not just a big war but a long war where, despite the aspirations of both sides and despite everyone's preference for this to be done and over, the dynamics of it suggest, first of all, a long fight because neither side has won, neither side has lost, neither side is anywhere close to giving up. So, there's a lot of fighting to come at the cost of terrible destruction. But the most likely outcome is one of exhaustion and stalemate followed by profound disagreement for as long as you can imagine. And we may be staring at an outcome where you can't count [on] the war as being over for decades.
RFE/RL: That's an even bleaker prediction than the earlier one of yours, when you said that this war might last until 2025. And if indeed, we need to be bracing ourselves for such a long war, let me ask you whose side is time on strategically?
Barrons: The question of who prevails is one of choice. From the Western perspective, it has always been absolutely clear that Ukraine can be supported to achieve an outcome that Ukraine is content with, provided the West mobilizes a relatively small fraction of its money and its industry. Because Ukraine wins, or prevails, or at least it doesn't lose, so long as it is connected to money, at about $6 billion a month, and [the] Western defense industry to supply the weapons and ammunition and other equipment and stores that Ukraine needs to equip a mobilized society with. And if the West continues to choose to provide that support -- and let's be absolutely clear, that support is a very small fraction of the economic power of the West, so it is a matter of choice -- yes, there's a cost. But it's a very small percentage of the economic wealth of the West. If the West does that and Ukraine retains the will to fight, it can keep fighting.
From the Russian perspective, well, Russia is mobilizing its society more and more and reenergizing its defense industry, which employs around 2 million people. So, it's a very big enterprise. And Russia believes that it has the money, the will, and the social control, and the industry to outlast the West's will to continue.
And no one really knows the outcome of that. The one thing that would be a game changer now, in all sorts of ways, given that both sides are short of equipment, because of losses, and both sides are very short of ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, because of the rate of use and the time it will take to ramp up production -- so a lag of a year or two is going to apply to both the way the West supports Ukraine and the way Russia drives up its own industry.
The one thing that would change things in the short term would be China and/or India connecting the Russian Armed Forces to their stocks of ammunition -- the things that already exist. Because that would energize the Russian military with ammunition that the West simply can't match in the time that we're talking about. And that is wholly dangerous, because were that to occur, it takes you to a much higher prospect of the West having to engage in the fighting, because reenergized Russian forces start to break through in a way that would be very disconcerting. And it also, of course, cements this idea that the war in Ukraine, which is a war between Russia and Ukraine, is actually a proxy conflict between liberal democracy in the West and autocratic capitalism, led by Russia and China but actually led by China, increasingly followed by Russia. And were that to be become amplified in Ukraine, then I don't see any way in which that makes our world safer, better, or more prosperous.
Continued at
www.rferl.org
)General Sir Richard Barrons is a former commander of the British Joint Forces Command and is now chairman of the defense and security company, Universal Defense & Security Solutions.
He spoke to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about the constraints on both sides of Russia's war on Ukraine, the importance of industrial transformation in a drawn-out conflict, and offered a bleak forecast for the course of the war.
RFE/RL: What have we learned after one year of warfare in Ukraine? And where are we now?
Sir Richard Barrons: There are some lessons at a very high level, particularly for Europe. And the first of those is that we haven't somehow grown out of fighting in a way that some people wanted to believe at the end of the Cold War in 1990. And we're being reminded by the war in Ukraine that war is part of the human existence. And even if you would prefer it was not so, there is no guaranteed immunity from it. And as [Prussian] General von Clausewitz says, "You may not choose war, but war can choose you." And when it occurs, it is the same brutal, feral, dangerous, usually disappointing business it has been for millennia. And yet, at least once a generation, we feel the need to reacquaint ourselves with that thought.
And the second thing it has reminded us [of] is that big wars -- and the war in Ukraine is a big war -- are fought, won, and lost by civilians, as the war becomes not something that is just conducted by the professional, regular armed forces in the way Western armies principally took part in Iraq and Afghanistan and Balkan interventions in the 1990s. These big wars, where the survival of the state is at stake, which is the case in Ukraine, are fought by citizens who are mobilized and industry that is mobilized. And you can see that actually now, on both sides, in this war in Ukraine, that it's being fought by Ukrainian citizens who a year ago, in many cases less than a year ago, were teachers, nurses, mechanics, whatever; and increasingly, on the Russian side, the manpower is being mobilized from civil society. So again, people who were not professional soldiers.
RFE/RL: And if the tactics of the private Wagner mercenary group are employed, people who were not professional soldiers, but professional criminals.
Barrons: Yes. And that is a feature that is important to the Russian effort -- that there is a mixture of the Russian armed forces, increasingly mobilized civilians, and the Wagner Group, which has this extraordinary role in this war of a private enterprise mobilizing prisoners and mercenaries to fight alongside the Russian armed forces. And indeed, now they are locked in a competition about who is succeeding and who is failing, and actually who is to blame for failing. And you don't see that on the Ukrainian side.
And I think the third thing we're being reacquainted with is there is no logical rule that says these wars either have to be definitively successful for one or other party, or quick. And what we're essentially seeing playing out in Ukraine is not just a big war but a long war where, despite the aspirations of both sides and despite everyone's preference for this to be done and over, the dynamics of it suggest, first of all, a long fight because neither side has won, neither side has lost, neither side is anywhere close to giving up. So, there's a lot of fighting to come at the cost of terrible destruction. But the most likely outcome is one of exhaustion and stalemate followed by profound disagreement for as long as you can imagine. And we may be staring at an outcome where you can't count [on] the war as being over for decades.
RFE/RL: That's an even bleaker prediction than the earlier one of yours, when you said that this war might last until 2025. And if indeed, we need to be bracing ourselves for such a long war, let me ask you whose side is time on strategically?
Barrons: The question of who prevails is one of choice. From the Western perspective, it has always been absolutely clear that Ukraine can be supported to achieve an outcome that Ukraine is content with, provided the West mobilizes a relatively small fraction of its money and its industry. Because Ukraine wins, or prevails, or at least it doesn't lose, so long as it is connected to money, at about $6 billion a month, and [the] Western defense industry to supply the weapons and ammunition and other equipment and stores that Ukraine needs to equip a mobilized society with. And if the West continues to choose to provide that support -- and let's be absolutely clear, that support is a very small fraction of the economic power of the West, so it is a matter of choice -- yes, there's a cost. But it's a very small percentage of the economic wealth of the West. If the West does that and Ukraine retains the will to fight, it can keep fighting.
From the Russian perspective, well, Russia is mobilizing its society more and more and reenergizing its defense industry, which employs around 2 million people. So, it's a very big enterprise. And Russia believes that it has the money, the will, and the social control, and the industry to outlast the West's will to continue.
And no one really knows the outcome of that. The one thing that would be a game changer now, in all sorts of ways, given that both sides are short of equipment, because of losses, and both sides are very short of ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, because of the rate of use and the time it will take to ramp up production -- so a lag of a year or two is going to apply to both the way the West supports Ukraine and the way Russia drives up its own industry.
The one thing that would change things in the short term would be China and/or India connecting the Russian Armed Forces to their stocks of ammunition -- the things that already exist. Because that would energize the Russian military with ammunition that the West simply can't match in the time that we're talking about. And that is wholly dangerous, because were that to occur, it takes you to a much higher prospect of the West having to engage in the fighting, because reenergized Russian forces start to break through in a way that would be very disconcerting. And it also, of course, cements this idea that the war in Ukraine, which is a war between Russia and Ukraine, is actually a proxy conflict between liberal democracy in the West and autocratic capitalism, led by Russia and China but actually led by China, increasingly followed by Russia. And were that to be become amplified in Ukraine, then I don't see any way in which that makes our world safer, better, or more prosperous.
Continued at
British General Says Ukraine War Could Last For 'Decades'
A former commander of the British Joint Forces Command who advises and lectures on defense and security issues, General Sir Richard Barrons, talks about tactics, industrial mobilization, and how, depending on Ukrainian and Western choices, the war could last for many, many years.
www.rferl.org
cont....
RFE/RL: On a Ukrainian counteroffensive then, and let me lump three short questions in one here: When to expect it, what to expect, and what would be realistic war goals for Ukraine?
Barrons: I think the first point on the Ukrainian offensive is [that] how powerful it is will partly be dictated by how much loss has been sustained in breaking up the Russian offensive. And what we've begun to see among Ukrainians is weariness among Ukrainian soldiers who have been fighting in some cases for six months without relief; every day they've gone to fight, they've defeated the Russians, but they had the thought "I've got to come back tomorrow," and they've seen many of their friends die and be injured in this process….
And the question is: How big are they, how good are they, and have they got enough stuff? And no one knows the answer to that question.
But what we would expect to see is a Ukrainian counteroffensive when they judge the Russian offensive is exhausted and when the current thaw is over, and the ground has hardened up again. So, I think this takes you into April and probably May before you could maneuver without being taken prisoner by the mud.
And when that offensive occurs, one of the interesting features is where does it occur…. Wherever they look now, they are looking at quite well-defended Russian positions, and in some places they would be fighting for territory that belongs to Ukraine but where the people who are there now are either ambivalent or want to be Russian.
And that is an important consideration and obviously a very difficult one. And we also know that the quantity of Western equipment that has been provided so far -- an enormous amount of equipment has been provided in the early months of this year, but it is not in numbers that would enable us to equip the entire Ukrainian Army or allow them to fight and endure.
So, we might expect the Ukrainian military to inflict some defeat on the Russian occupation, but it would be a major leap of faith to judge that it would be good enough to throw the whole Russian occupation out this year. And more likely, a Ukrainian counteroffensive will make a difference, but it won't end the Russian occupation.
RFE/RL: That rules out any chances of retrieving Crimea in the scope of this counteroffensive?
Barrons: I think in terms of the counteroffensive we expect to see in 2023, Crimea would be a very difficult objective because accessing it is hard. It's surrounded by sea in many places and there are only two roads that lead into Crimea. The Russians have assembled at least two lines of defense, and they've had since 2014 to take charge of Crimea, to prepare it for defense, and indeed to populate it with people who are inclined to support Russia. So, it is hard to imagine a successful Ukrainian offense into Crimea in 2023.
It is equally impossible to imagine that Ukraine would start saying that they will give up Crimea. Because in the middle of a war like this, you are never going to make a concession like that. And only time and circumstances will dictate whether removing Russia from Crimea is or is not actually achievable at a price that Ukraine is prepared to pay, bearing in mind the degree of Western support that it would also require. This is a very difficult issue, and I doubt it will be resolved in 2023.
RFE/RL: On Western military assistance: What does Ukraine need for a successful war effort, and will they be getting it?
Barrons: In terms of the equipment, Ukraine needs the conventional military tools to defeat what will be, I think, quite effective Russian defense. And we know that when you are on the defense, you should anticipate -- if you're good at your job -- defeating an attacking force that is three to even seven times larger.
So, Ukraine knows when they go on the offense, the problem is much greater. So, they need artillery; and above all, they need artillery with enough range, precision, and ammunition not just to fight today but for months to come. And currently they have some of that equipment and some ammunition, but simply because the production does not yet exist, [it is] hard to see that they have enough to prevail.
RFE/RL: On a Ukrainian counteroffensive then, and let me lump three short questions in one here: When to expect it, what to expect, and what would be realistic war goals for Ukraine?
Barrons: I think the first point on the Ukrainian offensive is [that] how powerful it is will partly be dictated by how much loss has been sustained in breaking up the Russian offensive. And what we've begun to see among Ukrainians is weariness among Ukrainian soldiers who have been fighting in some cases for six months without relief; every day they've gone to fight, they've defeated the Russians, but they had the thought "I've got to come back tomorrow," and they've seen many of their friends die and be injured in this process….
It would be interesting to know whether the losses in defeating the Russian offensive have depleted the ability for the Ukrainian side to go on the offensive. However, it is also clear that Ukraine very thoughtfully has kept good forces out of defeating the Russian offensive to train and equip them.
And the question is: How big are they, how good are they, and have they got enough stuff? And no one knows the answer to that question.
But what we would expect to see is a Ukrainian counteroffensive when they judge the Russian offensive is exhausted and when the current thaw is over, and the ground has hardened up again. So, I think this takes you into April and probably May before you could maneuver without being taken prisoner by the mud.
And when that offensive occurs, one of the interesting features is where does it occur…. Wherever they look now, they are looking at quite well-defended Russian positions, and in some places they would be fighting for territory that belongs to Ukraine but where the people who are there now are either ambivalent or want to be Russian.
And that is an important consideration and obviously a very difficult one. And we also know that the quantity of Western equipment that has been provided so far -- an enormous amount of equipment has been provided in the early months of this year, but it is not in numbers that would enable us to equip the entire Ukrainian Army or allow them to fight and endure.
So, we might expect the Ukrainian military to inflict some defeat on the Russian occupation, but it would be a major leap of faith to judge that it would be good enough to throw the whole Russian occupation out this year. And more likely, a Ukrainian counteroffensive will make a difference, but it won't end the Russian occupation.
RFE/RL: That rules out any chances of retrieving Crimea in the scope of this counteroffensive?
Barrons: I think in terms of the counteroffensive we expect to see in 2023, Crimea would be a very difficult objective because accessing it is hard. It's surrounded by sea in many places and there are only two roads that lead into Crimea. The Russians have assembled at least two lines of defense, and they've had since 2014 to take charge of Crimea, to prepare it for defense, and indeed to populate it with people who are inclined to support Russia. So, it is hard to imagine a successful Ukrainian offense into Crimea in 2023.
It is equally impossible to imagine that Ukraine would start saying that they will give up Crimea. Because in the middle of a war like this, you are never going to make a concession like that. And only time and circumstances will dictate whether removing Russia from Crimea is or is not actually achievable at a price that Ukraine is prepared to pay, bearing in mind the degree of Western support that it would also require. This is a very difficult issue, and I doubt it will be resolved in 2023.
RFE/RL: On Western military assistance: What does Ukraine need for a successful war effort, and will they be getting it?
Barrons: In terms of the equipment, Ukraine needs the conventional military tools to defeat what will be, I think, quite effective Russian defense. And we know that when you are on the defense, you should anticipate -- if you're good at your job -- defeating an attacking force that is three to even seven times larger.
So, Ukraine knows when they go on the offense, the problem is much greater. So, they need artillery; and above all, they need artillery with enough range, precision, and ammunition not just to fight today but for months to come. And currently they have some of that equipment and some ammunition, but simply because the production does not yet exist, [it is] hard to see that they have enough to prevail.
